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General Introduction
This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters. The unifying theme of these chapters
is their focus on understanding rural households’ decision making with regards to the adoption of
innovative technologies. In chapter 1, we study small-holder farmers’ adoption of improved agri-
cultural inputs in response to receiving access to such inputs. In chapters 2 and 3, we investigate
important demand and supply side factors in the provision of voluntary health insurance policies.
In chapter 2, I study the role of households’ social network in their demand decision. In chapter
3, we investigate the presence of adverse selection in a low-income health insurance market, its
potential welfare effects, and provide measures to mitigate such adverse effects. The following
paragraphs provide a brief summary of these chapters.
Chapter 1
Access and Adoption of Hybrid Seeds: Evidence from Uganda
This chapter was written during my research stay and internship with IDinsight. It is joint work
with Nikolaus Axmann, Kevin Keller, Kevin Leiby, Daniel Stein and Paul Wang. It has received
a Revise and Resubmit at the Journal of African Economies.
In this chapter, we focus on understanding the phenomenon of low adoption of improved agri-
cultural inputs among small-holder farmers across the African continent. Generally, the adoption
of such inputs is oftentimes hindered by a combination of both economic and behavioral fac-
tors such as a lack of market access, lack of information or trust in improved seeds, liquidity
constraints or present-biasedness. We conduct a field-experiment designed to overcome several
potential barriers to adoption of improved inputs. In particular, we measure the effect of offer-
ing hybrid maize seeds for purchase during a time when potential customers have high liquidity.
Working with a large buyer of agricultural commodities in Northern Uganda, we randomly offer
smallholder farmers the opportunity to purchase certified hybrid maize seeds at the same time as
they sell crops from a previous harvest in stores of this buyer. We find that 16% of those offered
purchase hybrid seeds, and that average adoption of hybrid maize among those offered increases
by 8 percentage points compared to a control group who does not receive the offer. Among those
who accept the offer, we see an increase in hybrid maize planting of 50 percentage points. This
1
effect is more pronounced for female farmers than for their male counterparts. Our findings sug-
gest that providing access to certified agricultural inputs at the place and time of post-harvest sales
is a promising strategy to increase input usage. At the same time, we find that adoption decisions
are inhibited by many factors that are not easily overcome, even when addressed simultaneously.
Chapter 2
Social Interaction Effects in the Demand for Low-Income Health
Insurance
In this chapter, I study the role of the social network in rural households’ decision to adopt an
innovative health insurance policy. Around the world, there is a growing interest to provide such
formal insurance policies to low-income households. To mitigate vulnerability to adverse health
shocks, insurance is oftentimes offered to pre-existing jointly liable credit groups. In this chapter,
I argue that it is not clear how expected choices in the social network affect insurance take-up. On
the one hand, social norms and conformity considerations might lead to similar behavior in the
group. On the other hand, externalities arising from being insured potentially create incentives to
free ride. Using data from a randomized control trial in Pakistan, I estimate a static simultaneous
move game of incomplete information that allows to estimate rational equilibrium expectations.
I find that a ten percentage point increase in peer expectations increases demand by 3.5 to 4.3
percentage points. Elasticity estimates suggest that this effect is comparable to a price decrease of
about 4.5 to 6 percent. These findings are driven by positive social interaction effects in individual
insurance policies that allow to insure any number and combination of dependents. In contrast,
for household policies in which all dependents need to be insured, positive and negative social
interaction effects seem to cancel out. These findings are in line with a reduced taste for confor-
mity due to higher prices to conform with expected peer choices and larger incentives to free ride
resulting from stronger externalities of other’s take-up.
Chapter 3
Adverse Selection in Low-Income Health Insurance Markets:
Evidence from a RCT in Pakistan
This chapter is joint work with Markus Frölich and Andreas Landmann.1
1 The studied experiment has received IRB approval at the University of Mannheim and is registered in the American
Economic Association (AEA) RCT Registry under the ID AEARCTR-0000604.
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In this chapter, we study supply side factors of the above insurance intervention. In particular,
the selection of high-risk individuals into the insurance pool is an often cited impediment for the
sustainability of such schemes. We provide robust evidence on the presence of adverse selection
from a large randomized control trial on health insurance in rural Pakistan. Our experimental setup
allows us to separate adverse selection from moral hazard, to estimate how selection changes at
different points of the demand curve and to test measures against adverse selection. The results
suggest that there is substantial adverse selection if health insurance coverage can be individually
assigned. In particular, adverse selection tends to become worse with higher premium prices,
creating a trade-off between cost recovery and the quality of the insurance pool. In contrast,
adverse selection is mitigated when bundling insurance policies at the household or higher levels.
Further analyses suggest that adverse selection in individual products has non-negligible welfare
consequences and that these are less pronounced in relative terms when bundling policies.
3
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Chapter 1
Access and Adoption of Hybrid Seeds:
Evidence from Uganda
1.1 Introduction
There is compelling evidence that hybrid seeds can significantly improve agricultural produc-
tion and reduce its variance compared to conventional seeds, thereby increasing and smoothing
farmers’ profit (Kathage et al., 2012; Mathenge et al., 2014; Suri, 2011; Jones et al., 2012; Harou
et al., 2017). Despite its proven merits, usage of hybrid seeds among smallholder farmers in
Africa is low (Nyangena and Juma, 2014).1 Many barriers to adoption of hybrid seed and other
agricultural inputs have been studied and include factors like liquidity constraints (Simtowe et al.,
2009; Carter et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014; Beaman et al., 2013), lack of information (Aker,
2011; Matsumoto et al., 2013), lack of access to markets (Karlan et al., 2014; Asfaw et al., 2016),
uncertainty (Bold et al., 2015; Emerick et al., 2016; Suri, 2011) and behavioral factors (Allcott
and Mullainathan, 2010; Brune et al., 2015; Taffesse and Tadesse, 2017; Duflo et al., 2011).
In this paper, we evaluate a randomized intervention that is designed to jointly relax several
constraints to adoption of hybrid seeds. In cooperation with the Gulu Agricultural Development
Company (GADC), an agribusiness operating in Northern Uganda, we randomly offer smallholder
farmers the opportunity to purchase a fixed quantity of certified hybrid maize seed at the time when
they sell crops from a previous harvest. This offer is made at stores run by GADC to farmers
who are visiting the store to sell crops, and the operational cost to the company is negligible.
Although hybrid seed is available for purchase at local markets, providing the opportunity to
purchase certified hybrid seeds at the point of sale helps overcome barriers related to access,
information, trust, cognitive biases and liquidity.
We find that 16% of farmers offered hybrid maize seed decide to purchase it. Farmers are more
1 Usage in this context is understood as the “actual application of that resource in productivity-producing outputs
[. . . ]”(Peterman et al., 2014)
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likely to accept this offer if the revenue they make from their post-harvest sale is larger, suggesting
that liquidity constraints play a particularly important role. In the following maize season, we find
that farmers offered hybrid maize seed are 8 percentage points more likely to plant a non-zero
amount of hybrid maize compared to an average of 20% of farmers planting hybrid seeds in the
control group (intention to treat, ITT estimator). Those farmers accepting the offer at baseline
increase hybrid maize planting by 50 percentage points (treatment on the treated, TOT estimator).
We find that the treatment effect on the adoption decision is stronger for female farmers, who
make up 45% of our sample.2 Females are slightly less likely to accept the offer to purchase hybrid
seeds, and the ITT treatment estimate for female farmers is higher than that for men. However,
neither of these differences are statistically significant. In the TOT specification, though, we find
a much higher and statistically significant effect for women: 100 percentage points versus 25
percentage points for men. This suggests among the “compliers” who choose to purchase the
seed, the effect on planting maize is much larger for women. While this study is not designed
to disentangle the underlying channel, the significantly larger TOT estimate for female farmers
suggests that female compliers would have been much less likely to purchase hybrid seeds in the
absence of the intervention, compared to their male counterparts.
The studied intervention is designed to overcome several of the barriers to higher adoption of
hybrid seeds at the same time. First, in Uganda (as in many places) there is limited access to
hybrid seeds. Although hybrid seeds are available at markets and agro-dealers in the area, farmers
frequently live far from these sources and only visit them infrequently. At endline, around 60% of
farmers who were not using hybrid seed state that they do not know where to purchase them. This
intervention reduces access costs for the intervention population (those selling crops to GADC)
by providing hybrid seeds for purchase at the same time and place of post-harvest sale, saving
farmers additional travel and search costs.
Even if farmers are able to access hybrid seeds, uncertainty about the quality of seeds might
hinder adoption. The quality of hybrid seeds is not observable, and potential buyers must trust
the seller. In fact, the prevalence of counterfeits in the Ugandan setting is shown to potentially
result in negative returns on adoption for farmers (Ashour et al., 2015; Bold et al., 2015).3 This
intervention mitigates such concerns by having GADC distribute the hybrid seeds. GADC is a
trusted institution in the area due to its history of purchasing agricultural products and providing
extension services. In our field-experiment, none of the farmers who declined to purchase hybrid
seeds lists a lack of trust of GADC as a reason.
Furthermore, an interplay of behavioral biases and liquidity constraints can prevent higher
adoption of improved inputs. Generally, the seasonal nature of farming results in a gap between
2 We define female farmers as women making the purchase of hybrid seeds at the time and point of sale. This does
not necessarily mean that these women are the head of the household, though.
3 It is well established that the marginal value of hybrid seeds depends on the complementary use of inorganic
fertilizer (Nyangena and Juma, 2014). While hybrid seeds have a positive effect on yield on their own, the effect is
substantially larger when combined with fertilizer.
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when a household receives harvest income and when it must purchase inputs for the next season.
Bridging this gap requires either pre-purchasing the inputs or saving, both of which can be difficult
for poor households. Brune et al. (2016) show that providing farmers access to commitment
savings accounts can increase spending on inputs, though the primary mechanism may be mental
accounting as opposed to the savings accounts themselves. Duflo et al. (2011) find that farmers’
low input usage is in line with a model of present-biased decision making that traps present-
biased farmers in a low investment low yield equilibrium. The authors offer small, time-limited
reductions in the cost of purchasing fertilizer (in the form of free delivery) at the time of harvest
to find fertilizer use increase by 47 to 70 percent. The intervention studied here - while not testing
explicitly for present biased decision making – adopts the general idea of jointly overcoming
present-biasedness and liquidity constraints in providing access to certified hybrid seeds at the
time of selling crops, when cash is more likely to be readily available.
A number of recent studies have shown that input usage is frequently lower for female farm-
ers in developing countries (Peterman et al., 2014; World Bank, 2015). This suggests that the
barriers to inputs listed above may be stronger for female farmers than their male counterparts
(Udry, 1996). Although our intervention is not designed to address barriers to adoption specific to
women, we would expect it to be more effective for women if the barriers it addresses are stronger
amongst women. We do find stronger results for women, suggesting that providing hybrid seeds at
the time and place of post-harvest sales addresses barriers that are especially important for women
in our context.
1.2 Setting and Intervention
The majority of farmers in Northern Uganda are smallholders who cultivate a number of dif-
ferent crops for household consumption and food security. The primary food crops are cassava
and sorghum, while popular cash crops include sesame and cotton. Maize is popular as both a
food and a cash crop. There are two primary cropping seasons in Northern Uganda (as illustrated
in Figure 1.1), though changing weather patterns have resulted in many farmers cultivating at
non-traditional times. The main cash crop harvest tends to be in December/January, while the
July/August harvest is more oriented towards subsistence crops.
Figure 1.1 – Agricultural seasons and project timeline
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Adoption of improved inputs in Northern Uganda is relatively low. According to the 2008/2009
Agricultural Census, only 21% of farmers in northern Uganda used any improved seeds (hybrid
or otherwise) and 18% used any fertilizer (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2010). In the baseline,
47% of farmers self-reported having planted hybrid seed in the past 12 months, but self-reported
adoption tends to be unreliable because farmers typically consider any seed they purchased (as
opposed to re-used) to be a hybrid. A more rigorous measure constructed based on reported pur-
chasing source, seed variety and price is used at endline. This more reliable measure of adoption
results in adoption rates of hybrid seed of around 20% in the control group.
The Gulu Agricultural Development Company (GADC) is an agribusiness based in Gulu,
Uganda, that works with a network of approximately 70,000 smallholder farmers to purchase
and process cotton, sesame, sunflower, and chili. GADC provides trainings on good agronomy
practices and has a network of area coordinators, field officers, and lead farmers that work directly
with farmers on a year-round basis. In 2015, GADC expanded its operations to include the pur-
chase and processing of maize. As a part of this expansion, GADC devoted resources to boosting
maize yields and production through maize agronomy trainings and by offering farmers in-kind
access to hybrid maize seeds. Larger farmer yields are a positive for GADC because it increases
the amount of maize available for purchase on the market. Beyond GADC, there are some gov-
ernmental and non-governmental extension services in the area, but penetration is insufficient to
provide input access and training to most farmers.
While overall adoption of hybrid maize seeds is low, demand for such seeds appears to be
present in the target population of this article. An IDinsight scoping survey of 220 smallholder
farmers randomly selected from the GADC network (conducted in July 2015) found that nearly
all respondents (97%) would be interested in an intervention that makes hybrid seeds more ac-
cessible. Among self-reported non-adopters, the respondents name either the high costs of such
seeds and/or the lack of access to such seeds as main barriers (both 38%).
1.2.1 Description of Intervention
The target population of the intervention studied here consists of all farmers that sold crops
in 16 GADC stores in the intervention period from January 15th to February 5th, 2016. These
16 stores were randomly selected from all 52 GADC stores.4 The dates of the intervention were
selected since these two weeks were in the harvest window for multiple crops and post-harvest
sales were expected to peak during this period. Farmers may have been waiting longer than
normal to sell their harvest because the elections in 2016 delayed the start of the school year, and
thereby the due date of school fees typically paid with incomes from harvest sales.
Once farmers sold their crops, they were invited to take a short survey collected on mobile
tablets (programmed with SurveyCTO) by trained interviewers. At the end of the questionnaire,
4 These stores bought cotton, sesame, and maize at fixed prices that are consistent in all stores in this study.
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the survey application granted the respondent - with 50% probability - the opportunity to purchase
one two-kilogram bag of certified hybrid seeds. The randomization is thus within store at the
individual level. GADC did not offer seeds (or any other input) to farmers who do not receive the
randomized offer to purchase hybrid seeds.
The hybrid seeds offered by GADC were sourced from Equator Seeds, which is well-known
among smallholder farmers as a producer of high quality seeds. The exact variety of seed sold was
Longe 7H, which —according to GADC’s agronomist and FAO— is expected to increase average
yield in particular in drought affected regions without having to increase complimentary inputs.5
The two-kilogram bag of hybrid seeds was sold for 11,000 Ugandan Shillings (approximately
$3.266), which equals the price at which GADC sourced the hybrid seeds from the distributor.7
This bag size was determined by GADC and corresponds to the recommended quantity to cover a
plot size of 20 to 25 percent of an acre (Matsumoto et al., 2013). GADC structured the intervention
in this way because they believed that smallholder farmers would not be willing to buy a large
quantity of seed from a new input provider without testing it first. Also, keeping the per-person
amount of hybrid seed low allowed GADC to more accurately control their supply chain without
risk of running out of seeds. If scaled up, GADC intends to allow larger purchases, and states that
there is no barrier to doing so.8
For GADC, the cost of the intervention was minimal since seeds were sold rather than given
away for free, and seed distribution and storage was effectively integrated into existing operational
processes. GADC chose to sell the seeds at cost since they viewed increasing the maize supply
as a more central goal than establishing input sales as a separate revenue stream. If priced above
the cost of acquisition, transport, and storage, selling seeds (and other inputs) could be profit
generating for GADC.
Smallholders did not receive additional information treatments along with the offer to purchase
hybrid seeds. This is because adopting the hybrid variety does not entail any changes to existing
maize farming procedures. There is some risk involved in purchasing seeds early, though, as
seeds could spoil during storage before they are planted. Our data shows that is a minor but not
negligible risk. In our endline survey, 12% of farmers that purchased the certified hybrid seeds
reported some of the seeds spoiling before planting.
Given the relatively small quantity of seed offered, the primary objective of this intervention
was not to have a measurable impact on maize yield, but rather to increase the number of small-
5 Longe 7H is reported to be particular tolerant to drought, major leaf diseases, (GLS, NLB, MSV), low nitrogen
and rust. Moreover it exhibits excellent stay green quality and good lodging resistance (Source: http://teca.
fao.org/read/8920). The maturity period is about 120 days. Average yield per acre under optimal smallholder
conditions is reported between 2.5 to 3.5 tons, thus significantly higher than smallholder farmers’ average maize yield
of 600kg per acre for traditional maize seed varieties (Okoboi, 2010).
6 Exchange rate of 1 UGX = 0.000296470 USD. Source: Xe.com. Accessed September 2, 2016.
7 This equates to a cost of 5,500 UGX / KG for high-quality hybrid seed. For comparison, non-hybrids can be
purchased from local markets for as cheap as 500 UGX / KG
8 Providing bags of smaller sizes was not discussed with GADC, though as far as we know smaller bags were never
requested by customers.
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holder farmers adopting this improved input. Even if farmers only used a small quantity initially,
they will potentially increase their use of hybrid seeds once they observe the benefits of the reliable
seed sold by GADC.
1.2.2 Data and Summary Statistics
Given logistical constraints, it was not possible to survey all 16 stores at each day of the in-
tervention period. Instead, the IDinsight survey team attempted to balance spending some days at
each store (for representativeness) with spending more time at busier stores (in order to increase
sample size). Therefore our sample is skewed towards busier stores. The enumeration team visited
eight stores per day during a total of 21 days.
After the first week of the survey, GADC communicated the potential of purchasing hybrid
seed more widely through its networks (after limited communication before that), with the hope
of inducing more sales during the experiment. Therefore, our sample may also be skewed towards
smallholder farmers with a higher baseline interest in purchasing hybrid maize. Overall, our
results apply to a specific subset of farmers in Uganda who chose to sell crops to GADC while our
evaluation was taking place. Note that since randomization was done within-store at the individual
level, the selection of store and farmer communication do not compromise internal validity. This
is because only smallholder farmers selected in the lottery are eligible to purchase certified hybrid
maize seeds from GADC.
One worry is that farmers not receiving the offer could directly benefit from the intervention
through receiving seeds from their peers.9 To asses this concern, we conducted a telephonic
follow-up survey with farmers who purchased hybrid seeds. We reached 40% (30 out of 75) of
farmers who purchased hybrid seeds, none of whom reported selling or giving the seeds away to
neighbors or friends. These results mitigate internal validity concerns.
In each store that is surveyed at a given day, every farmer selling any crop to GADC is part
of our sample. After crops were sold, enumerators administered a short survey that covered de-
mographic information and farming behavior.10 A total of 996 farmers were surveyed during the
baseline, of which 481 farmers received the offer to purchase hybrid maize seeds (treatment). At
two stores less than five surveys were conducted, as there were few farmers selling crops to GADC
in those areas.11
We followed up with the evaluation sample to conduct an endline survey from May-June 2016.
9 The next section discusses that — if such contamination was present — our results would be a lower bound of the
estimated treatment effect.
10 No potential participants declined to be surveyed.
11 The analysis below will omit store fixed effects for these two stores because there is no variation in treatment
status for the farmers sampled in these stores. The four respondents from these two stores are still included in the
analysis, though. Robustness checks reveal that dropping these respondents from the sample does not affect the
results. Moreover, since the sample already focuses on a specific subset of farmers, we do not think including or
excluding these farmers affects external validity.
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The timing was chosen to be before harvest, as the survey was designed to gather data about
planting decisions and agricultural practices. 98% (974 out of 996) of farmers surveyed at baseline
were also surveyed at endline. Out of the 22 that were not surveyed at endline, 15 were confirmed
moved or passed away, while the field team was unable to locate 7 farmers. Our final sample
therefore consists of 974 farmers, of which 467 were offered the hybrid maize seeds.
Our main outcome variable to measure adoption is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if
the respondent planted hybrid maize seed. At baseline, we create this variable by simply asking
respondents whether they had planted hybrid maize within the last year. As self-reported data
on seed type tends to be unreliable, though, we follow a more sophisticated approach at endline.
Since hybrid seeds lose their genetic advantage if replanted, we are convinced that a farmer could
only have actually planted true hybrid seeds if he bought them from a reputed retailer (or received
them from an NGO). Also, there is an issue of counterfeit hybrid seeds being sold for relatively
low prices in the area. For these reasons, we additionally consider the price paid for the reported
hybrid seed. At endline, we categorize a farmer to have planted hybrid seed if she reports having
received hybrid seeds from the government or an NGO, or purchasing hybrid seeds from a reputed
retailer at a price higher or equal than 2,000 UGX / kg.12
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics and balancing tests of the baseline characteristics. Over-
all, 55% of sampled farmers are male and are 37 years old on average. About 37% have completed
primary education and about 53% or 42% are reachable by phone or own a phone respectively.
Average landholdings amount to 1.43 acres and landholdings are unknown for about 18% of the
sample.13 82% of sampled farmers grew maize in the last 12 months and 34% report to have grown
hybrid maize. About 21% of farmers sold maize on the day of the baseline interview. The farmers’
revenue from post-harvest sales at the time of the interview averages to about 49,000 UGX.14 The
subsequent columns of Table 1.1 provide subgroup means by treatment status. While baseline
characteristics are largely balanced, we observe that farmers receiving the offer to purchase cer-
tified hybrid maize seeds are significantly older and appear more likely to have sold maize to the
agribusiness.15 The final column of Table 1 presents p-values from a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
for continuous variables. While the age distribution appears to be balanced, the revenue distribu-
tion seems unbalanced. This observed imbalance can be explained with a single outlier in the 99%
12 This price was stated by local experts as the minimum price for which any sort of hybrid maize seeds could
be purchased. Given that no other proxies that allow to objectively assess whether respondents have planted hybrid
maize, we assess the sensitivity of our results using proxies for source and price. We conduct robustness checks of this
price cut-off with thresholds at 1,800 and 2,200 UGX, respectively, and find that the results are essential unchanged in
terms of effect size and level of significance. These results are available upon request. We report additional robustness
checks of the definition of growing reliable hybrid maize in the Appendix.
13 The landholdings variable has been winsorized at the 99.5 percentile to account for imbalance in outliers across
the treatment and comparison group.
14 Note that revenue information is missing for about 8% of the sample. This variables is missing because it was not
included early versions of the survey due to a programming error. Missing revenue information is dealt with in the
analysis with zero-imputation and inclusion of a missing variable indicator.
15 The main empirical strategy employed below does not control for any baseline covariates. A second specification,
meant to increase precision of the estimates, controls for a set of baseline characteristics including those two variables
that appear unbalanced.
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quantile of the treatment group. The lower panel of Table 1.1 presents results from a joint test for
model significance from a regression of the treatment indicator on the set of all observable char-
acteristics. While the results indicate that we are able to reject the null that these characteristics
do not jointly explain treatment assignment, this is to be expected given the number of covariates
controlled for. Overall, we interpret the results of Table 1.1 as supporting the conclusion that our
randomization procedure achieved balance on observable characteristics.
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Table 1.1 – Summary Statistics and Covariate Balance
Overall No Offer Offer
P-Value
Mean
P-Value
KS
Growing Maize 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.20
(0.384) (0.374) (0.395)
Grew Hybrid Maize 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.78
(0.473) (0.470) (0.476)
Age 37.39 36.52 38.34 0.04 0.28
(13.904) (13.843) (13.923)
Gender: Male 0.55 0.56 0.54 0.89
(0.498) (0.497) (0.499)
Completed Primary Education (or above) 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.66
(0.483) (0.486) (0.480)
Reachable by Phone 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.62
(0.500) (0.500) (0.499)
Owns Phone 0.42 0.41 0.43 0.61
(0.494) (0.493) (0.495)
Crop Sold: Cotton 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.97
(0.434) (0.440) (0.426)
Crop Sold: Sesame 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.16
(0.500) (0.500) (0.501)
Crop Sold: Maize 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.07
(0.410) (0.397) (0.423)
Revenue (UGX) 48928.04 46233.94 51867.64 0.43 0.00
(128801.165) (109559.408) (147028.481)
Revenue Missing 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.83
(0.273) (0.270) (0.277)
Plot Size planted with Maize (Acres) 1.43 1.51 1.35 0.25 0.32
(2.202) (2.466) (1.872)
Plot Size missing 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.15
(0.386) (0.374) (0.398)
Grow: Beans 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.90
(0.468) (0.465) (0.471)
Grow: Cassava 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.82
(0.429) (0.433) (0.426)
Grow: Cotton 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.97
(0.483) (0.486) (0.479)
Grow: Groundnuts 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.88
(0.500) (0.500) (0.501)
Grow: Pigeon Peas 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.04
(0.428) (0.431) (0.425)
Grow: Sesame 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.70
(0.409) (0.410) (0.409)
Grow: Sorghum 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.58
(0.499) (0.500) (0.500)
Grow: Soya 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.28
(0.395) (0.387) (0.403)
Grow: Sweet Potato 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.92
(0.487) (0.487) (0.487)
Grow: Vegetables (Salad,Greens) 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.70
(0.399) (0.395) (0.403)
N 974 507 467
F-statistic (Joint) 3.5059
P-value (Joint) 0.0000
Note: This table reports (sub-)sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses). The P-value (Mean) column provides the p-value
of the difference in mean between treatment and comparison group. This value is derived from OLS regression of the variable on a binary
treatment indicator, controlling for 14 store fixed effects and using Huber-White robust standard errors. Two of the 16 store indicators are
excluded because the low sample from these stores resulted in no variance in the treatment status. The final column reports p-values from a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equal distributions for continuous characteristics. Further, we conduct a joint test for model significance of a
regression of the treatment indicator on all variables. The F-statistic and the corresponding p-value are reported in the lower panel. Exchange
rate of 1 UGX = 0.000296470 USD. Source: Xe.com. Accessed September 2, 2016.
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1.3 Empirical Strategy
We first explore correlates of accepting the offer to purchase certified hybrid maize seeds for
the subsample of farmers who received the offer. We model farmer i’s decision to accept the offer
of certified hybrid seeds, AcceptOfferib, when selling crops at store b via a linear probability
model (LPM). The model can be written as
AcceptOfferib = α0 + γ0Xib + ω0b + εib (1.1)
Xib is a vector of farmer specific baseline characteristics that among others includes age, gen-
der, education, whether the respondent owns a phone, the type of crops planted that season and
the type of crop sold that day, the revenue from this sale and whether the farmer grew (hybrid)
maize. ω0b is a vector of binary variables for each store, capturing store fixed effects16 and εib is a
mean zero iid farmer specific error term.
Next, we estimate the impact of the intervention on farmer’s decision to plant reliable hybrid
maize seeds. First, we consider the overall effect of improved access to reliable hybrid maize
seeds on adoption of such seeds in farmers’ subsequent planting decisions (regardless of whether
the offer has been accepted or not). Second, we are interested in the effect of accepting the offer
on adoption decisions.
The first approach is the intention-to-treat (ITT), which compares adoption decisions of farm-
ers who have received improved access to farmers who have not. Our estimation uses the following
linear probability model to identify this difference
PlantHybridib = α1 + β1OfferedHybridib + γ1Xib + ω1b + uib (1.2)
where PlantHybridib is the outcome indicator of having planting hybrid seeds at endline and
OfferedHybridib is the binary treatment indicator that equals 1 if the farmer has received access
to certified hybrid seeds. uib is a mean-zero, iid error term and the remaining variables are de-
fined as in (1.1). Due to random assignment, β1 reflects the causal effect of being offered seeds
on planting. As treatment is exogenous, our first regression specification does not include base-
line covariates. The additional information is included in a second regression, though, as it may
increase precision of the estimates.
The second approach is the treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) estimator, which compares adop-
tion decisions of farmers that are induced to purchase hybrid seeds due to having received the offer
to adoption decisions of farmers that would have purchased the hybrid seeds had they received the
offer. We estimate the following system of linear equations in a two-step instrumental variables
16 In the analyses, we will include 14 binary indicators for the 16 stores included in the study. For the remaining two
stores, for which we sampled less than four clients each, there is no variation in treatment status, causing identification
issues in the fixed effects estimation. Therefore we leave these stores as the omitted category.
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framework (TSLS) to identify the TOT effect.
AcceptOfferib = α2 + β2OfferedHybridib + γ2Xib + ω2b + ϕib (1.3)
PlantHybridib = α3 + β3AcceptOfferib + γ3Xib + ω3b + vib (1.4)
In equation (1.4), the purchasing decision of certified hybrid seeds from GADC,AcceptOfferib,
is potentially correlated with other unobservable characteristics that also explain the adoption of
hybrid seeds, i.e. the population error term vib. We therefore instrument AcceptOfferib using the
randomly assigned offer to purchase certified seeds, OfferedHybridib. We report results from
first stage relationship in (1.3) separately. While the offer is voluntary, only farmers receiving the
offer are able to purchase certified hybrid seeds from the implementation partner at baseline. For
this reason, the situation is characterized by one-sided non-compliance.
Given the conventional relevance and exclusion restriction, the TOT estimates described above
are identified. To assess the relevance of our instrument, we show that the treatment indicator is a
strong predictor for purchasing seeds from GADC. Regarding the exclusion restriction, we believe
that it is unlikely for the treatment to increase planting of hybrid seeds through simply the offer of
purchasing hybrid maize, as opposed to the purchase itself. The justification for this follows the
same reasoning as why we think spillovers are low: there is already good knowledge of hybrid
seeds but much difficulty obtaining them from sources other than GADC.
We also conduct a heterogeneity analysis, in which — for the ITT analysis — we include
a binary subgroup indicator and an interaction term of this subgroup indicator with the random
treatment indicator, OfferedHybridib. The estimation equation is
PlantHybridib = α34 + β4OfferedHybridib + γ4Groupib
+ δ4OfferedHybridib ∗Groupib + ω4b + uib
(1.5)
where Groupib is the binary subgroup indicator and all other variables are defined as above.
Note that the heterogeneity analysis accounts for store fixed effects, but excludes any additional
baseline characteristics. The coefficients estimates δˆ4 capture the differential treatment effect for
the specific subgroups. The results tables below report estimates of the subgroup means from this
specification, given by βˆ4 and βˆ4 + δˆ4.
In the TOT analysis, the analogous interaction term of the subgroup indicator with the take-
up indicator AcceptOfferib is endogenous. Therefore, we use the interaction of the treatment
indicator OfferedHybridib with the respective subgroup indicator as an additional instrument.
In general, inference relies on Huber-White-robust standard errors. While there could be a
case for correlated error terms of the planting decisions on the store level, we choose to not cluster
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standard errors on this level because treatment is assigned on the farmer level17. As a robustness
check, we present inference using cluster wild bootstrapped standard errors in the Appendix.
1.3.1 Threats to Identification
The main threat to our main (ITT) identification strategy is spillovers, as the experiment was
randomized at the individual level. The worry is that treatment farmers could sell or give hybrid
seeds to farmers in the control group. We think this is unlikely to be a major concern for two
reasons. First, the small amount of seed distributed makes it unattractive for farmers to give away
a portion of it. Second, the previously-mentioned phone survey revealed that no treatment farmer
reported giving away or selling the seeds. Additionally, one may be concerned that simply learning
about the offer of hybrid seeds could act as a marketing mechanism for farmers in the control
group, spurring them to seek hybrid seeds from other sources. While we don’t have evidence on
whether this mechanism was in play, we find it unlikely as hybrid seed was already well-known by
farmers in our sample. At endline, 58% of control farmers stated that they would not know where
to purchase hybrid seeds if they wanted them. Therefore, we do not expect the information about
hybrid seeds to encourage non-treated farmers to buy hybrid seeds from other sources. If these
information spillovers were present, they are expected to positively affect adoption outcomes in
the control group, thus leaving the impact estimates presented below as a lower bound.
If we assume that the conventional relevance and exclusion restrictions hold, the TOT estimates
described above should be also be identified. To assess the relevance of our instrument, we show
that the treatment indicator is a strong predictor for purchasing seeds from GADC. Showing that
the exclusion restriction holds is of course far more difficult. The key assumption is that the offer
of hybrid seed can only induce greater planting of hybrid seed through the channel of purchasing
seed from GADC during our experiment. This assumption could fail, for instance, if the offer
of hybrid seeds reminded farmers to purchase them from other sources. While plausible, in this
case we think these alternative channels are unlikely. The justification for this follows the same
reasoning as why we think spillovers are low: there is already good knowledge of hybrid seeds
but much difficulty obtaining them from sources other than GADC. Overall, we believe that the
assumptions required for the TOT estimates to be valid are likely to hold.
As for every experimental study, even if internal validity holds, the results are likely context
specific. In this paper, we study a particular set of smallholder farmers who sell crops from a
previous harvest during a particular time at a particular set of stores. If better informed or more
market oriented farmers learn about the opportunity to purchase hybrid seeds, they might for
example be more keen to make sales during that time period, limiting external validity.
17 Note that there is an ongoing discussion in the literature about appropriate inference in such settings of individual
level treatment assignment for which the analysis includes group fixed effects (Imbens and Kolesár, 2016).
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1.4 Results
We are interested both in characterizing the demand for these hybrid seeds in terms of observ-
able baseline characteristics and providing causal estimates of this offer on the adoption of hybrid
seeds in subsequent planting decisions. First, we explore how uptake of the offer to purchase
seeds is correlated with farmer characteristics. Second, we estimate the causal impact of the offer
of reliable hybrid seeds on hybrid seed adoption in subsequent planting decisions. Finally, we test
whether the treatment effects differs among specific subgroups of farmers.
1.4.1 Demand for Hybrid Seeds
Table 1.2 reports how individual characteristics affect the choice to accept the offer to purchase
hybrid seeds. Column 1 restricts the sample to those offered seeds, and provides results from a
linear probability model for a regression of the binary acceptance indicator on a set of baseline
characteristics and store fixed effects, as indicated in equation (1.1). Column 3 includes the whole
sample, and adds the treatment indicator to the regression. It represents the first stage of the TOT
regressions that will be presented later.18
We observe that, in both specifications, the acceptance decision is correlated with the revenue
from crop sales made at the time of baseline and the respondent’s phone ownership. On average,
an increase in revenue from crop sales by 1% increases the probability to accept by 2.4 percentage
points.19 Further, farmers who own a phone are on average about eleven percentage points more
likely to purchase than does who do not. In both specifications, these correlations is statistically
significant at the 10% level.
Table 1.3 provides some insights as to why treatment farmers who were offered hybrid seeds
choose to not purchase. A vast majority of these farmers (70%) state that not having any money
available is one of the reasons for not purchasing. Also, about a fifth of the respondents mention
having to discuss the purchase with other members of the family. Only 5% of respondents mention
that the price of seeds is too expensive. Other reasons, are mentioned by less than 5% of the
respondents.
18 The first stage F-statistics reported column (2) of Table 1.2 come from i) a model that controls for store fixed
effects, ii) the same model that does not control for store fixed effects. We see that excluding store fixed effects in
the first stage regression suggests a strong and statistically significant relationship between the random offer and the
acceptance of the offer.
19 The statistical significance of the missing revenue variable in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2 can be explained by
observations from one specific store during the first week of the survey for which the data collection tool did not ask
about crop revenue. This question was only added to the survey instrument during the first week of data collection.
Therefore 85% of respondents from that store during the first week have missing revenue information. At the same
time, a relatively large fraction of farmers selling crops at this store accepted the offer to purchase (38%). The results
from including a binary indicator for respondents from that specific store in the first week of survey in columns 2 and
4 of Table 1.2 reveal that the missing revenue variable is no longer statistically significant.
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Table 1.2 – Uptake of Hybrid Seed Offer
LPM LPM First Stage First Stage
Treatment 0.161*** 0.161***
(0.017) (0.017)
Growing Maize 0.040 0.049 0.009 0.010
(0.049) (0.048) (0.024) (0.024)
Grew Hybrid Maize 0.063 0.056 0.035* 0.034
(0.042) (0.042) (0.021) (0.021)
Age -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender: Male -0.031 -0.023 -0.001 0.001
(0.040) (0.040) (0.019) (0.019)
Completed Primary Education (or above) 0.023 0.019 0.004 0.000
(0.040) (0.039) (0.019) (0.019)
Reachable by Phone 0.024 0.018 0.007 0.003
(0.058) (0.059) (0.028) (0.028)
Owns Phone 0.117* 0.113* 0.057* 0.057*
(0.063) (0.063) (0.031) (0.031)
Crop Sold: Cotton -0.131 -0.129 -0.065 -0.053
(0.153) (0.153) (0.074) (0.075)
Crop Sold: Sesame -0.242 -0.239 -0.118 -0.108
(0.152) (0.152) (0.072) (0.073)
Crop Sold: Maize -0.212 -0.222 -0.122* -0.114
(0.152) (0.152) (0.073) (0.074)
Log(Revenue, UGX) 0.022* 0.021 0.012* 0.012*
(0.014) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
Revenue Missing 0.330** 0.188 0.164** 0.116
(0.163) (0.166) (0.077) (0.076)
Plot Size planted with Maize (Acres) -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Grow: Beans 0.014 0.015 0.021 0.019
(0.046) (0.046) (0.022) (0.022)
Grow: Cassava -0.033 -0.024 -0.009 -0.007
(0.041) (0.040) (0.020) (0.020)
Grow: Cotton -0.064 -0.060 -0.031 -0.032
(0.050) (0.049) (0.025) (0.025)
Grow: Groundnuts 0.016 0.013 0.004 0.002
(0.038) (0.038) (0.019) (0.019)
Grow: Pigeon Peas -0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.043) (0.043) (0.020) (0.020)
Grow: Sesame -0.003 -0.004 0.014 0.015
(0.053) (0.052) (0.026) (0.026)
Grow: Sorghum -0.034 -0.029 -0.021 -0.018
(0.044) (0.044) (0.021) (0.021)
Grow: Soya 0.017 0.012 0.023 0.021
(0.052) (0.052) (0.026) (0.026)
Grow: Sweet Potato 0.041 0.038 0.021 0.021
(0.037) (0.036) (0.018) (0.017)
Grow: Vegetables (Salad,Greens) -0.023 -0.022 -0.015 -0.015
(0.035) (0.037) (0.018) (0.018)
Specific Store (Week 1) 0.349** 0.152**
(0.165) (0.075)
Constant 0.187 0.196 -0.006 -0.021
(0.242) (0.241) (0.112) (0.113)
Store Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 467 467 974 974
R2 0.211 0.222 0.181 0.186
F-Statistic 3.07 3.11 2.85 2.79
Note: This table reports results from a linear probability model (LPM) of purchasing hybrid seeds. Column 1 includes the subsample of
farmers that was offered such seeds. Column 2 includes the whole sample. Farmers not offered seeds are not eligible to purchase. The
coefficient from missing revenue indicator is omitted. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.* significant at 10%, ** significant
at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.3 – Reasons for Not Buying Hybrid Maize
Mean (SD)
No Money available 0.70
(0.457)
Need to discuss with family 0.18
(0.383)
Unfamiliar with hybrid seeds 0.03
(0.158)
Too expensive 0.05
(0.225)
Other plans to use revenue 0.03
(0.179)
Concerned about storage 0.03
(0.172)
Intends to buy later in the year 0.02
(0.141)
N 393
Note: This table provides the relative frequency distribution of reasons stated for not buying hybrid maize when offered (treatment group).
The original question is a multiple choice, implying that the stated reasons do not need to sum to 100%. Reasons mentioned by less than 2%
of respondents are not displayed. Standard deviations in parentheses.
1.4.2 Adoption of Hybrid Seeds
ITT and TOT Analysis
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.4 report ITT results of the effect of improved access to certified
hybrid seeds at the time and place of post-harvest crop sales on the adoption of reliable hybrid
seeds in the subsequent planting season. As described above, the ITT results come from a linear
probability model that includes buyer fixed effects and uses Huber-White-robust standard errors.
The offer to purchase hybrid seeds increases planting of hybrid seeds by 8 percentage points
compared to a control group mean of 20%. This 40% relative change in adoption is statistically
significant at the 1% level. Controlling for additional baseline covariates does not change the
point estimate, but increases overall explanatory power of the model. Further, column 2 shows
that hybrid seed adoption at endline is higher among male farmers and farmers who have planted
hybrid seeds at baseline.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.4 provide TOT results on the causal effect of purchasing certified
hybrid seeds on adoption in the following planting season. The result in column 3 shows that
farmers purchasing certified hybrid seeds at the time and place of post-harvest crop sale are 50
percentage points more likely to grow hybrid seeds in the subsequent planting season compared
to farmers who have not accepted this offer. Column 4 confirms that the magnitude of this effect
is unchanged when controlling for additional baseline covariates.
As mentioned earlier, our main outcome variable is a dummy of whether the farmer planted
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reliable hybrid seeds, and is calculated using various information received about the seed the
farmer planted. In appendix Table A.1 we show that our primary results are robust to alternative
definitions of “reliable” hybrid seeds. We compare three alternative definitions. First, we consider
self-reported hybrid maize adoption. Second, we consider self-reported hybrid seed adoption if
the seeds were sourced from an NGO, the government or bought at a shop, without imposing a
minimum price threshold. Third, we consider the main outcome variable that imposes a price
threshold and require in addition that the reported seed variety is of type Longe.
The ITT and TOT results give different perspectives on the intervention’s effect, with both
being potentially policy-relevant. The ITT results state that the probability of planting hybrid
seeds for an average farmer that is offered to buy certified seeds increases by 8 percentage points
compared to a farmer not given the offer. In contrast, the TOT results state that someone who
accepts the offer increases their propensity to plant hybrid seeds by 50 percentage points.20 This
TOT estimate is valid for the so-called compliers, who are the participants who purchased seed
when given the offer to do so. It suggests that around half of the people who purchased seeds as
part of our experiment would have cultivated hybrid seeds even in the absence of our intervention.
Appendix Table A.2 reports equivalent ITT and TOT results that account for clustered standard
errors at the store level using via a cluster-wild bootstrap routine.21 The reported p-values coincide
with the fraction of bootstrap test-statistics larger than the test statistic originally observed. While
standard errors increase, the results show that the significance of the effects — both for ITT and
TOT — persists under the more conservative approach.22
Heterogeneity Analysis
We examine differences in adoption patterns by gender, age, growing hybrid maize at baseline,
and affordability of the certified seeds based on the revenue from crop sold at baseline.
Table 1.5 presents ITT and TOT results for these four different subgroups of farmers. Each
row of Table 1.5 presents either the first stage, ITT or TOT approach described in the previous
section. The first column presents point estimates and standard errors of the treatment effect
for the indicated subgroup, e.g. female farmers, the second column reports the results for the
20 The 50 percentage point TOT estimator reflects both the fact that some farmers would have planted seed in absence
of the intervention, and that some farmers purchased the seed but then did not report planting them before the endline
survey. We reached out to some farmers who purchased seed but did not plant them to derive anecdotal evidence of
why this was the case. Some farmers reported that dry conditions induced them to save the seed for future seasons.
Other farmers reported planting the seed even though they did not report this in the survey, suggesting there was some
measurement error in the original survey.
21 Inference is based on STATA’s boottest routine with 1000 Bootstrap samples.
22 To assess whether GADC announcing the opportunity to purchase hybrid seeds after the first week of the survey
affects external validity, we compare impact estimates by survey week. In Appendix Table A.3, we find very similar
ITT estimates of around 13.5 percentage points for survey weeks 1 and 2, suggesting that announcements do not
alter the composition of our sample. At the same time, the effect is not statistically significant for week 3. The
pattern of the TOT estimates suggests decreasing take-up towards later weeks of the survey. These findings could
be interpreted as suggestive evidence of information about the availability of hybrid seeds spreading irrespective of
additional advertising, and leading likely adopters to sell crops earlier rather than later.
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Table 1.4 – ITT and TOT Estimates of Hybrid Seed Adoption
ITT ITT TOT TOT
Seeds Offered 0.082*** 0.084***
(0.026) (0.026)
Accepted Offer 0.505*** 0.517***
(0.157) (0.156)
Age -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Gender: Male 0.067** 0.068**
(0.031) (0.030)
Growing Maize -0.031 -0.035
(0.039) (0.038)
Grew Hybrid Maize 0.064* 0.045
(0.033) (0.032)
Crop Sold: Maize -0.238** -0.175*
(0.101) (0.096)
Log(Revenue, UGX) 0.001 -0.006
(0.011) (0.011)
Completed Primary Education (or above) -0.009 -0.011
(0.032) (0.031)
Reachable by Phone 0.082 0.077
(0.054) (0.052)
Owns Phone -0.037 -0.065
(0.054) (0.052)
Crop Sold: Cotton -0.217** -0.185*
(0.106) (0.101)
Crop Sold: Sesame -0.244** -0.185*
(0.100) (0.095)
Plot Size planted with Maize (Acres) 0.004 0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
Grow: Beans 0.025 0.015
(0.036) (0.035)
Grow: Cassava 0.052 0.057*
(0.034) (0.032)
Grow: Cotton -0.036 -0.020
(0.045) (0.043)
Grow: Groundnuts -0.013 -0.015
(0.030) (0.029)
Grow: Pigeon Peas 0.056 0.055
(0.039) (0.037)
Grow: Sesame 0.004 -0.003
(0.040) (0.038)
Grow: Sorghum 0.013 0.023
(0.031) (0.031)
Grow: Soya 0.030 0.018
(0.042) (0.040)
Grow: Sweet Potato 0.007 -0.004
(0.029) (0.028)
Grow: Vegetables (Salad,Greens) -0.037 -0.029
(0.042) (0.042)
Store Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 974 974 974 974
R2 0.074 0.120 0.118 0.151
Control Mean 0.20 0.20
Note: This table reports Intention-to-treat and treatment-on-the-treated outcome estimates based on linear linear probability / TSLS models,
using robust standard errors. The outcome is an indicator for whether the farmer reliably planted hybrid maize at endline. The coefficient
from missing revenue indicator is omitted.* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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complement of this subgroup, i.e. male farmers. As discussed in the Empirical Strategy section
the latter are obtained as the sum of the coefficient estimates of the treatment indicator and the
interaction term of the treatment indicator with the binary subgroup indicator. The third column
provides the difference in these treatment effects, i.e. the coefficient estimate on the interaction
term. Thus, we find evidence for differential treatment effects by subgroup if the latter estimate is
statistically significant from zero.
Panel A presents heterogeneity results by gender. On average, improved access to certified hy-
brid seeds increases adoption among female farmers by 12 percentage points. This ITT effect for
female farmers is statistically significant at the 5% level. The corresponding ITT for male farmers
is 5 percentage points, but not statistically significantly different from 0. Column 3 shows that
we cannot reject the null of these two ITT estimates being equal. Regarding the TOT results, we
observe that the probability of adopting hybrid seeds among female farmers who have purchased
certified hybrid seeds on average increases by 100 percentage points. This TOT effect is statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level. The corresponding TOT for male farmers is 25 percentage points,
but not statistically significant from 0. Column 3 provides evidence for differing TOT effects by
gender.
The large coefficient for the TOT for females and its difference in the coefficient in the male
sample warrants additional discussion. Note that (as shown in the first stage), there is 5 percentage
point difference in acceptance of the offer between male and female customers, and that there is
an 8 percentage point difference in the ITT estimates across gender. None of these differences
is statistically significant at conventional levels. Taken together, however, these result in large
differences for TOT, suggesting that the intervention had much larger effects on female purchasers
than male purchasers. The fact that the TOT estimate for females is near 1 seems very high, and
should be interpreted with caution. There were only 26 females who accepted the offer, which
meaning that this estimate is potentially skewed due to the small effective sample.
Panel B present heterogeneity results across baseline planting decisions. While not statistically
significant, the effects of access to hybrid maize seeds are 4 percentage points higher for farmers
that grew hybrid maize in the 12 months preceding the baseline survey than farmers who did
not. Panels C and D shows that there is no evidence for heterogeneous effects with respect to the
revenue received from crop sale and farmer age.
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Table 1.5 – Heterogeneity of Adoption Decision
Panel A (1) (2) (3)
Female Male Difference
First Stage 0.1346*** 0.1854*** 0.0508
(0.0229) (0.0237) (0.0326)
ITT 0.1267*** 0.0457 -0.0811
(0.0353) (0.0380) (0.0518)
TOT 1.0066*** 0.2523 -0.7543**
(0.3039) (0.1958) (0.3715)
N 440 534
Panel B
No Hybrid Hybrid Difference
First Stage 0.1505*** 0.1864*** 0.0359
(0.0201) (0.0295) (0.0355)
ITT 0.0686** 0.1100** 0.0414
(0.0326) (0.0446) (0.0553)
TOT 0.4516** 0.5892** 0.1377
(0.2156) (0.2294) (0.3190)
N 646 328
Panel C
Rev.>Price Rev. <=Price Difference
First Stage 0.2076*** 0.0774*** -0.1302***
(0.0231) (0.0203) (0.0308)
ITT 0.0847** 0.0738* -0.0108
(0.0346) (0.0399) (0.0529)
TOT 0.4111*** 0.9766* 0.5655
(0.1585) (0.5510) (0.5729)
N 626 348
Panel D
Age>=35 Age<35 Difference
First Stage 0.1469*** 0.1775*** 0.0306
(0.0229) (0.0245) (0.0335)
ITT 0.1155*** 0.0530 -0.0626
(0.0382) (0.0365) (0.0529)
TOT 0.7796*** 0.2857 -0.4939
(0.2498) (0.2037) (0.3251)
N 458 516
Note: This table reports heterogeneous treatment effets by gender, type of sale, revenue and age. Each row presents results from one
regression. First stage results are derived from OLS of the uptake decision on the subgroup indicator, the exogenous treatment indicator and
an interaction term of these. ITT estimates are derived in the same manner and TOT estimates come from TSLS. Instead of the treatment
indicator, the TOT models include the take-up decision and an interaction of the take-up indicator with the subgroup indicator. The take-up
decision and the interaction term are instrumented with the the treatment indicator and the interaction of the treatment with the subgroup
indicator. In addition, both ITT and TOT approaches control for store fixed effects, but exclude baseline covariates. Columns (1) and (2)
present the treatment effects for the respective subgroups along with robust standard errors. Column (3) provides results for whether these
effects differ by subgroup. Technically, column (1) provides the coefficient of the treatment/take-up indicator. Column (2) provides the
coefficient of the interaction term, and column (2) is the sum of (1) and (3).* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the effects of simultaneously addressing barriers to adoption related to
market access, quality of seeds, liquidity constraints and behavioral biases on the decision to plant
hybrid seeds. In particular, we provide smallholder farmers with access to certified hybrid seeds at
the time and place of post-harvest crop sale. We conduct our experiment on smallholder farmers
who are visiting GADC stores to sell other crops, and find increased adoption of hybrid seed,
especially for female farmers. This low-cost intervention is easily scalable, and has the potential
to positively affect the livelihood of smallholder farmers as well as the profits of an agricultural
purchaser such as GADC once initial adoption of hybrid seeds translates into permanent usage.
While our experiment shows only a modest effect size, we believe that in other contexts it
could be much larger. Our results show that people who sell more crops (and therefore are less
likely to be liquidity constrained) at the time of the offer to purchase seed are more likely to take
up the offer. In our experiment, the average amount of sale was lower than expected, at less than
five times the price of the bag of seeds. We believe that if the intervention was conducted at times
of larger sales it would likely be even more effective. Also, as this was the first time GADC
offered hybrid seeds for sale, many potential buyers likely did not know about the opportunity. In
a context where all farmers were informed one might expect higher purchasing rates. Additionally,
this evaluation’s implications extend to other productive inputs, beyond hybrid maize seed. If cash
availability at the time of planting is a significant barrier to the adoption of more expensive (and
more productive) inputs, providing access to such inputs when farmers sell crops could lead to
greater adoption of productive technology. At the same time, our findings suggest that farmers
face multiple constraints to adoption of improved inputs that are not easily overcome, even when
addressed simultaneously.
Selling seeds at the point of sale has a particularly large effect on female farmers. This is likely
due to the fact that female farmers experience many barriers to input usage, and our intervention
was successful in overcoming them. The exact mechanism is not entirely clear. Female farmers
may have lower levels of trust in outside sources of seeds, but feel comfortable purchasing from a
known entity such as GADC. Another explanation could be that women find it harder to save for
seeds, and therefore the opportunity to purchase at a time of high liquidity is especially valuable.
In either case, our results suggest that this intervention may be an effective tool in reducing the
gender gap in agricultural productivity.
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Chapter 2
Social Interaction Effects in Low-Income
Health Insurance
2.1 Introduction
The rural poor in developing countries are particularly vulnerable to adverse health shocks
(Krishna, 2007). Since conventional risk management and coping mechanisms oftentimes pro-
vide only imperfect coverage (Dercon and Krishnan, 2000), access to formal health insurance
is considered a promising avenue to mitigate existential health risks (Morduch, 2006). The low
uptake and renewal rates of formal insurance schemes observed in many contexts are therefore
particularly concerning from a social impact perspective (Platteau et al., 2017). The literature has
investigated a multitude of channels that could potentially spur insurance demand.1 On the sup-
ply side, key determinants include the price (Chemin, 2018; Giné et al., 2011; Cole et al., 2011;
Dercon et al., 2015), the quality of covered services (Dong et al., 2009), sufficient information
provision about the policy (Das and Leino, 2011; Thornton et al., 2010; Platteau et al., 2013),
and transaction costs (Thornton et al., 2010; Chemin, 2018). On the demand side, among others,
financial literacy (Giné et al., 2011; Gaurav et al., 2011; Carpena et al., 2011; Bonan et al., 2011;
Schultz et al., 2013) and trust in the insurance provider (Liu and Myers, 2016; Dercon et al., 2015;
Clarke, 2011; Cai et al., 2015a; Cole et al., 2017; Townsend et al., 2010) have been studied exten-
sively. More recently, the role of social networks as a demand side factor potentially increasing
demand has gained attention (Chemin, 2018; Giné et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2014; Janssens and
Kramer, 2016).
In this paper, we argue that the role of the social network in the demand for low-income health
insurance is ambiguous. On the one hand, positive social interaction effects might emerge as a
consequence of a desire to conform with expected choices in the group (Bernheim, 1994). In other
words, when offered a new technology for which no clear behavioral norms exists, group members
1 Refer to Platteau et al. (2017) for a recent review of both theoretical models and empirical studies of demand for
indemnity as well as index based micro-insurance products.
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might orient their own decision towards the predicted take-up of their group members (Festinger,
1954). As a result, a group member who expects a larger fraction of peers to take-up might decide
to also demand the product. On the other hand, when insurance is offered to members of joint
liability groups, the correlation of wealth distributions implies that all group members benefit
from the positive externality of a single member’s decision to insure against idiosyncratic risk,
potentially creating an incentive to free ride (Janssens and Kramer, 2016; De Janvry et al., 2014).2
Therefore, anticipating a higher fraction of group members to demand insurance, might inhibit
the agent’s take-up. At the same time, such incentives to free ride might be mitigated through
repeated interactions in the group (Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2018). 3
To test which of these channels dominates empirically, we use data from a randomized control
trial through which the members of 199 jointly liable credit groups in rural Pakistan are offered
one of four voluntary hospitalization insurance policies. All members of the same group are
offered the same policy and the offered policies differ in their eligibility criteria. Two individ-
ual insurance policies allow the credit group member to insure any number and combination of
household members. In contrast, two household insurance policies require to insure all household
members. We hypothesize the effect of expected peer choices on own demand in the subgroup of-
fered individual insurance policies to be larger in magnitude as compared to the subgroup offered
household insurance policies for two reasons. First, it is more expensive to insure all dependents
in the household policies. The higher price to conform with peer decisions might therefore miti-
gate the desire to conform. Second, the decision to take-up household insurance implies that more
household members are insured on average. The positive externality from insurance is thus larger
than in the individual policies, resulting in a stronger incentive to free ride.
Utilizing the framework developed by Lee et al. (2014a) and Yang and Lee (2017), we model
an agent’s binary insurance decision as a static, simultaneous move game under incomplete in-
formation. Agents’ insurance demand depends on the expected choice of other group members,
which is derived as a rational expectation given publicly observed characteristics. Given the dis-
cussion above, the sign of this social interaction effects parameter is considered as an indication
of which channel dominates. The model accounts for the similarity of group members’ decisions
via contextual effects and can be extended to capture correlated group-level unobservables. In
estimating this game, we determine the rational expectations equilibrium in each group. For this
reason, the estimation procedure is based on a nested fixed point maximum likelihood estimation
procedure common in the estimation of dynamic discrete choice models (Rust, 1987, 2000; Bajari
et al., 2010).
2 In joint liability groups, group members are obliged to cover outstanding loan amounts of their group members in
case of default.
3 Generally, network interactions might also lead to social learning, thereby directly or indirectly affecting priors
about the value of the offered insurance product (Choi et al., 2015). The setting of the study precludes group members
to directly observe their peers’ decisions, ruling out the former observational learning channel. Knowledge spillovers,
in contrast, might indeed lead to positive peer effects. The empirical framework allows to account for such implied
correlations of decisions because of factors common to the group.
26
Pooling joint liability groups from all offered policies, we find a positive effect of expected peer
choices on own insurance demand. This finding indicates that the conformity and repeated interac-
tions channels dominate potential incentives to free ride. Average partial effect estimates suggest
that a ten percentage point increase in expected peer take-up would increase demand by 3.5 to
4.3 percentage points. Price elasticity estimates indicate that a comparable increase in demand
would require a decrease in premium price by 4.5 to 6 percent. Estimation results disaggregated
by policy type reveal that the overall positive social interaction effects are driven by comparable
effects of expected peer take-up on demand in the subgroup offered an individual insurance policy.
For the subgroup offered a household insurance policy, in contrast, the social interaction effects
estimate is negative, but estimated imprecisely. The estimated average partial effect suggests that
a ten percentage point increase in expected peer demand would lead to a decrease in demand by
2.2 percentage points. This decrease in demand is comparable to a one percent increase in the
insurance premium. Taking the relatively small and statistically insignificant effect of expected
peer take-up on own demand by heart, conformity considerations and incentives to free ride ap-
pear to cancel each other out. This finding is in line with the hypotheses of a smaller magnitude
of the social interaction effect in the subgroup offered a household insurance policy. Overall, we
therefore conclude that incentives to free ride do seem to exist in the joint liability context of this
study, but are likely to be dominated by social preference considerations.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we add to a broader literature on the role
of social networks in agents decisions such education (Sacerdote et al., 2011; Epple and Romano,
2011; Boucher et al., 2014) and health (Fortin and Yazbeck, 2015; Clark and Lohéac, 2007).
In a developing country context, peer effects have been studied in the demand for innovative
health services (Oster and Thornton, 2012; Miller and Mobarak, 2014) and improved agricultural
products (Conley and Udry, 2010; Carter et al., 2014).
Second, we contribute to an emerging literature on the role of social networks in the demand for
financial services in developing countries. In addition to savings and high stakes investment deci-
sions (Bursztyn et al., 2014), microfinance loans (Banerjee et al., 2013) and index-based weather
insurance (Cai et al., 2015b; Giné et al., 2011), the role of social networks in health insurance
decisions has been studied (Chemin, 2018). Investigating the demand for voluntary, public health
insurance in rural China over time, Liu et al. (2014) find positive effects of observing others’ in-
surance choices, indicative of social learning. Instead of observed decisions, this paper focuses
on the role of expected peer choices and a trade-off between conforming with and free-riding on
these expected decisions.
Third, we extend a strand of literature relating insurance decisions to risky investment decisions
in the context of joint liability (Fischer, 2013; Giné et al., 2010). Complementing existing evidence
on free riding from framed insurance experiment (Janssens and Kramer, 2016), this paper provides
novel evidence from actual insurance decisions. Studying actual decisions in joint liability groups
allows for a more realistic description of the interplay of the various channels potentially affecting
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insurance demand. In addition to incentives to free ride, the setting of this paper incorporates the
motifs of social norms, a taste for conformity, communication learning and repeated interactions
in the group.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a theoretical motiva-
tion of the conformity and free-riding channels and discusses a unifying framework. Section 2.3
discusses how the model informs the estimation strategy. Section 2.4 discusses the institutional
framework, the intervention and the sources of data used for estimation. Section 2.5 presents the
results and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
The purpose of this section is threefold. Section 2.2.1 briefly discusses the economic theory
underlying the conformity and free riding channels. In addition, social learning is conceptualized
and put in context of this study. Section 2.2.2 discusses the history of social interaction effects
models. Section 2.2.3 discusses the behavioral model developed by Lee et al. (2014a) and ex-
tended by Yang and Lee (2017).
2.2.1 Social Interactions in Insurance Demand
In the context of interacting in joint-liability groups, economic models justify the existence of
both positive and negative peer effects in the demand for low-income health insurance. This sec-
tion discusses the various channels through which peer effects have been shown to affect behavior
and rules out mechanisms not applicable in the studied context. Generally, this paper refers to
peer effects as an observed correlation in agents’ behavior, and defines social interaction effects
as an agent’s utility being directly affected by another agent’s behavior (Cooper and Rege, 2011).
Social Learning Learning from peers about a new technology or product, such as health insur-
ance, can occur in two different ways (Golub and Sadler, 2017). First, an agent can observe other
agents’ decisions and indirectly infer useful information that influences her own decision. Second,
an agent can learn directly about other agents’ beliefs or opinions and incorporate these into his
decision making. Models employing the former notion of learning are often referred to as obser-
vational learning models (Choi et al., 2015). The latter type of models are called communication
learning models (Choi et al., 2015) or models with knowledge spillovers (Cooper and Rege, 2011)
Observational learning models are often at the heart of studies of agricultural adoption of im-
proved technologies. Observing the outcome of others’ decision to adopt an improved technology
might allow to assess the profitability of that technology, thereby influencing own adoption (Besley
and Case, 1993; Goyal, 2011). Relatedly, many improved technologies are complex to use and
require a specific combination of inputs to achieve optimal results. For this reason, in target-inputs
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models, Bayesian agents observe input-output combinations and update their input choice to re-
flect that of successful peers (Conley and Udry, 2010). In a similar spirit, Oster and Thornton
(2012) document that school-girls in Nepal learn from their peers about the appropriate use of
a new health product. As the name indicates, observational learning models require to observe
other agent’s actions to infer useful information.4 In this study, a new product is introduced for
the first time in a context that does not allow agents to observe their group members decisions and
outcomes. While agents might have an incentive to strategically delay take-up of the product to
benefit from social learning (Maertens, 2017), this is not applicable in the given context because
agents face a one-shot decision.
Communication learning models exhibit direct information sharing and formalize how learning
of others’ beliefs about an unknown or ambiguous state of the world affects own actions.5 In the
insurance context, ambiguous states of the world could for example be the perceived value of the
offered product or the perceived probability of insurer default. Perceiving an insurance provider
likely to default is found to inhibit insurance demand both in theory (Liu and Myers, 2016) and in
practice (Dercon et al., 2015). In a situation with high ambiguity about the perceived value of the
product or probability of default, learning about others’ beliefs might therefore lead the agent to
update his priors and thereby change his decision. Giné et al. (2011) document social interaction
effects in the demand for an index based weather insurance product. The authors exogenously
vary both the price of the policy and the intensity of access to information material across villages
in Kenya, leading to exogenous variation in the exposure to treated peers. They find spillovers
of the information material above a specific threshold of treated peers, but no spillover of the
discount voucher. Similarly, Cai et al. (2015b) document knowledge spillovers in the demand for
a weather insurance product in rural China. Within a given village, the randomized study offers
the product to farmers through information sessions that are held over the course of several weeks.
The authors find that the effect of the information session on demand is lower for second round
sessions, and that this reduction is explained by the diffusion of insurance knowledge from first
round participants to their friends participating in the second round. Using an estimation approach
comparable to this paper, Liu et al. (2014) provide evidence of social learning in households’
decision to enroll in voluntary, public health insurance in rural China. The authors find that a 10
percentage point increase in average village enrollment leads to a five percentage point increase
in the likelihood to enroll.
This study focuses on the role of social networks in demand for a health insurance product
offered to credit group members of a well-known rural development organization in Pakistan.
4 Imitation, in a sense, qualifies as a simple heuristic that is based on observational learning. Instead of inferring
useful information, an imitating agent would infer something about the correctness of his decision making (Cooper
and Rege, 2011).
5 How agents update their beliefs is an ongoing field of research. DeGroot (1974) proposes a simple updating rule
that averages over all beliefs. In contrast, Bayesian updating models postulate a more sophisticated decision rule
(Choi et al., 2015). Grimm and Mengel (2014) tests different belief formation models in the lab and finds evidence
that lies somewhere in between.
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While the room for observational learning in this context is limited, communication learning might
play an important role. One example is that the majority of group members is not aware of the
concept of health insurance.6
Social Norms and Conformity Social norms and conformity considerations can be a channel
for positive social interaction effects in the demand for the offered health insurance product. Social
norms are defined as a set of behavioral rules that guides agents to take socially accepted decisions
(Cooper and Rege, 2011). Learning about the social desirability of a decision oftentimes happens
through sanctions in the form of (dis-)approval by others in the social network (Coleman, 1994).
Similarly, conformity is defined as changing one’s actions to align with the (expected) action of
others (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). In situations in which no objectively acceptable behavior
is defined, such as the introduction of a new product, conformity considerations and social norms
operate in a comparable manner (Festinger, 1954). Social preference models postulate that agents
care about the choices of others per se (Manski, 2000; Lahno and Serra-Garcia, 2015). The utility
function in such models oftentimes features a loss function of own behavior in relation to others’
behavior given by the distance of the agent’s decision from the (expected) group decision (Bern-
heim, 1994; Akerlof, 1997). A conformity parameter that weighs this distance determines the
magnitude of the conformity considerations. For a non-negative conformity parameter, utility is
maximized if the agent’s decision is as close to the expected decision of the remaining members in
the group. Expecting a higher average demand in group, the conformity channel would predict that
the agent is more likely to purchase insurance. Thus, the agent’s decision depends positively on
the average decision in the group, establishing the potential for positive social interaction effects.
In a group interaction, such (simultaneous) decision making can be modeled as a non-cooperative
game. Non-cooperative games, in which the agent’s marginal utility depends positively on the
other agents’ actions, are said to exhibit strategic complementarities (Jackson and Zenou, 2015;
Ballester et al., 2006).7
Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2015) conduct a lab experiment to test whether other agent’s choices
and/or others’ outcomes matter in the context of making decisions under uncertainty. They find
that peer effects almost double when peers make choices as compared to when peers are allocated
a lottery. 8 Similarly, Bursztyn et al. (2014) conduct a large scale field experiment with a financial
brokerage in Brazil to document social learning and social utility considerations in financial deci-
sion making. The study design allows the authors to separate the decision to buy an asset from the
possession of that asset, thereby enabling them to separately estimate the effects of information
6 Table 2.3 illustrates that only 22% of the credit group members in the sample have heard of the concept of health
insurance. Note that positive peer effects indicate a positive correlation of own and other behavior. This might go in
both ways in that an agents learning of another agents higher (lower) perceived value would lead him to positively
(negatively) update his belief and potentially action.
7 Vice versa, a game exhibits strategic substitutes if an agent’s marginal utility depends negatively on other agents
taking the same decision. Section 2.2.3 provides a framework that allows to study conformity considerations.
8 For a review of experimental literature studying the role of social networks in models of other regarding preferences
refer to Breza (2016).
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spillovers and social preferences. In particular, clients of the investment brokerage receive either
no information or are informed about both the purchasing decision and the ownership of the asset
status of their friends or family members who have also been offered the asset. The authors find
that both observing a connected peer expressing interest to purchase and observing a connected
peer owning the asset increases the likelihood of purchasing. Moreover, the authors find that
learning is more pronounced among financially sophisticated agents.
Instead of high-income brokerage clients and their decision to invest, this study focuses on
low-income members of joint liability groups and their decision to insure against existential health
risk. Studying the demand for index weather insurance, Cai et al. (2015a) find that participants
of a training program are more likely to purchase insurance when learning about a high demand
among former training participants. This study focuses on indemnity insurance and studies how
group member’s expected behavior influences own decision making.
Free Riding By construction, joint liability implies that group members’ wealth is dependent
on the wealth distribution of their fellow group members.9 Unforeseen health expenditures for
example constitute an adverse wealth shock that might lead to a group member defaulting on her
outstanding loan amount. In that case, joint liability would require other group members to make
up for the missing contribution. Offering voluntary insurance against idiosyncratic health risks
in a joint liability context has two counteracting effects (De Janvry et al., 2014). First, insurance
directly affects the distribution of the group member’s own wealth. Standard insurance theory
predicts that risk averse agents prefer full insurance at a fair premium price. In the case of jointly
liable groups, though, there is a second, indirect effect of one member’s insurance decision on
the wealth distribution the remaining group members face. The reduced probability of having to
cover for an insured member means that individual insurance exhibits a positive externality for
other members.10 In other words, individual insurance constitutes a public good to the group,
creating an incentive to free ride (De Janvry et al., 2014; Janssens and Kramer, 2016).11 Conse-
quently, expecting a larger fraction of fellow group members to take up insurance might inhibit
own demand, leading to negative social interaction effects.12
Free riding on other’s insurance decision is akin to free riding on jointly liable group mem-
bers when it comes to risky project choice. Fischer (2013), for example, develops a model of
investment choice and risk sharing in joint liability groups to explain two inefficiencies of the
conventional group lending setting. First, risk pooling allows to invest in riskier projects with-
out having to bear the full costs in case of failure - a positive externality that encourages agents
to take more risky projects. Second, peer monitoring of individual investment decisions - like
9 If agents’ utility is separable, i.e. depends only on own wealth, free riding cannot occur (De Janvry et al., 2014).
10 Depending on the structure of the policy, insurance might only be partial.
11 Formalizing this insurance game might lead to multiple equilibria (De Janvry et al., 2014). Section 2.2.3 provides
a formal model of the insurance decision.
12 Requiring full insurance at the group level might be one way to overcome the free riding incentives (De Janvry
et al., 2014; Janssens and Kramer, 2016).
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group insurance - is able to solve the free riding problem, but might lead to lower than socially
optimal investment behavior. Bringing these predictions to the data, Fischer (2013) conducts lab-
in-the-field experiments with microfinance clients in rural India. The results of these experiments
suggest that there is substantial free riding in investment decisions, especially among more risk
tolerant clients. Similarly, Giné et al. (2010) test the effects of the loan contract structure on in-
vestment behavior in a series of ten different experiments run over the course of ten months with
Peruvian micro-entrepreneurs. The results provide evidence of considerably higher risk taking in
jointly liable groups. At the same time, they find that dynamic incentives, in the sense of clients
being excluding from future loan disbursements in the case of group default, significantly reduces
risk taking behavior. These findings are in line with theoretical predictions and other experimen-
tal studies investigating the effect of repeated interaction on cooperative behavior (Dal Bó and
Fréchette, 2018).
Janssens and Kramer (2016), to the best of my knowledge, are the only ones who empirically
test the free riding hypotheses in the health insurance context. They conduct a framed lab-in-the-
field experiment with 335 credit group members in Tanzania. For the sake of the experiment, study
participants are randomly allocated to form jointly liable groups to play multiple rounds of a public
good game that is framed as a health insurance decision. To test whether group insurance does
indeed overcome potential free riding problems, groups are randomly offered individual insurance
policies or group insurance that mandates 100% take-up among all group members. Similar to
Fischer (2013), the results reveal that relatively risk averse group members are more likely to take
up insurance when individual insurance is offered. In contrast, more risk tolerant group members
tend to free ride on their group members insurance decisions. Since the offered insurance is
optimal from an individual group member’s perspective, group insurance leads to higher uptake
and is found effective in overcoming the free riding problem. While these results support the free
riding hypothesis, the experimental setting abstracts from several important factors. First, even
though the game is dynamic, group members are not able to save and finance health expenditures
through pre-cautionary savings. Second, randomly formed groups allow to overcome potential
endogeneity issues in the empirical analysis13, but might switch off the particular channel through
which social norms might induce group members to conform to the average choice in the group.
Third, the experiment mandates anonymous decision making, potentially reducing the taste for
conformity even further.
In this paper, I study real life health insurance decisions of members of pre-existing joint-
liability groups. Since these groups are not formed at random, the empirical strategy discussed
below will ideally account for group unobservables that could explain similar decision taking.
Further, the members of these groups are supposedly subject to social norms and a credible threat
of punishment throughout future interactions. In theory, it might therefore be possible to provide
the public good of insurance (Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2018). The confor-
13 Refer to section 2.3 for a more detailed discussion of how endogenously formed groups can bias the empirical
analysis in a social interaction framework.
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mity channel in a repeated interactions context thus provides room for the existence of positive
social interaction effects. At the same time, theoretical and experimental evidence suggests that
agents are well aware of the strategic incentives they face when interacting in jointly liable groups.
Consequently, there is grounds for the existence of negative social interaction effects. Whether
conformity or free-riding considerations dominate in the context at hand is therefore an empirical
question.
The theoretical framework introduced in section 2.2.3 accommodates the free riding and con-
formity channels through a single social interactions parameter. If conformity considerations out-
weigh the free riding considerations, we would expect to observe positive social interaction effects.
Vice versa, if free riding considerations dominate, we hypothesize the parameter of interest to be
negative. Before discussing the model in more detail, though, section 2.2.2 provides a brief history
of identification in social interaction effects models.
2.2.2 Identification of Social Interaction Effects Models
The discussion of identification in social interaction models goes back to Manski (1993). In
general, linear social interaction models attempt to disentangle the role of (expected) peer choices
in agents’ decisions from the role of own characteristics, the fact that agents with similar char-
acteristics are likely to take similar actions, and the fact that common environmental factors can
induce similar actions. A direct effect of a connected peer’s (expected) choice on an agent’s de-
cision is referred to as an endogenous effect due to its potential spillover effects in equilibrium.
The possibility that agents’ take similar decisions because they have similar characteristics is re-
ferred to as contextual effects.14 Analogously, agents’ decisions taken in a similar environment
could be similar because of factors common to this environment, a channel denoted correlated
effects. Manski (1993) discusses the challenges of disentangling these channels due to a so-called
reflection problem. Intuitively, the reflection problem arises due to a simultaneity of individual
choice and average behavior in the group. More recent contributions demonstrate that the original
non-identification result is implied by the particular setting of interacting in complete groups and
substituting observed peer choices for expected peer choices. If instead group members are ob-
served to be connected only to a subset of individuals in the group, the network structure provides
identification conditions similar to the conditions in spatial econometrics (Kelejian and Prucha,
1998; Bramoullé et al., 2009).
This study models households’ decision to purchase insurance as a binary choice. For this
reason, the discussion of identification focuses on binary choice models that incorporate social
interaction effects. Brock and Durlauf (2001) adapt Manski’s original social network model to the
context of a binary decision problem. As in the original framework, their model exhibits inter-
14 Contextual effects can only be accounted for if the relevant characteristics influencing the decision are observable
by the researcher. Unavailability of such information might lead to a spurious correlation in behavior that can in fact
be explained by similarity in agent characteristics.
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action in complete groups. Moreover, the authors assume that agents form rational expectations
about their group members’ choices by taking into account group level characteristics.15 As a
consequence, all agents attribute the same choice probability to each group member, implying
that every peer exerts identical influence on others. In other words, the influence an agent exerts
on other individuals is solely determined by being member of a particular group and that group’s
characteristics.
Lee et al. (2014a) relax this assumption in allowing agents to form heterogeneous rational
expectations. Their model assumes that every agent has full information about peer characteristics
and that this information is taken into account when forming expectations about peer decisions.
This assumption implies that every agent has the same expectation about a peer’s decision. These
expectations differ across peers because of differences in peers’ observable characteristics. While
the original binary choice framework seems reasonable in large group settings in which the agent
is interested in average behavior of the group, the extended setting seems more applicable to small
group interactions in which agents know their peers better.
Yang and Lee (2017) extend this generalized binary choice framework to allow for private
information in the formation of rational expectations. Intuitively, agents form heterogeneous ex-
pectations about peer choices because of (i) differences in peer observables (Lee et al., 2014a) and
(ii) asymmetric information sets about privately observed peer characteristics. Accounting for
private information in the formation of expectations is an interesting topic, but beyond the scope
of this study. Section 2.2.3 nevertheless discusses the generalized conceptual framework in more
detail.
2.2.3 Binary Choice with Social Interactions and Heterogeneous Expecta-
tions
This study employs the binary choice framework with social interactions discussed in Lee
et al. (2014a) and extended by Yang and Lee (2017). The subsequent paragraphs summarize key
components of that framework, adopting their notation. The components comprise the definition
of social interactions, the information structure, the decision making process, and the equilibrium
conditions. While introduced in a general manner, each of the component is then discussed in the
context demand for low-income health insurance.
Social Interactions Suppose that there is a set of n individuals organized in G groups, where
group g has size ng,
∑
g ng = n. Assuming no interactions across groups, the social-interaction
matrix Wg captures connections within group g. Define Wg = (wg1, ..., wgng)′ where wgi =
(wgi1, ..., wging), g = 1, ...G, i = 1, ...ng. wgi captures agent i’s connections and the respective
15 A different set of studies assumes that the peer’s realized outcome directly enters an agents utility function (Krauth,
2006; Soetevent and Kooreman, 2007).
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weight she assigns to group members 1 to ng. The model abstracts from self-influence, thus
wgii = 0. If individual i is not influenced by individual j they are unconnected, wgij = 0. If
individual i considers j a connection, wgij > 0. The literature usually considers equally weighted
links with wgij = 1. In general, networks are differentiated along two dimensions: directionality
and completeness. Directed networks are characterized by non-symmetric socio-interaction ma-
trices Wg. In directed networks models it matters which agents reports to be connected to which
peer. In undirected network graphs, this information is aggregated and a connection is established
as soon as one part reports a link. Thus, Wg is symmetric. Directed and undirected network mod-
els differ in terms of the implicit assumptions imposed on the link formation process.16 In terms
of network completeness, interaction in complete groups implies that every member of the group
is connected to every other member, wgij = 1ng−1 , i 6= j. In contrast, interaction in incomplete,
potentially overlapping subgroups allows for more subtle connections between members of the
same group. Given the context of joint liability groups, this study assumes interaction in com-
plete groups.Aggregating group level information, and assuming no interaction across groups, the
socio-matrix W is block diagonal
W =

W1 0 . . . 0
0 W2 . . . 0
... . . .
0 0 . . . WG
 .
Information Structure The social interaction matrix Wg is assumed to be common knowledge.
In addition, agent i in group g is described by the set of characteristics Xgi = (Xg
′
g , X
c′
gi, X
p′
gi)
′,
where Xg′g denotes group level characteristics that are observable by all members of the group.
17
Xc
′
gi contains observable characteristics, such as the member’s gender, age and occupation, that
are common knowledge among the group members. Xp
′
gi denotes characteristics that are poten-
tially known to (specific) group members, such as the number of children or household members’
health status. Jgi is a (ng × 1) vector that captures agents i’s knowledge about other group mem-
bers’ private characteristics Xpgj, j ∈ {1, ..., ng}. Jgi(j) = 1 if i knows j’s private characteristics,
0 otherwise. Thus, Jg = (Jg1, ..., Jgng) captures the information structure in group g. This in-
formation structure is assumed to be common knowledge. Define XpJgi as the vector of private
characteristics Xpgj that are in i’s information set. Yang and Lee (2017) differentiate three types
of information structures: (i) publicly-known characteristics, i.e. XpJgi = (X
p′
g1, ..., X
p′
gng)
′,∀i,
(ii) self-known characteristics, i.e. XpJgi = X
p
gi, and (iii) socially-known characteristics, i.e.
XpJgi = (X
p′
gj : j = i∨wgij 6= 0)′. At this stage, the empirical application assumes publicly known
16 In this study, social interactions are regarded exogenous (conditional on fixed group characteristics). Goldsmith-
Pinkham and Imbens (2013) suggest a test for exogenous network formation. Johnsson and Moon (2016) propose a
control function approach to model an endogenous network formation process.
17 These group level characteristics can be either observed or unobserved by the econometrician, influencing the
modeling choice later on. Ideally, the estimation will allow for unobserved correlated effects by estimating a random
effects model a la Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1982) (see section 2.3).
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characteristics. This is considered the benchmark for potential extensions that leverage other in-
formation structures. Specifically, the study design features privately observed characteristics in
the form of random premium discounts that are allocated in private.18 The public information in
group g is summarized in Zg = (Xg, Xcg1, ..., X
c
gng ,Wg, Jg).
Behavioral Model This paper studies agents’ binary decision to insure at least one member
of their household, ygi ∈ {0, 1}.19 This decision is modeled through a latent variable model,
ygi = I
(
y∗gi > 0
)
, where I() is the indicator function and the latent index y∗gi is a function of
the agent’s characteristics Xgi and a weighted average of her expectation about connected peers’
choices20
y∗gi = β0 +X
c′
giβ1 +X
p′
giβ2 +X
g′
g β3 + λ
ng∑
j 6=i
wgijE
[
ygj|XpJgi , Z
]
− gi, (2.1)
where (βl, λ), l = 0, 1, 2, 3 are the parameter vectors of interest. β1 and β2 capture the direct
effects of own (private) characteristics, β3 captures correlated group effects and λ is the main social
interaction effects parameter. If agent i in group g expects a higher demand among the other group
members
(∑ng
j 6=iwgijE
[
ygj|XpJgi , Z
])
and λ > 0, the latent index increases, making the agent
more likely to demand insurance. This is in line with the conformity and repeated interactions
arguments presented in section 2.2.1. Thus, if λ > 0, the model exhibits positive social interaction
effects. In contrast, for λ < 0, expecting a higher demand among the (connected) group members
decreases the latent index, making the agent less likely to purchase insurance. Therefore, λ < 0
implies negative social interaction effects, in line with the free riding channel. gi is an iid random
component drawn from a logistic density function f. The respective draw of gi is known only to
agent i and assumed to be independent of the socio-matrix Wg and the observable characteristics
18 Another reason for focusing on the case of publicly known characteristics is that the social interaction parameter
of interest does not seem to be identified in the presence of group level unobserved characteristics in the cases of
privately or socially known characteristics (Yang and Lee, 2017).
19 The description of the behavioral model follows the notation of Yang and Lee (2017). Guerra and Mohnen (2017)
develop an analogous multinomial choice model and provide an application to occupational choice.
20 The empirical approach assumes publicly known characteristics and will thus include peers’ observed characteris-
tics as contextual variables. These are excluded from equation 2.1 for notational purposes. In case of socially known
characteristics, for example, the agent would form expectations conditional on his information structure, accounting
for a potential correlation in private characteristics.
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Xgi. An agent’s expected choice is thus given by21
E
[
ygi|XpJgi , Z
]
= P (ygi = 1) = P (y
∗
gi > 0)
= F
(
β0 +X
c′
giβ1 +X
p′
giβ2 +X
g′
g β3 + λ
ng∑
j 6=i
wgijE
[
ygj|XpJgi , Z
])
.
(2.2)
This framework can be formally described as a Bayesian game in which agents take simultaneous
decisions given their information structure XJgi and their type gi (Yang and Lee, 2017). If all
characteristics are publicly known, it is a complete information game. If there are privately or
socially known characteristics the game exhibits (asymmetric) incomplete information.22 More-
over, the econometrician does not observe agents’ subjective expectations about peer actions.23
Therefore, it is assumed that agents form rational expectations about the choices of their con-
nected peers given the agent’s available information. Depending on the information structure,
these expectations can be heterogeneous for two reasons. First, individuals differ in their ob-
servable characteristics, Xcgi, and agents take these differences into account when forming their
expectations about the individuals’ choices (Lee et al., 2014a). Second, information about an in-
dividual’s privately observed characteristics Xpgi can be asymmetrically distributed among group
members. This asymmetry in information implies that group members take into account differ-
ent information for the same individual when forming their expectations (Yang and Lee, 2017).24
The empirical application currently only allows for the former type of heterogeneity because it
assumes publicly known characteristics. The equilibrium condition of this game requires that ev-
ery agent, as described by a specific information set XpJgi and private type gi, chooses his best
strategy sgi(X
p
Jgi
, gi) given her belief of all other (connected) agents’ strategies. Formally, the
consistency condition for equilibrium strategies states that ∀i = 1, ..., ng
sgi(X
p
Jgi
, gi) = I
(
β0 +X
c′
giβ1 +X
p′
giβ2 +X
g′
g β3 + λ
ng∑
j 6=i
wgijE
[
sgj(X
p
Jgj
, gj)|XpJgi , Z
]
− gi > 0
)
(2.3)
21 Lee et al. (2014a) point out that this specification follows from a random utility framework (McFadden, 1974).
Yang and Lee (2017) describe a structural model of conformity that is consistent with this framework in their ap-
pendix. Alternatively, Blume et al. (2015) suggest that a model of complementary choices, in which an agents
marginal utility increases in the average (expected) choice of peer behavior, would lead to a similar estimation equa-
tion. Bajari et al. (2010) state that this set-up implies only pure strategies of the game.
22 Agents type gi will never be known by others. Privately or socially known characteristics are not observed by all
agents in the group.
23 The data collection process did not elicit subjective expectations to remain independently of the intervention.
This protocol was followed to ensure that the introduction of insurance is not anticipated. For more details on data
collection and roll-out refer to section 2.4. Li and Lee (2009) use subjective expectations in a binary choice model
with social interactions in the context of voting decisions.
24 Information asymmetry is relevant if characteristics are socially-known or if privately known characteristics are
correlated across individuals (or with observable characteristics).
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Equilibrium Expectations and Solution The solution of this game involves solving for agent
i’s conditional expectation of her connected peers’ j strategies, E
[
sgj(X
p
Jgj
, gj)|XpJgi , Z
]
. In
general, these expectations depend on agent i’s information structure XpJgi . In the case of pub-
licly observed characteristics, though, every agents has the same information structure, XpJgi =
(Xp
′
g1, ..., X
p′
gng)
′,∀i. Following Yang and Lee (2017), for some agent i, connected to some j, we
can express her expectation of j’s action as a function of that information structure Jgi,
Ψegj,Jgi(x) = E
[
ygj|XpJgi = x, Z = z
]
. (2.4)
It can be shown that this vector-valued function is a contraction mapping if regularity con-
ditions hold and social interactions are not too strong (Lee et al., 2014a; Yang and Lee, 2017).
The contraction mapping property implies that there is a unique Bayesian equilibrium of the
simultaneous move game. The sufficient condition for a unique equilibrium in a framework
with row-normalized social interaction matrices and logistic error-term distribution is |λ| < 4.
In the case of complete networks, Lee et al. (2014a) establish that there is a unique solution
to this equation if and only if the social interactions parameter is within a specific range, λ ∈(
− (ng−1)
maxuf(u)
, 1
maxuf(u)
)
.25
If characteristics are publicly know, all agents have the same information set and therefore form
identical expectations about any peer they have in common.26 In the case of complete networks,
this implies that all agents form identical expectations of a given group member’s insurance de-
cision. Nevertheless, these expectations differ across group members because of differences in
their observable characteristics (Lee et al., 2014a). Formally, ∀i = 1, ..., ng, XpJi =
(
Xp1 , ..., X
p
ng
)
requires the equilibrium expectations
Ψe =

E
[
y1|Xp1 , ..., Xpng , Z = z
]
...
E
[
yng |Xp1 , ..., Xpng , Z = z
]

25 Note that the condition for a unique solution depends on the size of the respective group. In the empirical ap-
plication there is considerable variation in group sizes and thus variation in the condition for a unique equilibrium
solution. Note, that given a particular value of the social interactions parameter, variation in group size might lead to
multiple equilibria for some groups, but not others. In the empirical application the occurrence of multiple equilibria
is mitigated by focusing on groups with more than 3 members attending.
26 For more information on the cases of self and or socially known characteristics see Appendix B.1. For a more
detailed discussion of the numerical methods required to obtain solutions these cases refer to Yang and Lee (2017).
Note that in the case of interaction in complete networks there is no room for socially known characteristics, while
there would be room for privately known characteristics.
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to satisfy the consistency condition
Ψei = E
[
I
(
β0 +X
c′
giβ1 +X
p′
giβ2 +X
g′
g β3 + λ
ng∑
j 6=i
wgijΨ
e
j − gi > 0
)
|Xp1 , ..., Xpng , Z = z
]
,
∀i = 1, ..., ng.
(2.5)
As stated above, a unique solution of the equilibrium consistency condition exists if the social
interactions parameter λ is within a specific range. In case the numerical procedure described
in section 2.3 leads to multiple equilibria, a random selection rule is implemented. The random
selection rule assigns a probability of one to one of the equilibria and probability zero to all others.
If the selection rule is correctly specified, this leads to consistent point estimates (Krauth, 2006;
Soetevent and Kooreman, 2007).27
Reparameterization Following Lee et al. (2014a), the behavioral model proposed in equation
2.2 is reparameterized. The reparameterization allows the authors to establish that the identifying
assumption on the social interaction effects parameter λ is no stronger than the assumption invoked
in the case of homogeneous equilibrium expectations (Brock and Durlauf, 2001) or in the case
of a linear social interactions model with continuous outcome variable (Bramoullé et al., 2009;
Kelejian and Prucha, 2010).28 To show this equivalence the authors define y˜gi ∈ {−1, 1} as
y˜gi = 2ygi − 1 and rewrite equation 2.2 as
P (y˜gi = 1) = P (y˜
∗
gi > 0) = F
(
β˜0 +X
c′
giβ˜1 +X
p′
gi β˜2 +X
g′
g β˜3 + λ˜
ng∑
j 6=i
wgijE
[
y˜gj|XpJgi , Z
])
.
(2.6)
Agent i’ expected choice is then given by E
[
y˜gi|XpJgi , Z
]
= P (y˜gi = 1) − P (y˜gi = −1) =
2P (y˜gi = 1) − 1. In a further step, it can be shown that λ = 2λ˜.29 For the Bayesian game
with logistic type distribution  and row-normalized socio-interaction matrix Wg this implies that
a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists if |λ˜| < 2. Writing out the logistic cumulative distri-
bution function in equation 2.6 and rearranging we have
P (y˜gi = 1) =
exp
(
k˜
)
1 + exp
(
k˜
) = exp
(
˜˜k
)
exp
(
˜˜k
)
+ exp
(
−˜˜k
) = 1
1 + exp
(
−2˜˜k
) (2.7)
27 Lee et al. (2014a) hypothesize that their estimation approach should be robust to this a procedure.
28 Moreover, specifying yig ∈ {0, 1} implicitly assumes that yig = 0 does not exert any peer effects (Soetevent and
Kooreman, 2007). 29 The relationship between β and β˜ depends on λ˜ and is derived in Lee et al. (2014a).
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where
k˜ = β˜0 +X
c′
giβ˜1 +X
p′
gi β˜2 +X
g′
g β˜3 + λ˜
ng∑
j 6=i
wgijE
[
y˜gj|XpJgi , Z
]
and
˜˜k = ˜˜β0 +X
c′
gi
˜˜β1 +X
p′
gi
˜˜β2 +X
g′
g
˜˜β3 +
˜˜λ
ng∑
j 6=i
wgijE
[
y˜gj|XpJgi , Z
]
with β˜t = 2
˜˜βt, t = 0, 1, 2, 3 and λ˜ = 2
˜˜λ. Consequently, |˜˜λ| < 1 emerges as the necessary
restriction on the reparameterized social interactions parameter. Moreover, using equation 2.7,
agent i’s expected value can be expressed as
E
[
y˜gi|XpJgi , Z
]
=
2
1 + exp(−2˜˜k)
−1 = 1− exp(−2
˜˜k)
1 + exp(−2˜˜k)
=
exp(˜˜k)− exp(−˜˜k)
exp(˜˜k) + exp(−˜˜k)
= tanh(˜˜k) (2.8)
2.3 Estimation Strategy
This section discusses how to obtain parameter estimates for the model discussed in section
2.2.3. The estimation strategy focuses on the case of publicly observed characteristics because
it is a benchmark for potential extensions and because the parameters are not identified for other
information structures in presence of group effects unobservable by the researcher (Yang and Lee,
2017).30 Therefore, the model in equation 2.7 can be adapted to include contextual effects without
having to solve for the conditional expectation of privately or socially known characteristics. As
discussed in section 2.2.2, contextual effects account for the possibility that agents take the same
decision because they exhibit similar characteristics.31 Households that both exhibit higher health
risks for example might both be more likely to take-up insurance. Following the literature, such
contextual effects are incorporated for by allowing agent i’s choice to depend on average observed
characteristics of her connected peers j,
∑ng
j 6=iwgijXgj .
Moreover, members of the same joint liability group g might take similar decisions because
they are exposed to the same environmental factors or common shocks (Manski, 1993).32 The
choice model described in section 2.2.3 accounts for such environmental factors through observ-
able group characteristics Xg′g . The estimation approach could account for such observable group
characteristics. However, additional group level determinants that are potentially unobservable to
the econometrician might influence the group members’ general tendency to enroll in insurance.
30 Yang and Lee (2017) provide a discussion of the estimation approach for the cases of privately and socially known
characteristics in absence of correlated group effects.
31 In addition to the observability of the relevant characteristics by the research (as stated in section 2.2.2), the
insurance game specified in section 2.2.3 requires that the characteristics are observable by other group members. For
the case of publicly observed characteristics the information structure guarantees this by assumption.
32 In the setting at hand, insurance is introduced by social organizers in a community meeting. Since all group
members interact with the same social organizer, αg could capture effects specific to the social organizer. Further, the
group formation process could be driven by considerations that are shared among the potential group members, such
as a taste for risk taking (Attanasio et al., 2012; Cooper and Rege, 2011).
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At the same time these group level characteristics might be correlated with group members’ char-
acteristics (Mundlak, 1978). Neglecting the possibility of group unobservables could therefore
result in biased estimates even when accounting for observable group characteristics (Lee et al.,
2014a; Wooldridge, 2010). One way to account for the possibility of unobserved correlated group
effects would be to include group level fixed effects in the decision model (Lin, 2010).33 Estimat-
ing group fixed effects in a non-linear discrete choice model, however, is likely to result in biased
estimates due to the incidental parameters problem (Lee et al., 2014a; Greene, 2004; Wooldridge,
2010). Instead, the estimation approach could follow Lee et al. (2014a) and Liu et al. (2014) in
leveraging a correlated random effects model to overcome potential endogeneity concerns (Mund-
lak, 1978; Chamberlain, 1982). While such a correlated random effects approach is not imple-
mented in the estimation of this paper yet, a formal discussion is provided. The correlated random
effects framework can be modeled through a composite error term, gi = ug + vgi, that comprises
of group and individual level innovations, ug and vgi respectively. For a logistic choice model,
the individual level innovations vgi are independent draws from a logistic distribution. The group
level component ug is modeled as a linear projection of average group characteristics and a group
level projection error (Bajari et al., 2010)34
ug = X¯gβg + αg, (2.9)
where X¯g contains average values of observable characteristics across all group members and αg
is the projection error. By construction, αg is uncorrelated with the linear projection. Moreover,
the parameter estimates of the contextual effects and individual characteristics absorb the linear
projection term. Furthermore, assuming that the projection error αg follows a normal distribution
with unknown variance for all groups g, σαg ∼ N(0, 1), the correlated random effects approach
introduces only one additional parameter to estimate (Lee et al., 2014a). Consequently, we can
re-write the linear index in equation 2.7 as
˜˜k = ˜˜β0 +X
c′
gi
˜˜β1 +X
p′
gi
˜˜β2 + ˜˜γ
ng∑
j 6=i
wgijXgj +
˜˜λ
ng∑
j 6=i
wgijE
[
y˜gj|Xp1 , ..., Xpng , Z = z
]
+σαg, (2.10)
.
where ˜˜γ provides the vector of contextual effects parameters and σ is the unknown standard
deviation of the group random effect. Note that the current estimation approach does not account
for the group random effect σαg yet.35
33 The inclusion of group level fixed effects might only partially solve the endogeneity problem in the case of incom-
plete networks, because peer-to-peer link formation might still be influenced by unobservable characteristics common
to the respective pair of peers (Bramoullé et al., 2009; Lin, 2010; Johnsson and Moon, 2016).
34 In the original panel data setting, the group level component is modeled as a linear projection of average individual
level characteristics across all time periods (Mundlak, 1978). In the social interaction context, time periods are
replaced with group members exposed to the same environment (Liu et al., 2014). 35 If the estimation accounted for
the group random effect, a reparameterization of σ as eω would ensure σ > 0.
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Given the distributional assumptions above, it is possible to obtain parameter estimates through
maximum likelihood estimation. As seen in equation 2.10, these estimates depend on endoge-
nously formed expectations about group members’ behavior. For this reason, the estimation strat-
egy incorporates a nested fixed point routine to solve the equilibrium consistency condition (Lee
et al., 2014a).36 Intuitively, the first step of the iterative procedure is to obtain values for peer
expectations through numerically solving the equilibrium consistency condition in equation 2.5.
The resulting expectations are then used in a second step as an input in the maximum likelihood
estimation. In subsequent iterations, these parameter estimates serve as updated starting values to
solve for the expectations term. If a unique rational expectations equilibrium exists, this approach
can be followed until the vector of parameter estimates converges.37
The log-likelihood function is given by38
lnL( ˜˜β0,
˜˜β1,
˜˜β2, ˜˜γ,
˜˜λ, σ; Y˜ |Xp1 , ..., Xpn, Z) =
n∑
i=1
(
y˜gi + 1
2
ln [P (y˜gi = 1)] +
y˜gi − 1
2
ln [P (y˜gi = −1)]
)
(2.11)
where Z is the vector of publicly observed information andXp1 , ..., X
p
n is the vector of privately
observed information as discussed in section 2.2.3. In the case of publicly observed characteris-
tics, every group member is assumed to have full information about all other group members’
characteristics. For this reason, the estimation procedure includes household level characteristics
in X that are thought to be both observable by other group members and important determinants
of insurance demand. In particular, the estimation procedure controls for household-level socio-
demographic information such as education, age or household size, the household’s economic
situation as measured for example by asset ownership, and the household’s health history.39
To assess the importance of controlling for contextual and correlated group effects, I follow
Lee et al. (2014a) and estimate models in which some of the social interaction parameter vectors
are restricted to 0.40
36 Iterative nested fixed point algorithms are commonly used in the estimation of dynamic discrete choice models
(Yang and Lee, 2017; Rust, 2000, 1987). An alternative approach would be a two-step estimation procedure (Bajari
et al., 2010). The first step would be to obtain (non/semi-parametric) estimates the choice probability. These estimates
can be used in the second step to obtain unbiased estimates. Generally, the first stage of this approach requires an
exclusion restriction to overcome potential endogeneity. Liu et al. (2014) create such an exclusion restriction by
assuming no contextual effects.
37 In case multiple rational expectations equilibria exist for at least some groups, I implement an equilibrium selection
rule that randomly assigns a probability of one to one of these equilibria. In the estimation, multiple equilibria do not
appear regularly.
38 The individual likelihood contributions are independent since the agent’s type vgi is iid and independent of ob-
served characteristics and the socio-matrix. Obtained estimates for the random effects coefficient σ, the estimation
approach would employ a simulated maximum likelihood estimation approach in which the choice probabilities in
equation 2.11 would be replaced with simulated choice probabilities. These simulated choice probabilities would
result from averaging predicted choices over D draws of αg from a standard normal distribution.
39 Table 2.3 provides a detailed list of household-level characteristics accounted for in the analysis. Refer to section
2.4.2 for a more detailed discussion on the available sources of data.
40 The estimation is implemented in the statistical software R and partly based on the MATLAB routine provided
alongside the original paper (Lee et al., 2014b; R Core Team, 2014; Henningsen and Toomet, 2011).
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Model 1 No social interaction effects: ˜˜γ = ˜˜λ = σ = 0
Model 1 serves as a benchmark and constitutes a conventional binary choice model in which
the demand decision is solely determined by own characteristics.
Model 2 Endogenous social effects only: ˜˜γ = σ = 0
Model 2 allows for endogenous social interaction affects, but excludes contextual and cor-
related group effects. If the either of these channels matters, omitted variables bias could
lead to biased estimates of the endogenous social interactions parameter.
Model 3 Contextual effects only: ˜˜λ = σ = 0
Model 3 allows to assess the importance of contextual effects, while excluding endogenous
social interaction effects and random group effects. As for model 2, omitted variable bias
could lead to biased estimates if endogenous or correlated social effects are relevant.
Model 4 Endogenous and contextual effects only: σ = 0
Model 4 allows for both endogenous social interaction and contextual effects, thereby par-
tially overcoming the potential concerns of omitted variable in models 2 and 3. If unob-
served group effects are present, this model might still result in biased estimates. A model
that, in addition, accounts for such unobserved effects would therefore allow to mitigate
such concerns.
While the estimation of these models provide parameter estimates, the interpretation of these
estimates as marginal effects is complicated by two factors. First, the non-linearity of the model
implies that the marginal effects depend on the level of individual characteristics and peer char-
acteristics. Second, the parameter estimates depend on endogenously formed equilibrium expec-
tations. Since these expectations are also based on peer characteristics, a change in any of these
characteristics affects the choice probability both through a change in the direct or contextual
effect and through an indirect effect via a change in equilibrium expectations. Moreover, the pres-
ence of direct and indirect effects implies that, in general, marginal effects differ for individuals
whose own characteristics change and individuals that only experience this change. Lee et al.
(2014a) derive marginal effects formulas that explicitly account for these channels.
In this paper, the main parameter of interest is the endogenous social interactions parameter.
A negative social interactions parameters suggests that an increase in an agent’s expectation of
his group members’ insurance decision leads to a lower probability of take-up, in line with the
free riding argument. A positive social interactions parameter in contrast suggests that an increase
in expected demand among group members’ leads to a higher probability to purchase. Being
agnostic about the underlying reason for a change in equilibrium expectations, the conventional
marginal effect is then given by the partial derivative of equation 2.7 with respect to the agent’s
expectations,
∂P (y˜gi = 1)
∂M
= 2P (y˜gi = 1) [1− P (y˜gi = 1)] ˜˜λ, (2.12)
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where M =
∑ng
j 6=iwgijE
[
y˜gj|XpJgi , Z
]
. Using equation 2.12, it is possible to obtain average
partial effect estimates of the endogenous social interactions terms by averaging individual level
marginal effects estimates.
2.4 Empirical Setting and Data
This paper uses data from a randomized control trial in rural Pakistan. While Pakistan is classi-
fied as a lower-middle income country, in 2013, about one third of the population lived below the
national poverty line.41 For this reason, adverse health shocks and the resulting financial burden
pose an existential risk to a large part of the population (Heltberg and Lund, 2009a). The govern-
ment attempts to mitigate this risk through its system of free public health facilities. Due to low
public spending on health42, many expensive treatments and drugs provided in these facilities are
not covered (MoH, 2009). Further, formal private health insurance plays little to no role in poor
household’s risk management portfolio.43 At the start of this study, our implementation partner,
the National Rural Support Programme of Pakistan (NRSP), was the only non-governmental insti-
tution that offered low-income hospitalization insurance with significant outreach (SECP, 2012).
NRSP is the largest rural development program in Pakistan, reaching more than 2.5 million
households. In rural areas, most activities are implemented through community organizations
(COs), groups of 9 to 15 members living in the same village.44 Members of COs are eligible to
apply for NRSP agricultural and livestock loans. These loans exhibit joint liability meaning that
group members will have to cover outstanding loan amounts of defaulting members. In urban
areas, NRSP operates as a micro-finance organization extending enterprise loans to credit groups
comprised of three to five members.
As of 2005, NRSP credit products are bundled with mandatory hospitalization and disability
insurance for microcredit clients and their spouses. The main benefit of this insurance policy
is the coverage of inpatient hospitalization expenditures accrued during the loan period up to a
threshold of PKR 15,000 (∼ USD 150) per person insured. The coverage threshold is at about
65% of available monthly household income and suffices to finance a minor surgery with a four
41 If not stated otherwise, information in this section is based on the World Bank Indicators 2015, http://data.
worldbank.org/country/pakistan. Fischer et al. (2017) provide a similar description of the background
and intervention.
42 The Government of Pakistan spends about one percent of its GDP on health, one of the lowest fractions in the
world.
43 Existing insurance schemes predominantly target formal and public sector employees.
44 COs are formed in a four stage mobilization process. In a first step, a NRSP social organizer identifies and
introduces the organization and its program to social activists in the community. These activists inform the community
about NRSP and its program in an informal, unstructured way. In a third step, the NRSP social mobilizer formally
introduces the organization and its operations to the community in a program induction meeting. After this meeting,
the CO forms as a group of self-selected individuals that share the intention to collect savings. NRSP policies permit
members of the same CO to come from the same household. In the inaugural CO meeting, the members of the group
select a CO president and a CO manager who share administrative responsibilities and act as contact persons for
NRSP staff.
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day stay in the hospital.45 The total premium of PKR150 is automatically deducted from the loan
amount before disbursement. Note that in the mandatory policy, only a fraction of the household
is insured against unforeseen health expenditures.
2.4.1 Intervention and Sampling
In 2014, our implementation partner engaged in a randomized control trial (RCT) to test the
scope for expanding the existing mandatory insurance coverage. In collaboration with the Uni-
versity of Mannheim, NRSP developed four low-income health insurance policies that allow its
credit clients to cover additional household members against unforeseen health expenses. In the
RCT, one of these four policies is offered in a randomized manner to members of community
organizations and credit groups from the same village. Table 2.1 summarizes the characteristics
of the four policies.46 The offered policies exhibit either individual eligibility (policies P1 and
P2) or household eligibility (policies P3 and P4). In the individual eligibility policies the client
is allowed to enroll any number and combination of dependents in his household. In contrast, in
the household eligibility policies, the client is required to insure either all dependents or none.
The group policy (P4), in addition, requires minimum take-up of 50% among the group mem-
bers present during the community meeting through which insurance is offered. The benefits of
the offered policies are comparable to the benefits of the mandatory policy described above. The
coverage threshold for hospitalization expenses (in policies P1, P3 and P4) is PKR15,000 per per-
son insured for a contract length of 12 months. The corresponding premium per person for these
policies is PKR100. The individual policy P2 exhibits a coverage threshold of PKR30,000 and
therefore a higher premium of PKR150 per person.
The insurance innovations are rolled out through community meetings held by NRSP social
organizers. These sessions are structured into three phases. In the first phase, the social orga-
nizer conducts an interactive awareness session to recap the concept of insurance and explain the
existing, mandatory insurance contract. This first phase of the meeting takes about 30 to 40 min-
utes.47 In the second phase, the social organizer introduces the new, voluntary insurance policy
that has been randomly determined to be offered in that village. The third phase is given by the
enrollment procedure that is held with each group member in private. During enrollment, group
members play a lottery that randomly assigns a discount of PKR 0, 10, 20 or 30 on the per person
insurance premium. Since this third phase is held with each group member in private, enrollment
is sequential. At the same time, there is considerable uncertainty about other group members’
demand when deciding about own take-up, making the decision effectively simultaneous.48
45 The mandatory policy also covers accidental death and disability of the household’s main breadwinner. Further-
more, the policy includes a life insurance element in that the outstanding loan amount is written off in case of main
breadwinner’s death. Refer to Fischer et al. (2017) for a more detailed description. 46 This table along with more
detailed information on the policies can also be found in Fischer et al. (2017). 47 During this first phase, the social
organizer confirms the attendance of the group members. 48 Even if a group member was aware of realized take-up
of the peers deciding before him, uncertainty about the
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The sampling frame for this study is determined by the set of NRSP clients in Sargodha district
in the Punjab province of Pakistan who apply for a loan with our implementation partner between
December 2014 and March 2015. Observing clients who apply for a loan, the sampling frame is
given by all active members of joint liability groups with at least one incoming credit application in
the sampling window (Fischer et al., 2017).49 We attempt to sample approximately 13 households
per village. The sampling frame consists of both smaller credit groups and larger community
organizations.50 Due to their small group size, credit groups are excluded from the analysis.51
Table 2.1 – Insurance Innovations
Individual Individual Household Group
(P1) High (P2) (P3) (P4)
Eligibility Individual Household
Add. Requirement
50% Uptake
in the group
Coverage Limit (pp) 15, 000 30, 000 15, 000 15, 000
Premium (pp) 100 150 100 100
Premium discounts (pp) 0 - 30 0 - 30 0 - 30 0 - 30
Numbers are in PKR; USD 1≈ PKR 101, PKR 15,000≈USD 148 (in February 2015),
pp = per person.
Individual Eligibility: Insure any number and combination of dependents.
Household Eligibility: Insure either all or none of the HH members.
Premium Discounts: Vouchers of PKR 0, 10, 20 and 30 (pp); randomized with equal
probability at the household level.
2.4.2 Data
This study leverages three different sources of household and individual level data of both ad-
ministrative and survey nature. First, client level administrative data obtained from the implemen-
tation partner’s management information system (MIS) provides unique identifiers for households,
groups and villages. This information allows to map clients to groups and groups into villages.
demand of peers deciding after remains. For this reason, the decision process can be modeled as a simultaneous
game. Observing some group members’ realized demand would potentially introduce some room for observational
learning.
49 Members of joint liability groups generally take loans at the same time with our implementation partner, making
this approach equivalent to sampling all members of the joint liability group.
50 In urban and peri-urban locations, NRSP provides business and entrepreneurship loans to members of so-called
credit groups that consist of three to five members. The members of these groups apply for individual loans as a
group.
51 The sampling procedure would select complete groups until at least 13 households are sampled per village and
consider the village as fully sampled thereafter, thus ignoring later incoming credit applications. Effectively, the
focus on community organizations leads to sampling all active members of one or two COs per village. For more
information on the sampling procedure refer to Fischer et al. (2017).
46
The administrative data contains information on incoming credit applications, thereby facilitating
the sampling procedure described above. Furthermore, the administrative data includes a house-
hold roster that defines the dependents eligible for insurance.52 After roll-out, administrative data
collected from the MIS system is supplemented with information on the sampled dependents’
insurance status, including the type of policy offered and the premium paid.
Second, this study leverages information from a baseline survey conducted between December
2014 and March 2015.53 The survey is administered to the client registered in our implementa-
tion partner’s system to align with the captured insurance decisions. The survey is administered
through computer-assisted personal interviews (CAPI) by independent enumerators operating in
the name of University of Mannheim, Germany.54 The survey modules capture both household
level and individual level information. Among others, the collected household-level information
comprises socio-demographic and economic indicators and psychological well-being. Individual-
level information is collected on further socio-demographic indicators, income generating activ-
ities, and health status. The health module contains detailed information on subjective health
status, the history of both in- and outpatient treatments, and coping strategies in case of a health
shock.
Third, we collect additional information through a bi-monthly phone survey over the course
of one year. The phone survey is administered remotely through independent enumerators and
attempts to capture higher-frequency information about the occurrence of health shocks in the
household. The phone survey collects dependent level information on health status, the history
of inpatient and outpatient health shocks (since the last call), health expenditures incurred, and
coping strategies utilized. Fischer et al. (2017) use the information on dependent level health ex-
penditures to predict dependents’ expected health expenditures given their baseline characteristics.
The empirical application aggregates these individual level expected cost measures as a proxy for
households’ perceived health risk.
Insurance Demand The administrative data provides information about the insurance status of
all eligible dependent’s for all sampled households.55 This information is aggregated on the house-
hold level to define a dichotomous indicator of a household insuring at least one eligible member.
52 The household roster is collected by the implementation partner’s field staff as part of the credit application process
and elicited before roll-out of the intervention. Information from this household roster is incorporated in the CAPI
software to facilitate the data collection process and to improve data quality. The MIS data also contains information
about which clients take administrative positions within the joint liability group. In general, every group has both a
president and a group manager, positions that could proxy an individual’s influence in the group.
53 The baseline survey is conducted before program implementation. All sampled households from a given village
must be interviews before the village is eligible to receive the intervention. In practice, there is a two to three week
waiting period between baseline survey and program implementation.
54 The CAPI system included both instantaneous in-field quality assurance and more sophisticated, regular data
quality checks on the enumerator level. These data quality checks are anticipated to prevent logical errors and serious
measurement error, especially of sensible data.
55 The administrative data is back checked to align with the data provided by the social mobilizers introducing the
insurance policy.
47
This extensive margin indicator provides the coarsest level of information about a household’s
insurance decision. Note that the amount of information contained in this dichotomous indica-
tor varies by policy. For this reason, the analysis reports results both for pooling all policies
regardless of the offered insurance policies and separate by type of offered policy. Implicitly,
the extensive margin indicator is assumed to be the key information group members use in their
decision making. At the same time, more nuanced, extensive and/or intensive margin indicators
might be driving household decision making.56 On the intensive margin, agents might consider
the marginal effect of insuring an additional household member (of a particular age group and/or
gender), and how this affects other group members’ behavior. While the estimation approach
could be adjusted to account for other extensive margin outcome indicators, assessing intensive
indicators would require a modified estimation procedure.57
Social Interactions This study defines the relevant peer group as the members of the joint liabil-
ity group. While group members might have broader social circles in their respective village and
beyond, the roll-out procedure used to introduce the insurance innovations prevents inter-group in-
teractions from influencing demand decision.58 Corresponding socio-matrices can be constructed
from the group membership information contained in the administrative dataset.
2.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.2 provides the number of villages and groups in which insurance is offered. In total,
insurance policies are offered in 334 villages and 1025 groups. As mentioned above, we focus
on the subset of community organizations (COs). These 199 jointly liable groups are located
in 161 villages and have about 2100 members in total (average group size of 10.5 members).59
About 75% of the group members attend the community meetings through which the respective
insurance policy is introduced. Attending group members have about 4950 dependents eligible
for insurance (average of 3.18 eligible dependents per group member).60 Figure 2.1 depicts the
distribution of group members and members attending the group meeting. We observe that there
are four groups with only one or two members attending the group meeting. These groups are
excluded from the analysis.61
56 In a social learning framework, for example, agents might form expectations on whether peers insure dependents
of particular age groups or gender and integrate this into their decision making.
57 At this point, the empirical application focuses on extensive margin indicators of a household’s insurance status.
58 The roll-out protocol specifies that community meetings can be attended by members of one community organi-
zation at most. Therefore, all community organizations considered in the empirical application have been offered the
insurance policy in separate meetings.
59 Note that the number of COs offered the respective policy seems to systematically increase from P1 to P4. This
might be because the sampling process was not stratified on the number of COs in each village. Instead, the sampling
approach solely focused on the total number of households sampled per village.
60 Eligible dependents exclude the client’s spouse but includes any other dependent mentioned in the household
listing.
61 Group members with no eligible dependent reported at baseline have been excluded during data cleaning as they
do not face an active insurance decision.
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Socio-Demographic Information Table 2.3 provides household level information for the sub-
set of group members attending the community meetings. As mentioned in section 2.3, we include
the set of household-level characteristics that is thought to both influence insurance demand and
to be observable by other group members. Households have 3.18 eligible dependents on average.
This number differs from the number of dependents reported in the survey due to mismatches with
the administrative database.62 Clients’ average age is approximately 39 years, and about 40% of
clients in the sample have not attained any formal education. 12% of clients in the sample are
female. Total monthly household income amounts to about PKR 22, 000 (∼ $190)63 and total
savings amount to about 70% of monthly income. Outstanding liabilities in form of loans (credit)
amount to about twice monthly household income. Since monetary measures tend to be noisy,
as indicated by their large variances, the baseline survey captured household’s ownership of a set
of durable assets. This asset ownership information is used in a principal components analysis
to construct a standardized index that indicates socio-economic status (wealth index) (Vyas and
Kumaranayake, 2006; Kolenikov and Angeles, 2009).64 Considering health indicators, 11% of
households had to admit one of their dependents for treatment in a hospital within the last 12
months (inpatient treatment). The average cost for inpatient treatment is PKR 4,461 (∼ $40),
but heavily skewed to the right. Note that costs for treatment of health conditions without be-
ing admitted to a hospital (outpatient costs) exhibit both a higher mean and a higher variance
than inpatient costs. As discussed in section 2.4.2, we use baseline survey data and phone survey
follow-up information about the occurrence of health shocks to predict expected health expendi-
tures on the individual level. Aggregating these individual level predictions, the average household
faces expected inpatient health expenditures of about PKR300 (Expected Cost Index).65 Table B.1
in Appendix B.2 provides summary statistics and balance tests for the set of socio-demographic
characteristics across the different policies offered. While there appear to be statistical imbalances
in some of the descriptive variables considered, balance is achieved on key variables related to the
households economic and health status.
62 Dependent-level matches are constructed using a fuzzy merge routine that is based on the dependents’ name, age
and gender reported both in the survey and administrative data.
63 Exchange rate: $1 = PKR101
64 The wealth index is constructed using information from the complete sample of credit group and community
organization members. The positive mean in column 1 indicates that the subsample of community group members
has a higher socio-economic status than the sample of credit groups and COs combined.
65 For more information on the construction of the expected cost index refer to Fischer et al. (2017). In the estimation
procedure, the monetary variables for income, savings, credit and inpatient and outpatient costs are standardized to
log-measures in PKR’000 to make the expected parameter space smoother.
49
Table 2.2 – Overview and Treatment Allocation
P1 P2 P3 P4 Total
Villages 82 84 82 86 334
Groups 260 262 246 257 1025
Villages with COs 35 39 42 45 161
COs 41 48 54 56 199
HHs in COs 433 490 560 614 2097
HHs Attending in COs 338 368 417 434 1557
Dependents in COs 1212 1512 1783 1780 6287
Attending Dep. in COs 997 1187 1397 1375 4956
Note: This table provides an overview of the treatment allocation and the study sample. Overall, insurance
policies are offered to more than 1000 groups in 334 villages. This study focuses on the decision to insure of
the 1557 households attending community meetings in the subsample of about 200 jointly liable community
organizations (COs) offered insurance in 161 villages.
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Table 2.3 – Summary Statistics
Mean (SD)
Socio-Demographics
Dependents (Survey) 3.96 (1.76)
Dependents (Matched) 3.18 (1.70)
Group_Leader_(D) 0.18 (0.38)
Client_Female_(D) 0.12 (0.33)
Client No Education (D) 0.40 (0.49)
Client_Age 38.73 (11.07)
Economic
Wealth Index 0.29 (2.51)
Income (month) 21846.39 (23435.35)
Savings 15396.26 (84632.82)
Credit 43404.42 (89539.38)
Health & Insurance
Knows Health Insurance (D) 0.22 (0.42)
Any Inpatient (D) 0.11 (0.32)
Total Inpatient Cost 4461.46 (23875.02)
Total Outpatient Cost 6954.99 (34842.52)
Expected Cost Index (HH) 304.29 (306.53)
Insurance Demand
HH Insured 0.54 (0.50)
No. Insured Dependents 1.28 (1.64)
Note: The table provides means and standard deviations (SD) of the
respective variables. Binary variables are indicated with (D).
Outcome Data The lower panel of table 2.3 summarizes intensive and extensive measures of
insurance demand. On the extensive margin, 54% of households in the sample insure at least one
eligible dependent. On the intensive margin, about 1.3 dependents are insured per household on
average. Figure 2.2 plots intensive and extensive margin insurance demand for the two types of
policies across the different discount levels. As expected, as the discount increases, insurance
demand increases for each policy type both in terms of extensive and intensive measures of de-
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mand.66 Due to the difference premium price per person for the individual policies, Figure 2.2
possibly summarizes demand at different points along the demand curve. Figures 2.2b and 2.2a
in Appendix B.3 therefore verify the same patterns for each of the policies. Comparing demand
for individual and household level policies, extensive margin demand is higher for individual level
policies across almost all price levels. Vice versa, intensive level demand is higher for household
level policies at all price levels. Moreover, note that the intensive demand pattern for house-
hold policies can be explained by household size. Larger households appear less likely to buy
household insurance at higher premium prices. In general, insurance demand seems rather price
sensitive. In the household policies, for example, a 30 percent decrease in premium price almost
doubles the share of households insured. Figure B.3 in Appendix B.3 provides own price elasticity
estimates for the two types of policies and reveals that these elasticity estimates are larger than
one in absolute terms for both types of policies.
So far, we have mainly looked at household level demand. The focus of this paper is how
household level demand is affected by expected take-up decisions of other members in the group,
possibly resulting in aggregated patterns of group level demand. To study such patterns descrip-
tively, Figure 2.3 graphs the distribution of group-level demand pooling groups from both types
of policies. The histogram plots the number of groups with a fraction of group members taking
up insurance in the respective decile. The fraction of insured members within a group varies from
0 (29 groups with no member taking up) to 100 (15 groups with all members taking up) with
some groups in each of the deciles. The policy-wise distributions presented in Figure 2.4 allow
to explain the shape of the overall distribution. We observe a more or less uniform distribution of
group-level demand for policies P2 and P3, whereas group-level demand for the individual policy
P1 seems to be slightly skewed to the left. For group policy P4, the 50% uptake criterion explains
the large number of groups with no member insured and the missing probability mass in deciles
up to 50% of members insured. Six groups appear to have positive demand despite not meeting
the 50% group uptake requirement.
Overall, we observe a high level of variation in average group take up across groups and poli-
cies. As laid out in section 2.2.3, these differences can potentially be explained by differences in
group level characteristics, differences in individual group members’ characteristics, and the that
fact group members take into account expectations about their peers insurance decision in their
own decision making.
66 Table B.2 in Appendix B.2 provides evidence on balanced distributions of discount levels across the different
policies. While there seems to be some missing probability mass for zero discounts, especially for policy P1, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of a uniform distribution across the discount levels.
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Figure 2.1 – Distribution of Group Size
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Figure 2.2 – Insurance Demand
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Figure 2.3 – Average Take-Up across Groups
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Figure 2.4 – Average Take-Up across Groups
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2.5 Results
This section presents the estimation results for Models 1 to 4 discussed in section 2.3. Table
2.4 provides results of pooled estimations including all groups regardless of the offered insur-
ance policy. Column 1 contains the results of the baseline specification that does not account
for any social effects (Model 1). As expected, we observe that a decrease in price in the form
of a higher discount increases demand. Moreover, group members with some formal education
and higher savings seem more likely to purchase insurance. Also, group leaders are more likely
to purchase insurance. Larger households, in contrast, appear less likely to purchase insurance.
Accounting for endogenous social interaction effects, columns 2 and 3 reveal that an increase in
the propensity with which other group members are expected to take-up positively affects own
demand. The positive coefficient on the endogenous social interactions parameter suggests that
conformity considerations and repeated interactions dominate potential free riding concerns. The
difference between the two sets of results comes from the different optimization algorithms used
in the maximum likelihood estimation. While the coefficient estimates are very similar for both
specifications, the estimates based on a BFGS optimization algorithm are slightly less precise,
explaining the the difference in the level of significance for some of the coefficients.67
Model 3 excludes the endogenous social interactions parameter and only accounts for contex-
tual effects. The coefficient estimates of the individual characteristics are comparable to those
in Models 1 and 2. Assessing contextual effects, the results for Model 3 suggest that (average)
peer characteristics related to health and insurance directly influence group member’s take-up de-
cision. A given group member seems for example more likely to demand insurance if her group
members have received higher discounts or have spent more on inpatient treatment. At the same
time, a group member appears less likely to demand insurance if a higher fraction of her peers
know the concept of insurance or have admitted a household member to the hospital during the
last 12 months. While the signs of the latter contextual effects coefficients seem somewhat in
contradiction to common hypotheses at first, the results of Model 4 seem to clarify these.
Model 4, in addition to contextual effects, accounts for equilibrium expectations in the in-
surance decision. We observe an even stronger positive relationship between group member’s
expected take-up and own demand than in model 2. At the same time, the coefficient estimates
of the contextual effects parameters change considerably and, with the exception of average peer
discount, are no longer statistically significant. The change in point estimates might be related
to the two channels through which peer characteristics can influence a given group member’s
take-up decision. First, there is a direct channel through contextual effects. Second, there is an
indirect channel through equilibrium expectations, which are in turn derived using all publicly
67 The models in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.4 are presented side-by-side because they resulted in very similar values
of the log-likelihood function, which serves as a measure of model fit within a given class of models. For models 1
and 3 only one result is presented in Table 2.4 because the different optimization algorithms lead to identical results.
This can be seen in Table B.4.
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observed characteristics. As Model 3 only accounts for the direct channel, the resulting coeffi-
cient estimates absorb any indirect effect that would operate through the equilibrium expectations
term. The change in contextual effects parameter estimates indicates the estimates in Model 3
pick up a spurious correlation that is in fact attributable to this equilibrium expectations term.
The results from Model 4 reveal that it is in fact the expectation of group members take-up that
affects demand, while peers’ characteristics do not seem to matter above and beyond their influ-
ence on these expectations. The finding that higher peer discounts positively affect own demand
is surprising because - by design - group members should not know their peers’ discount draw.
A possible extension of the model would therefore modify the information structure to allow for
private information.68 Taking the fining by heart, though, the positive coefficient estimate suggests
that group members with a higher discount draw do exert some direct influence on their peers that
makes these more likely to take up. This effect is in the opposed direction of a potential anchoring
effect in which group members might be less likely to take up if their peers have received a higher
discount than themselves. In general, the absence of broader contextual effects are in line with
those in Liu et al. (2014) who study the role of social networks in the demand for voluntary, pub-
lic health insurance in rural China. The authors therefore use peer characteristics as additional,
exogenous variation in their two-step estimation approach (Bajari et al., 2010).
Given the theoretical discussion in section 2.2.1 and the observed positive coefficient estimate
of the social interactions term, we might conclude that the conformity and repeated interactions
channels dominate potential incentives to free ride. At the same time, the coefficient estimates
in Table 2.4 do not directly allow to interpret the magnitude of the social interaction effects. To
this end, as discussed in section 2.3, the last row of Table 2.4 provides an estimate of the average
partial effect (APE) of the social interactions parameter for the relevant models. We observe that
the APE estimates range between 35 and 43 percentage points, meaning that a 10 percentage point
increase in the propensity of peer take-up leads to an increase in demand by 3.5 to 4.3 percentage
points. It is possible to obtain a relative measure of the magnitude of this social interaction effect
by translating it into a price effect. Figure B.3 in Appendix B.3 facilitates such a comparison by
providing price elasticity estimates of the offered types of policies. Given an own price elasticity
estimate of−0.783 across all policies, an increase in demand comparable to a 10 percentage point
increase in the propensity of expected peer take-up would require a reduction in price by 4.5 to 6
percent.
68 Since all group members face the same probability distribution over discount levels, the more sophisticated estima-
tion approach would imply that the peer discount effect is effectively absorbed in the constant. For more information
refer to Appendix B.1 or Yang and Lee (2017).
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Table 2.4 – Estimation Results
row Model.1 Model.2a Model.2b Model.3 Model.4
Discount 0.026187 *** 0.011808 *** 0.012417 ** 0.025520 *** 0.010774 ***
( 0.002551) ( 0.002835) ( 0.005374) ( 0.002604) ( 0.002704)
Client Age 0.002057 0.001310 0.000830 0.002172 0.001031
( 0.002589) ( 0.001410) ( 0.002244) ( 0.002648) ( 0.002786)
client No Education (D) -0.147861 ** -0.061902 ** -0.060166 -0.111981 ** -0.036208
( 0.059647) ( 0.032386) ( 0.056338) ( 0.062776) ( 0.066619)
HH Size -0.045407 *** -0.021037 ** -0.024405 -0.045526 *** -0.024445
( 0.016637) ( 0.010126) ( 0.016166) ( 0.016753) ( 0.017174)
Wealth Indicator -0.001827 0.002307 0.002833 -0.003093 -0.000862
( 0.013246) ( 0.006533) ( 0.011028) ( 0.014027) ( 0.014763)
HH Income (Log Rs ’000) 0.017875 -0.011244 -0.004391 0.007150 -0.004670
( 0.048603) ( 0.025797) ( 0.043910) ( 0.051658) ( 0.054724)
HH Savings (Log Rs ’000) 0.035382 ** 0.015860 ** 0.014318 0.030537 0.016954
( 0.020876) ( 0.009487) ( 0.015448) ( 0.023207) ( 0.024245)
Group Leader (D) 0.329395 *** 0.210666 *** 0.224517 *** 0.416087 *** 0.132945 **
( 0.072917) ( 0.066064) ( 0.075634) ( 0.078708) ( 0.072529)
Knows Insurance (D) -0.089529 -0.063773 ** -0.077783 -0.052573 -0.028131
( 0.069703) ( 0.035471) ( 0.057027) ( 0.073847) ( 0.076959)
Total Inpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) 0.083083 0.062502 0.074844 0.073147 0.013511
( 0.079743) ( 0.052752) ( 0.067540) ( 0.081600) ( 0.081888)
Total Outpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) 0.007216 -0.004190 0.000139 0.014091 0.011835
( 0.023353) ( 0.011920) ( 0.021663) ( 0.024299) ( 0.025728)
HH Any Inpatient (D) -0.204233 -0.154714 -0.187609 -0.167144 0.002014
( 0.263742) ( 0.168847) ( 0.214445) ( 0.271227) ( 0.273015)
HH Exp Cost Index (Log Rs ’000) 0.033487 -0.008294 -0.008109 0.110217 0.065968
( 0.176052) ( 0.085506) ( 0.151498) ( 0.182367) ( 0.190104)
(del) Discount 0.016209 *** -0.006671 **
( 0.005850) ( 0.003547)
(del) Client Age 0.003017 -0.000348
( 0.006237) ( 0.002906)
(del) client No Education (D) -0.161632 0.007613
( 0.126960) ( 0.068940)
(del) HH Size 0.010224 0.015945
( 0.039427) ( 0.017756)
(del) Wealth Indicator 0.020900 0.003424
( 0.029432) ( 0.015349)
(del) HH Income (Log Rs ’000) -0.030365 -0.007852
( 0.117589) ( 0.056879)
(del) HH Savings (Log Rs ’000) 0.023525 -0.009026
( 0.042026) ( 0.025081)
(del) Group Leader (D) 0.886143 *** -0.002090
( 0.300274) ( 0.106279)
(del) Knows Insurance (D) -0.260973 ** -0.004380
( 0.140444) ( 0.079171)
(del) Total Inpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) 0.392174 ** 0.016919
( 0.202786) ( 0.089348)
(del) Total Outpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) -0.062247 -0.016259
( 0.053203) ( 0.026802)
(del) HH Any Inpatient (D) -1.183809 ** -0.071974
( 0.666233) ( 0.292379)
(del) HH Exp Cost Index (Log Rs ’000) -0.467138 -0.099256
( 0.386308) ( 0.196817)
Endogenous 0.855774 *** 0.792326 *** 0.967280 ***
( 0.053362) ( 0.187533) ( 0.064600)
Constant -0.320531 ** -0.114560 -0.136062 -0.567074 -0.017029
( 0.170925) ( 0.092822) ( 0.171814) ( 0.420666) ( 0.058680)
Unobserved
value LogLik -991.8327 -977.5561 -977.8521 -974.0990 -969.6540
Share Mult. Eq. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Iterations 2 39 5 2 9
Stop Reason 0 0 0 0 0
Convergence Code 2 3 0 2 3
Method BHHH BHHH BFGS BHHH BHHH
Gradient Analytical Analytical Analytical Analytical Analytical
APE 0.3689 0.3476 0.4234
Note: This table provides parameter estimates of the iterative MLE approach. value LogLik is the value of the
log-likelihood. Share Mult. Eq. gives the fraction of groups with multiple equilibria (if any).
Iterations: number of iterations until convergence. Stop Reason = 0: successful convergence of the iterative
approach. Convergence Code of latest MLE iteration. Method: optimization approach (BHHH,BFGS).
Gradients for BHHH and BFGS approaches are provided analytically.
APE: Average partial effect of the endogenous social interaction effects calculated using equation 2.12.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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2.5.1 Results by Eligibility
So far, the discussion has omitted the fact that the offered policies vary in terms of eligibility
and that this variation might lead to differences in the direction and the strength of social inter-
action effects. For this reason, Table 2.5 provides separate estimation results for individual and
household policies, respectively. The first four columns of Table 2.5 provide estimation results of
Models 1 to 4 for the individual policies. Analogously, the last four columns contain the results
for the household policies.
Considering the individual policies, the results from the baseline specification in column 1 re-
veal that, besides the premium price, only the group leader status seems to influence own demand.
Accounting for equilibrium expectations of peer take-up, in column 2, shows that an increase in
expected group member take-up positively affects own demand. This effect is statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level. Similar to the pooled estimation results, the results for Model 3 suggest that
some peer characteristics directly affect own demand. Yet, with the exception of the average peer
discount, these direct effects vanish once equilibrium expectations are accounted for in Model 4.
The coefficient of the social interactions term is positive and statistically significant at the 1%
level. The corresponding average partial effect estimate, contained in the final row of Table 2.5,
varies between 38 and 42 percentage points. In other words, a ten percentage point increases in
the propensity of expected peer take-up would increase demand by 3.8 to 4.2 percentage points.
Looking at the household policies, the results of the baseline specification in column five sug-
gest that more household level characteristics than for the individual policies affect demand. In
particular, households who receive a higher discount, are more educated or have more savings ex-
hibit a higher demand. Also, group leaders are more likely to take-up. At the same time, demand
decreases for larger households, confirming the descriptive pattern found in Figure 2.2. Moreover,
better knowledge of the concept of insurance seems to decrease insurance demand. While the
hypothesis would be that better understanding fosters insurance demand, the negative coefficient
estimate could suggest distrust in the insurance provider or a low perceived value of the offered
household insurance policies among those with a better understanding of the contract.
Accounting for equilibrium expectations, the results of Model 2 reveal a positive and statisti-
cally significant estimate of the social interactions term. Thus, expecting a larger proportion of
group members to take-up insurance seems to increase own demand, in line with the conformity
and repeated interactions channel dominating potential incentives to free ride. Controlling for
contextual effects only, the results for Model 3, similar to the pooled estimation results, suggest
that several peer characteristics related to health and insurance directly affect demand. Account-
ing in addition for equilibrium expectations of peer take-up, the results of Model 4 reveal that,
in contrast to the results from the pooled estimation, the contextual effects remain statistically
significant and even increase in absolute terms. The social interaction effects parameter, instead
of positive and statistically significant as in Model 2, turns negative but is estimated imprecisely.
Even though not statistically significant, the corresponding average partial effect is estimated at
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−0.22, meaning that a ten percentage point increase in the propensity of peer take-up leads to
decrease in demand of 2.2 percentage points.
Note that the patterns observed in the household policy results are in line with omitted variable
bias. Both the overestimation of the social interaction effect in Model 2, and the underestimation
of the contextual effects coefficients (in absolute terms) in Model 3.69 Therefore, Model 4 reveals
the importance of controlling for both equilibrium expectations and contextual effects.
The presence of contextual effects implies a direct effect of average peer characteristics on
own insurance demand. The positive effect from group leaders on their group members’ demand,
for example, could be explained by group leaders directly advertising to take up the policy. The
negative effect of a larger fraction of peers knowing the concept of insurance might indicate the
presence of communication learning. Group members who know the concept of insurance are
less likely to demand insurance, and might share their concerns in the group, thereby directly
reducing their peers propensity to take up. The interpretation of the remaining two contextual
effects variables found statistically significant is less obvious.70 Direct effects are expected to
be of higher relevance in particular in the group policy because it requires a minimum uptake of
50% among the group members. Compared to the other policies, this requirement might result
in stronger incentives to directly communicate or even convince group members to (not) take up
insurance.
To assess the relative magnitude of the positive social interaction effect in the individual poli-
cies and the negative social interaction effect in the household policies, we can engage in a similar
exercise as for the pooled estimation results to determine a corresponding price effect. For the
individual policies, the own price elasticity estimate in Figure B.3 is given by −1.08. Therefore,
to achieve an increase in demand comparable to a 10 percentage point increase in expected peer
demand, a decrease in price by 3.5 to 4 percent would be required. For the household policies,
a 10 percentage point increase in expected peer take-up would lead to a decrease in demand by
about 2.2 percentage points. To achieve a similar decrease in demand given an estimated own
price elasticity of −2.13, the policy price would have to increase by about one percent.
While the economic effect of peer take-up on own demand in the subgroup offered a house-
hold policy seems limited, another interpretation is that conformity considerations and incentives
to free ride to seem to cancel each other out. These findings can be explained by two effects. First,
the price to conform with the expected choice of other group members is larger in the household
policy, reducing the taste to conform. Second, a group member’s decision to take-up when of-
69 The contextual effects that exhibit a negative coefficient estimate are found to be negatively correlated with equi-
librium expectations. Vice versa, contextual effects with positive coefficient estimates are found to exhibit a positive
correlation with equilibrium expectations.
70 The negative direct effect on own demand from having a higher fraction of group members that had to admit a
household member to the hospital in the last twelve months is in the opposite direction as expected from an avail-
ability bias argument. The positive direct effect on own demand from higher risk peers might also be in line with
communication learning. At the same time, this seems implausible since a household’s own risk type does not seem
to affect own demand.
59
fered a household policy exhibits a larger externality on other group members due to the higher
number of dependents insured on average. Taken together, these two effects appear to reduce the
dominance of the social preference channel.
Further extensions might leverage inter-group variation in household size and riskiness among
group members. For groups with larger than average household size, for example, an expected
insurance decision would imply that the remaining pool of non-insured individuals is relatively
small. This reduces the risk posed by these individuals, potentially resulting in stronger incentives
to free ride as compared to groups with lower than average household size. Likewise, for groups
with low variation in group members’ riskiness, an expected insurance decision reduces the pool
of non-insured individuals but leaves the risk distribution more or less unchanged. In groups with
a higher variation in group members’ riskiness, in contrast, insurance take-up might be expected
in particular for higher risk group members, leading to a better risk distribution of non-insured
members and potentially increasing incentives to free ride.
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Table 2.5 – Estimation Results by Policy Eligibility
row IND.M1 IND.M2 IND.M3 IND.M4 HH.M1 HH.M2 HH.M3 HH.M4
Discount 0.023890 *** 0.010712 *** 0.024463 *** 0.010617 *** 0.030607 *** 0.014159 *** 0.030812 *** 0.052711 ***
( 0.003856) ( 0.003543) ( 0.004108) ( 0.004059) ( 0.003556) ( 0.004168) ( 0.003751) ( 0.018230)
Client Age 0.003452 0.000137 0.004240 0.003517 -0.000316 0.000640 -0.001706 -0.003509
( 0.003863) ( 0.001846) ( 0.004098) ( 0.004181) ( 0.003669) ( 0.002288) ( 0.003763) ( 0.003910)
client No Education (D) 0.103577 0.053050 0.107463 0.042351 -0.343181 *** -0.144412 ** -0.262275 *** -0.432889 **
( 0.089748) ( 0.043500) ( 0.097608) ( 0.101703) ( 0.083281) ( 0.064631) ( 0.089368) ( 0.172197)
HH Size 0.007990 -0.002724 0.020330 0.010753 -0.085730 *** -0.036206 ** -0.095427 *** -0.161011 ***
( 0.024618) ( 0.011069) ( 0.025415) ( 0.025819) ( 0.023920) ( 0.017906) ( 0.025041) ( 0.060169)
Wealth Indicator -0.021481 -0.005299 -0.015114 -0.008233 0.015577 0.008342 0.005084 0.007935
( 0.019103) ( 0.008504) ( 0.020749) ( 0.021659) ( 0.019406) ( 0.011544) ( 0.021524) ( 0.021456)
HH Income (Log Rs ’000) 0.075556 0.026258 0.026414 0.008012 -0.029701 -0.027411 0.021880 0.042266
( 0.064983) ( 0.028603) ( 0.071277) ( 0.074740) ( 0.077524) ( 0.050580) ( 0.084551) ( 0.084984)
HH Savings (Log Rs ’000) 0.015329 -0.006479 0.007289 0.005758 0.054566 ** 0.024112 0.040148 0.066342
( 0.029426) ( 0.011520) ( 0.033457) ( 0.034126) ( 0.032184) ( 0.016463) ( 0.037695) ( 0.043040)
Group Leader (D) 0.353674 *** 0.215059 ** 0.449988 *** 0.177429 ** 0.272256 *** 0.185145 ** 0.435515 *** 0.696647 ***
( 0.107391) ( 0.092656) ( 0.116681) ( 0.107608) ( 0.103241) ( 0.094753) ( 0.117379) ( 0.245649)
Knows Insurance (D) 0.090572 0.015410 0.102886 0.033316 -0.227284 ** -0.112416 ** -0.154110 -0.249753 **
( 0.101525) ( 0.044667) ( 0.108907) ( 0.112293) ( 0.100236) ( 0.063914) ( 0.110294) ( 0.132145)
Total Inpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) 0.148585 0.060413 0.131619 0.098549 0.010283 0.024807 -0.023668 -0.058527
( 0.110099) ( 0.063268) ( 0.116830) ( 0.119911) ( 0.118329) ( 0.095345) ( 0.125434) ( 0.130762)
Total Outpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) 0.005659 -0.000698 0.018221 0.009559 0.001063 -0.014286 0.019246 0.043042
( 0.034885) ( 0.015320) ( 0.037626) ( 0.039352) ( 0.033515) ( 0.020434) ( 0.035358) ( 0.036534)
HH Any Inpatient (D) -0.207525 0.028439 -0.125616 -0.253075 -0.122501 -0.150154 -0.000632 0.065378
( 0.368674) ( 0.214305) ( 0.391931) ( 0.405993) ( 0.385768) ( 0.306089) ( 0.409663) ( 0.420338)
HH Exp Cost Index (Log Rs ’000) -0.113995 -0.173984 0.068850 0.182533 0.019651 0.214173 -0.035494 -0.183058
( 0.239360) ( 0.119686) ( 0.243835) ( 0.247776) ( 0.318700) ( 0.204838) ( 0.344926) ( 0.364841)
(del) Discount 0.021366 ** -0.007708 ** 0.017202 ** 0.016151
( 0.009421) ( 0.004588) ( 0.008201) ( 0.010949)
(del) Client Age -0.014852 -0.004362 0.010250 0.016884
( 0.010174) ( 0.004549) ( 0.008824) ( 0.012430)
(del) client No Education (D) 0.258885 -0.016370 -0.280204 -0.326164
( 0.217378) ( 0.105595) ( 0.177455) ( 0.238162)
(del) HH Size -0.007138 -0.016319 0.080897 0.147963
( 0.062325) ( 0.027511) ( 0.059847) ( 0.100292)
(del) Wealth Indicator -0.006005 0.010588 0.012827 0.015267
( 0.048192) ( 0.023249) ( 0.042795) ( 0.057387)
(del) HH Income (Log Rs ’000) 0.151692 -0.010913 -0.117073 -0.187738
( 0.157114) ( 0.078815) ( 0.206375) ( 0.285061)
(del) HH Savings (Log Rs ’000) -0.091624 -0.007017 0.062652 0.086524
( 0.065490) ( 0.035249) ( 0.063057) ( 0.082806)
(del) Group Leader (D) 0.942478 ** -0.111110 1.320582 *** 1.849473 **
( 0.452524) ( 0.140555) ( 0.423805) ( 0.723795)
(del) Knows Insurance (D) 0.160182 -0.027607 -0.393336 ** -0.559462 **
( 0.214896) ( 0.115591) ( 0.211885) ( 0.309109)
(del) Total Inpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) -0.103447 -0.074555 0.477615 0.716698
( 0.300937) ( 0.125096) ( 0.328903) ( 0.482680)
(del) Total Outpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) 0.007342 -0.009238 -0.123425 -0.181358
( 0.079926) ( 0.042990) ( 0.080674) ( 0.120415)
(del) HH Any Inpatient (D) 1.754529 0.249236 -2.165621 ** -3.138696 **
( 1.134353) ( 0.448991) ( 1.050096) ( 1.622608)
(del) HH Exp Cost Index (Log Rs ’000) -2.181202 *** -0.269306 2.034412 ** 3.051237 **
( 0.573064) ( 0.262702) ( 0.805008) ( 1.319085)
Endogenous 0.926475 *** 1.034153 *** 0.814044 *** -0.540546
( 0.049285) (0.038310) ( 0.086950) ( 0.430910)
Constant -0.769866 *** -0.240228 ** -0.682571 0.017988 0.100761 -0.008993 -1.042319 -1.582720
( 0.241730) ( 0.131806) ( 0.625728) (0.089667) (0.255666) ( 0.160903) ( 0.675437) ( 1.019551)
Unobserved
value LogLik -450.9305 -438.9729 -430.3994 -421.0321 -519.7075 -509.8393 -496.0593 -495.4132
Share Mult. Eq. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Iterations 2 36 2 25 2 5 2 20
Stop Reason 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Convergence Code 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2
Method BHHH BHHH BHHH BHHH BHHH BHHH BHHH BHHH
Gradient Analytical Analytical Analytical Analytical Analytical Analytical Analytical Analytical
APE 0.3863 0.4202 0.3406 -0.2168
This table provides parameter estimates of the iterative MLE approach. value LogLik is the value of the log-likelihood.
Share Mult. Eq. gives the fraction of groups with multiple equilibria (if any).
Iterations: number of iterations until convergence. Stop Reason = 0: successful convergence of the iterative approach.
Convergence Code of latest MLE iteration. Method: optimization approach (BHHH,BFGS).
Gradients for BHHH and BFGS approaches are provided analytically.
APE: Average partial effect of the endogenous social interaction effects calculated using equation 2.12.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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2.6 Conclusion
The demand for formal low-income health insurance has been found to be low in many con-
texts. In this paper, we investigate the role of the social network in the demand decision. From
a theoretical point of view, interaction groups can both increase or decrease insurance demand.
On the one hand, social norms might create a desire to conform with the expected choice in the
group, leading to positive social interaction effects. On the other hand, an incentive to free-ride on
others’ insurance decision might arise when insurance is offered to jointly liable groups, implying
negative social interaction effects. At the same time, such potential incentives to free ride might
be mitigated through repeated interactions in the group.
To test which of these channels dominates empirically, we use data from a randomized con-
trol trial in rural Pakistan in which voluntary hospitalization insurance is offered to members of
pre-existing jointly liable credit groups. The binary insurance decision is modeled as a static, si-
multaneous move game under incomplete information. Agents’ take-up decision depends on the
expected choice of other group members, which is derived as a rational expectation given pub-
licly observed characteristics. In addition, the model accounts for contextual effects and can be
extended to capture correlated group effects. The estimation is based on a nested fixed point max-
imum likelihood approach commonly used in the estimation of dynamic discrete choice models.
The findings indicate that the social norms and repeated interactions channels dominate poten-
tial incentives to free ride in the subgroup offered an individual policy that allows to insure any
number and combination of dependents. Average partial effect estimates suggest that a ten per-
centage point increase in expected peer take-up would increase demand by 3.8 to 4.2 percentage
points. This effect is comparable to a decrease in the premium price by about 4 percentage points.
For the subgroup offered a household insurance policy, in contrast, the social interaction effects
estimate is negative, but estimated imprecisely. The estimated average partial effect suggests that
a ten percentage point increase in expected peer demand would lead to a decrease in demand by
2.2 percentage points. This decrease in demand is comparable to a one percent increase in the
insurance premium. Taking these results by heart, conformity considerations and incentives to
free ride appear to cancel each other out.
The smaller effect of expected peer decisions in household policies can be explained by several
factors. First, being offered a household policy requires to insure a larger number of dependents
on average, therefore increasing the household’s total premium compared to an individual policy.
Consequently, it is more expensive to conform with expected peer decisions, lowering the desire
to do so. Second, a larger number of dependents insured in the household policies constitutes
a stronger positive externality from expecting a peer to purchase insurance than in the individ-
ual policies. The larger externality from insurance in the household policies therefore results in
stronger incentives to free ride. Overall, we may conclude that incentives to free ride seem to
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exist in the joint liability context of this study, but are likely to be dominated by social preference
considerations.
This paper adds to an emerging literature on the role of social networks in the demand for
financial services in developing countries. Moreover, the findings complement existing evidence
on free riding in insurance decisions in a joint liability context from framed field experiments by
studying actual insurance decisions and allowing for other motifs to affect demand.
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Chapter 3
Adverse Selection in Low-Income Health
Insurance Markets: Evidence from a RCT
in Pakistan
3.1 Introduction
Poor households around the world are plagued by financial risk, and health shocks are often
the most important type of unexpected events that could lead poor families into severe financial
distress (e.g. Heltberg and Lund, 2009b). Effective insurance solutions not only promise to pro-
tect households from falling into a poverty trap, but might also improve long-term health and
productivity. Given the deficiencies of public health systems and inefficient public health in-
surance in many developing countries, the potential for market-based solutions is large.1 From
an economist’s perspective, however, the question whether private insurance schemes can attain
efficiency largely depends on the extent of adverse selection. If adverse selection is present, equi-
librium demand may be below the social optimum, and in the worst case markets might even break
down (Arrow, 1963; Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976).
The empirical debate about adverse selection in low-income health insurance is relatively re-
cent and controversial. Some authors find evidence for more risky individuals selecting into health
insurance (Zhang and Wang, 2008; Clement, 2009; Lammers and Warmerdam, 2010; Yao, Schmit,
and Sydnor, 2015), but there are also studies which find no evidence of adverse selection (Jütting,
2004; Dror et al., 2005; Nguyen and Knowles, 2010; Banerjee et al., 2014). Other scholars even ar-
gue that demand for health insurance of poor households often does not follow classical economic
principles and is rather determined by community norms (Dror and Firth, 2014). The available
1 The Swiss Reinsurance Company estimates that the microinsurance (i.e. low-income insurance) market comprises
approximately 4 billion potential customers (Swiss Re, 2010). Only about 500 million people were covered under
any microinsurance contract in 2013, but most of the major insurance companies currently engage in microinsurance
activities to expand this market share (ILO Microinsurance Innovation Facility, 2014).
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evidence is limited in several dimensions, though. First, many studies correlate uptake decisions
with ex-post measures of health risk, and hence suffer from a discrimination problem between
adverse selection and moral hazard (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000). Those papers which use ex-
ante health measures rarely show the relevance of these measures in terms of actual health events
after insurance take-up. Second, none of these research settings allows a rigorous assessment of
the welfare consequences of adverse selection. Third, there exists no systematic comparison of
different insurance designs regarding adverse selection and welfare.
This paper addresses these limitations by analyzing a large-scale cluster randomized control
trial (RCT) on hospitalization insurance conducted in rural Pakistan. The RCT tests different
insurance schemes that are randomized across more than 500 villages. We exploit baseline health
measures as well as detailed data on health events after the introduction of insurance to analyze
adverse selection. Additionally, the experiment induces exogenous price variation which enables
us to estimate demand and cost curves. Identifying these curves permits us to conduct a welfare
analysis similar to the approach of Einav and Finkelstein (2011). To the best of our knowledge, this
study is the first to apply their method with experimentally controlled price variation. Finally, we
test three insurance designs that are supposed to allow for different degrees of adverse selection,
and conduct a comparative welfare analysis. We construct a measure for the insurers’ expected
reimbursement costs for each individual’s inpatient expenditures based on detailed baseline health
status, health history, ex post hospitalization expenses and claim behavior.
Our results provide strong evidence that hospitalization insurance schemes for individuals suf-
fer from adverse selection. In particular, selection becomes more pronounced with higher pre-
mium prices, creating a trade-off between cost recovery and the quality of the insurance pool.
When bundling insurance policies at the household or group level, however, adverse selection
is mitigated. A welfare analysis suggests that bundled policies are also able to sustain higher
quantities and lower prices than individual policies. Further, the welfare consequences of adverse
selection seem less severe in relative terms for household policies.
The setup of our experiment has high relevance for the design of insurance in developing
countries. Compared to insurance markets in high-income countries, contracts in the low-income
context need to maintain low premiums, exhibit a simple design and keep administrative costs low.
These requirements imply a limited potential for ex-ante risk screening (Brau et al., 2011). In ad-
dition, providers often lack management capacity or cannot attract qualified staff, which prohibits
working with a portfolio of products. On the demand side, offering a single and easily under-
standable insurance product (pooling contract) simplifies marketing to a target group which is
often exposed to formal insurance for the first time. The drawback of policies which do not sepa-
rate different risk types and furthermore abstain from ex-ante risk screening is that they are highly
vulnerable to selection. We therefore explore simple measures against adverse selection in pooling
contracts which are widely applicable in low-income insurance markets, i.e. bundling individual
policies on different levels. Also the context of our study is typical for many low-income coun-
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tries: The Pakistani government spends little resources on public health care provision; a universal
social security system does not exist; the informal sector without any access to health insurance
products is large and health expenses as a consequence cause high financial stress for low-income
households. These challenges are shared by many countries in Africa and Asia, underpinning the
need for scalable insurance solutions.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 explains the approach we use
to analyze adverse selection and welfare in more detail. Section 3.3 describes the context of the
experiment, the different insurance innovations and the hypotheses linked to their implementa-
tion. Section 3.4 contains information about the data collection process and provides summary
statistics. Section 3.5 briefly discusses the demand for the offered insurance policies. Section 3.6
presents empirical results on adverse selection and Section 3.7 discusses welfare consequences.
Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Identification of Adverse Selection
The theory of adverse selection had its origin in the contributions of Arrow (1963), Akerlof
(1970), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). All these models (and many subsequent ones) hinge
on the assumption that agents select into insurance policies based on their individual risk type and
premium prices. In case of adverse selection, agents with the highest expected costs are those
with the highest willingness to pay. This implies that the expected costs caused by the insured
should always be higher than for non-insured. Further, it implies that individuals at the margin
exhibit lower expected costs than the pool of individuals already insured, which leads to a down-
ward sloping marginal cost curve. Similarly, products with higher risk coverage should attract
higher risk types, creating a positive correlation between coverage and riskiness of the insurance
pool. From an empirical point of view, however, it is difficult to establish the presence of adverse
selection due to the discrimination problem (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000). An observed positive
correlation between insurance coverage and loss incidences can either be caused by more risky
individuals selecting higher coverage (adverse selection) or by higher coverage causing behavioral
changes (moral hazard).
Cohen and Siegelman (2010), who summarize the empirical literature in a developed country
context, describe various approaches that go beyond a simple positive correlation test. These
methods include exploiting dynamic claim behavior and comparing positive correlation patterns
between subgroups with different potential for selection. Most of the reviewed studies on health
insurance, however, only provide some form of the positive correlation test.
Another possibility to test for selection is to correlate ex-ante measures of risk, such as sub-
jective health status or medical history before enrollment, with insurance uptake (e.g. Wang et al.,
2006). Relying on ex-ante risk proxies prevents potential confounding with moral hazard, as those
ex-ante risk proxies cannot be affected by the insurance status. The drawback of using ex-ante
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measures is the uncertainty about how they map into future costs faced by the insurer, especially
in the absence of data on ex-post health events and costs. Yao et al. (2015) discuss recent evidence
from low-income health insurance markets and document several studies using ex-ante measures,
but only few relate the results to actual health expenditures after the insurance choice (one excep-
tion is Banerjee et al., 2014). However, without reliable evidence that ex-ante proxies indeed have
predictive power for ex-post costs, those studies without ex-post costs may be of little value since
a lack of adverse selection found in the data could simply be an artifact of a bad proxy.
Another approach to identify and quantify adverse selection is to estimate the average cost
curve faced by the insurer (Einav and Finkelstein, 2011). As depicted in Figure 3.1, the marginal
cost curve decreases if higher risk types exhibit a higher willingness to pay for insurance. Conse-
quently, the insurer faces decreasing average costs with increasing demand, i.e. adverse selection.
Knowledge of the marginal and average cost curves and the demand curve not only identifies ad-
verse selection, but also allows for welfare analyses: The intersection of demand and average cost
curves determines the market allocation (under the assumption of perfect competition). A welfare
loss can be observed if the willingness to pay for insurance in the market equilibrium is higher
than the marginal costs of providing insurance. In Figure 3.1, this welfare loss is illustrated as the
shaded rectangle CDEF.
Insurance theory, therefore suggests a straightforward test of the presence of adverse selection
that relies on the slope of the marginal cost curve. Rejecting the null hypothesis of a flat marginal
cost curve, i.e. no relationship between insurance price and the claim ratio, constitutes evidence
for selection. Moreover, the direction of selection can be tested: A decreasing marginal cost
curve suggests adverse selection, while an increasing one suggests advantageous selection.2 The
presence of moral hazard does not confound this identification approach, as the slope after the
upwards shift of the average cost curve still reflects the degree of adverse selection.3
2 The finding of advantageous selection would not be in line with classical adverse selection model but could result
e.g. if highly risk-averse individuals purchase insurance but at the same time also take precautionary health actions,
e.g. preventive health efforts, or have unobserved characteristics that also make them care about future health, which
would result in the insurance-buying individuals having below-average costs.
3 In its simplest form, moral hazard should shift the average cost curve upwards by a constant. Even in case of
‘selection on moral hazard’ the slope still identifies adverse selection based on costs after the insurance choice, which
is the most important from the insurer’s perspective. This view is in line with Einav and Finkelstein (2011) who
consider the selection component in moral hazard as part of adverse selection.
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Figure 3.1 – Analysis of Adverse Selection and Welfare
Source: Figure 1 from Einav and Finkelstein (2011)
A necessary pre-requisite for applying this approach is exogenous variation in the premium
prices for the same insurance contract. Such exogenous variation in policy premiums allows esti-
mating demand curves and at the same time observing average costs at different demand points.
Providing credible exogenous price variation, however, is challenging in most settings. Einav et al.
(2010) are the first ones utilizing this identification approach. They investigate the presence of ad-
verse selection and its implied welfare costs in the context of employer provided health insurance
in the US. Using countrywide data from a large US employer, they are able to exploit differences
in regional pricing to estimate both demand and average cost curves of the provided health in-
surance schemes. The authors find a downward sloping marginal cost curve, which constitutes
evidence for the presence of adverse selection, but relatively small implied welfare cost. While
several other recent studies from developed insurance markets make use of the same identification
approach (e.g. Hackmann et al., 2012, 2015; Finkelstein et al., 2017; Panhans, 2017), we are not
aware of any studies using experimental variation in premium prices.
Within our RCT, we introduce exogenous price variation via random premium discounts. De-
mand and average cost curves for different insurance products can hence be estimated without
any further exogeneity assumption. The costs for the insurer are calculated from ex post health
events, expenditure and claim behavior. This cost data is then used to predict expected costs for
each individual based on detailed baseline health and demographic information. Predicting costs
for each individual provides us with sufficient statistical power to compare the quality of the risk
pool in different subsamples, while preserving the interpretation of the average cost curve in an
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expected value sense.4 We provide further details on the available data in Section 3.4, discuss the
‘expected cost index’ in Section 3.6.1 and provide more details on its construction in Appendix
C.4.
3.3 Setup of the Experiment
This section contains details on the RCT and its context. We first describe the public health
context in Pakistan and the role of our implementation partner in Subsection 3.3.1. The second
subsection explains the interventions as well as the most important hypotheses linked to each
policy. Subsection 3.3.3 presents our sampling strategy as well as the randomization procedures
employed for treatment allocation.
3.3.1 Background
Pakistan is a lower-middle income country with a population of 189 million and a GDP per
capita of USD 1,429 (2015). Almost one third of the population lives below the national poverty
line (2013).5 Furthermore, a majority of households faces the risk of remaining or falling into
poverty (World Bank, 2007, 8). The government spends less than one percent of its GDP on
health, which is low even compared to other developing countries. Public health expenditure hence
accounts for only about 35% of total health expenditure, while 87% of private expenditure has to
be paid out-of-pocket (2014). Free public health facilities exist, but service quality is perceived
as low and many expensive treatments and drugs are not covered (Pakistan Ministry of Health,
2009). Given the absence of a universal health insurance system, the poor are hence exposed to
considerable financial risk in case of health events (Heltberg and Lund, 2009b). Existing schemes
predominantly target public and formal sector employees, thus excluding the rural poor, who most
often work in the informal sector. A small number of NGOs and microfinance institutions provide
low-income insurance policies – so-called microinsurance – to their clients, but the majority of
these are life insurance products bundled with a loan.
Until very recently, the National Rural Support Programme of Pakistan (NRSP), our implemen-
tation partner, was the only microinsurance provider in Pakistan offering hospitalization insurance
at significant scale (World Bank, 2012, 11).6 NRSP is the largest of twelve Rural Support Pro-
grammes in Pakistan with an outreach of more than 2.5 million households. It supports poor
4 In principle, it would be straightforward to conduct the analysis with realized claim costs only. However, hospital-
ization is a rare event and despite our relatively large sample size, statistical power is too low to estimate average cost
curves based on realized/reimbursed claims directly. In particular, it is difficult to obtain precise estimates at different
demand points and for different products.
5 See World Bank Indicators 2015 at http://data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan. Subsequent
figures on public health spending and out of pocket expenditures are also drawn from this source.
6 Specific national and provincial government programs lately started to roll out similar hospitalization insurance
packages in selected districts. The Prime Minister’s National Health Program started in three out of 23 pilot districts
until August 2016 (http://www.pmhealthprogram.gov.pk). Also in 2016, the Social Health Protection
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households through community development activities and microfinance. NRSP is the leading
provider of microcredit and the largest holder of savings among the Rural Support Programmes
(Rural Support Programmes Network, 2015). In rural areas, NRSP usually works with community
organizations (COs), which consist of 12 to 15 member households. Members of these COs are
eligible for NRSP agricultural and livestock loans that exhibit joint liability on the group level.
Furthermore, NRSP offers micro-enterprise development loans to smaller, jointly liable credit
groups that usually consist of three to six members.
Since 2005, NRSP complements its micro-credit products with mandatory hospitalization and
disability insurance for its credit clients and their spouses. This policy offers three benefits. First,
it covers inpatient hospitalization expenditures up to a threshold of PKR 15,000 per person during
the loan period, which is equivalent to about USD 150. This is a significant amount relative to
households’ total monthly income (on average less than PKR 23,000 in our sample) and sufficient
for about four days in hospital including minor surgery. Second, it separately covers acciden-
tal death and disability of the main breadwinner up to a maximum threshold of PKR 15,000.7
Third, the outstanding loan amount is written off and a contribution of PKR 5,000 towards funeral
charges is paid to the family in the case of a normal death of the main breadwinner. The annual
premium of PKR 150 for both client and spouse is automatically deducted from the loan amount
before disbursement. The covered expenses during hospitalization range from room charges, doc-
tor fees, lab tests and prescribed drugs to transportation costs. For maternity-related expenses, the
reimbursement threshold is set to PKR 10,000. Pre-existing conditions are not covered under the
policy. The claim process depends on the availed health facility. In each district, NRSP has cre-
ated a panel of hospitals that are approved and whose quality is certified. In these so-called panel
hospitals, treatment expenditures up to the maximal threshold of PKR 15,000 are billed directly
to the insurance company, after confirmation of the insurance status by NRSP. Expenditures ex-
ceeding the maximal threshold have to be covered by the patient. In all other facilities, the patient
has to bear medical expenses first and will be reimbursed by NRSP after approval of the claim.
3.3.2 Intervention
With the insurance innovations tested in this experiment NRSP aims to increase the resilience
of its clients towards adverse health shocks, while also striving for a sustainable product. At
the same time, the local context restricts the range of possible innovations. NRSP’s large-scale
operations on the grass-root level heavily depend on simple routines and on recruiting staff from
local communities. NRSP’s field staff has on average nine years of formal education and its target
population is mostly poor and uneducated. Any scalable insurance solution therefore needs to
focus on simple contracts that are easy to administer in the field.
Initiative was initiated in four districts of the province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (http://www.healthkp.gov.
pk/SHPInitiative.asp).
7 The maximal benefit depends on the degree of disability caused by the accident.
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This study tests three simple policies that expand mandatory insurance described above by
offering voluntary coverage for additional household dependents. A fourth policy, which was also
included in the RCT but is not directly comparable to the other three designs, is also described here
for completeness. The benefits and claim procedure of the offered insurance policies are similar
to the existing mandatory insurance policy. All policies cover hospitalization expenditure and
accidental death or disability up to a specific threshold. Treatment in panel hospitals is cashless
up to the coverage threshold. Expenditures from non-panel facilities are reimbursed ex post.
NRSP already implemented a similar coverage innovation for dependents of their credit clients in
Hyderabad between 2009 and 2011. This earlier pilot led to promising social impacts, which are
in (Landmann and Frölich, 2015; Frölich and Landmann, 2018).
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the insurance innovations. The Individual policy (P1) allows
clients to enroll any number and combination of dependents in the insurance scheme. It covers
hospitalization expenditures of the insured individuals up to a threshold of PKR 15,000 for a pre-
mium of PKR 100 per person insured. In addition, death or disability resulting from an accident is
covered up to a maximum of PKR 15,000. The Household policy (P3) differs from the individual
products in that the client is required to enroll all dependents of the household to obtain addi-
tional insurance. This policy provides the same coverage as the individual product (P1) for each
insured dependent. The Group policy (P4) furthermore requires at least 50% uptake within the
respective credit group or community organization. Specifically, for any household of the group
to be eligible, at least half of the group members present in the meeting need to enroll all their
dependents. The Individual High policy (P2) is supposed to increase protection of clients against
more expensive health events. Its coverage limits are increased to PKR 30,000 per person insured,
which also justifies the higher insurance premium 8. Note that in contrast to all other schemes,
the high coverage policy changes the expected reimbursement costs for a given individual and
is furthermore offered at a higher price. So while the observations under this policy might help
to understand how baseline characteristics translate into health behavior, the demand and claim
patterns are not comparable to the other policies. We therefore focus on policies P1, P3 and P4 in
our main results.
In each village, one of these four policies is offered in a community meeting. The community
meeting starts with an introduction to the concept of insurance and explains in detail the benefits
of the existing, mandatory health insurance policy. These awareness sessions are held by trained
social organizers and take about 30 to 40 minutes. Afterwards, social organizers introduce the
policy which has been randomly allocated to the community. During the sign-up phase for the
insurance they also offer each client a discount vouchers in private. The resulting discount (0, 10,
20 and 30 PKR) applies to the per person premium for all of the eligible household members.
In terms of hypotheses, we expect a high level of adverse selection in the individual policy
8 About 80% of claims from the mandatory insurance in 2014 were above the coverage threshold of PKR 15,000.
Based on these numbers and expected increases in reimbursements, the fair premium was estimated at PKR 150.
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Table 3.1 – Insurance Innovations
Individual
(P1)
Individual
High (P2)
Household
(P3)
Group
(P4)
Eligibility Individual Individual Household Household
Add. Requirement
50% uptake in
the group
Coverage Limit (pp) 15,000 30,000 15,000 15,000
Premium (pp) 100 150 100 100
Premium Discounts (pp) 0-30 0-30 0-30 0-30
Notes: Numbers are in PKR, USD 1 ≈ 101 PKR, 15’000 PKR ≈ USD 148 (in February 2015), pp = per person.
Individual Eligibility: Client allowed to insure any number and any combination of dependents.
Household Eligibility: Client has to insure either all or none of the dependents.
Premium Discounts: Discount vouchers of 0, 10, 20 and 30 PKR (pp) were randomized with equal probability at
the household level.
(P1), as clients can cherry pick insurance coverage for ‘risky’ household members. Compared
to Individual insurance, the household policy (P3) is expected to impede selection of high risk
individuals, and the group policy (P4) additionally impedes selection of specific high risk house-
holds into the scheme. By construction, both bundled products should mitigate adverse selection
(P4 even more than P3). How much adverse selection is decreased depends on the clustering of
health risks within households and groups, as well as on the extent to which clients possess and
use information about aggregated financial risk at the level of these respective clusters.
The welfare implications of such risk bundling policies are ambiguous from a theoretical point
of view. On the one hand, we expect risk bundling to mitigate adverse selection, and thereby
increase overall welfare. On the other hand, limiting the choice of clients could in some cases
decrease welfare. Imagine, for example, that the marginal willingness to pay is above the uni-
form household price for some and below this price for other dependents. This would imply an
inefficient level of coverage under the household insurance (assuming that the von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms hold). The resulting demand might both be higher or lower compared to
the individual product at the same price. Furthermore, liquidity constraints might be more of an
issue in products P3 and P4, especially for large households, as premiums for all household mem-
bers need to be paid. We assess demand, selection into the insurance policies and overall welfare
effects in Sections 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7.
3.3.3 Sampling and Randomization
We chose the ‘revenue village’ or ‘mouza’, which is best described as a collection of settle-
ments forming a village, as the level of randomization. This means that only one out of four
interventions described above is made available to clients living in the same village. We choose
this level of randomization because it is sufficiently small to allow for the required number of
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clusters, while at the same time being sufficiently large to reach the optimal number of observa-
tions per cluster. Further, given the considerable distance between villages, this choice minimizes
the potential for information spillovers, which could contaminate the treatment effect estimates.
A map of the villages included in the experiment can be found in Appendix C.2.
The sampling procedure focuses on clients from groups whose loan application had been ap-
proved just before the introduction of the innovation in December 2014. This approach guarantees
that the group composition and household structure are exogenous to the introduction of the in-
novations. Moreover, this procedure allows the coverage periods of the mandatory and extended
insurance policies to overlap for most of the time. For sampling purposes, we first generate a
unique order of credit applications from the timing in which they appear in NRSP’s management
information system. In a second step, we select all members with active loans from the pool of
groups for which there is at least one credit application. New groups are added following this
procedure until at least 13 client households per village are sampled to achieve an optimal cluster
size.9 Sampling from incoming credit applications implies that we do not know the set of villages
with incoming credit applications ex-ante. We therefore employ a permuted block randomiza-
tion procedure for dynamic treatment assignment (McEntegart, 2003) and additionally stratify the
treatment assignment across a set of ex-ante village characteristics.10 Premium discounts are ran-
domized on the level of the household during the sign-up procedure. The discount is determined
through a lottery in which clients have to choose one of four seemingly identical cards. These
discount cards are drawn with replacement, hence giving each household an identical chance for
each discount level. The result is captured on a specifically developed sign-up sheet that contains
unique household level identifiers.
Table 3.2 presents the resulting allocation of treatments. In total, there are 502 villages with
6,461 client households, which are each allocated to one of the four insurance innovations or two
control groups. The first set of control villages constitutes a pure control group. In these villages
no intervention in addition to the usual procedures takes place. The sampled credit groups in the
second control group, labeled “Awareness”, receive a standardized session in which the contract
of the already existing mandatory insurance for clients and spouses is explained.11 In most of
our analysis, we focus on the 334 villages in which the four insurance innovations have been
implemented with policies P1, P3 and P4 being of particular interest. As expected by design,
the number of villages across treatment arms is balanced and each treatment cluster on average
comprises 13 households.
9 In general, this translates into sampling one complete community organization per village, which is sometimes
amended by a smaller credit group. Alternatively, we sample four to five smaller credit groups per village.
10 More details on the randomization procedure can be found in Appendix C.2.
11 This session is also conducted in the treatment villages in which an additional insurance policy is offered.
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Table 3.2 – Treatment Allocation
Control Awareness P1 P2 P3 P4
Total
(Policies) Total
Villages 86 82 82 84 82 86 334 502
Groups 283 230 268 266 252 264 1050 1563
HHs 1154 1026 1022 1083 1058 1120 4283 6463
HHs Attending 0 822 856 870 830 877 3433 4255
Dependents (Dep.) 4183 3539 3560 3920 3797 4085 15362 23084
Attending Dep. 0 2798 2981 3209 2938 3156 12284 15082
3.4 Data
To facilitate the understanding of our analyses, the data sources and the data itself are described
in the following.
3.4.1 Data Sources
In the analysis below, we combine household and individual level data from three different
sources. First, we use client level information captured in our implementation partner’s manage-
ment information system (MIS). Second, we collect household and individual level data from the
sample households through computer assisted personal interviews (CAPI). Third, we augment
this information with bi-monthly phone surveys for the subset of households that consented in the
baseline survey.
The MIS data includes unique client, group and village identifiers that we rely on in the ran-
domization process. In addition, our implementation partner’s credit procedure involves the col-
lection of household rosters for incoming credit clients. We use these household rosters in two
ways: On the one hand, it determines insurance eligibility of the dependents at the time of the
insurance offer.12 On the other hand, we incorporate these household rosters in the survey soft-
ware to facilitate the survey process. Moreover, we will have access to detailed claim data for the
introduced policies. The claim data will contain information on the type of claim (hospitalization
vs. accidental death/disability), the claim amount and details on the disease diagnosed.
The household survey consists of several modules capturing socio-demographic, psychologi-
cal, economic, and health indicators. The health module contains individual level information on
subjective health status, history of both in- and outpatient treatments and detailed information on
coping strategies. Baseline data was collected between December 2014 and March 2015 before
the implementation of the intervention. Externally hired enumerators operating in the name of the
University of Mannheim were engaged in data collection. To maximize data quality, our CAPI
12 This procedure also ensures that the household structure is exogenous to the introduction of insurance.
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system included both instantaneous in-field quality assurance and regular, more sophisticated data
quality checks on the enumerator level.
The phone survey captures high-frequency information on health events. In general, there is
the concern that information on more regular shocks such as visits to the doctor and corresponding
expenditures become inaccurate for longer recall periods. In order to collect complete and accurate
information on health shocks, we call respondents on a bi-monthly basis and ask about the health
status of their household members. The phone survey instrument captures both inpatient and
outpatient events along with the costs incurred and coping strategies. The phone survey data
collection covers the complete product cycle of the insurance innovation (one year).
3.4.2 Summary Statistics
Table 3.3 shows some basic summary for the 4283 households in the four insurance treatment
arms. The average household size reported in the baseline survey is close to six. The average
number of household members for whom the take-up information can be matched is about 5.4 and
the number of eligible dependents in the household is about 3.6. The average age of the client
is about 38.5 years old and about 53% of the clients are female. The majority of clients have
no formal education. The second panel of Table 3.3 (a) contains economic indicators. Average
monthly income of households is about PKR 22,700 (USD 220) and on average they own about 1.4
acres of land. Further, credit obligations are about three times as large as the savings stock, which
amount to about 30,000 and PKR 12,000, respectively. The third panel contains household level
health indicators. In about 12% of the sampled households, at least one member was admitted
to a medical facility for inpatient treatment in the last 12 months prior to the survey. In case of
hospitalization, average expenditure amounts to approximately PKR 37,000 per household. On
average, 18% of the sampled households have heard about insurance. 16% of the dependents
in the household consulted a doctor in the last month, whereas 2% of household members were
hospitalized in the past 12 months. Part (b) of Table 3.3 describes data gathered via the phone
survey (93% of respondents in the baseline agree to be contacted via phone). During the 12
months covered, 15% of households report that some dependents experienced an inpatient event,
while two thirds of households sought outpatient treatment for some of their dependents in the last
month. On the dependent level of the, reported inpatient and outpatient incidences are comparable
to those of the baseline survey (2% and 16% respectively).
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Table 3.3 – Summary Statistics
(a) Baseline Characteristics
N Mean SD
Socio-Demographics - HH
HH Size (Survey) 4283 5.99 2.12
HH Size (Matched) 4283 5.37 1.91
Dependents (Matched) 4283 3.59 1.87
Age of Client 4283 38.62 10.89
Client Female (D) 4283 0.53
Client No Education (D) 4283 0.55
Economic - HH
Income (month) 4283 22691 24695
Asset Index 4283 0.06 2.42
Savings 4283 12085 67986
Credit 4283 30439 71910
Health & Insurance - HH
Any Inpatient (D) 4283 0.12
Total Inpatient Cost 4283 4446 24475
Knows Health Insurance (D) 4283 0.18
Health - Dependents
Health Step (1-5) 15361 4.76 0.63
Outpatient Experience (D) 15361 0.14
Inpatient Experience (D) 15361 0.02
Outpatient Cost 15361 609.99 7920.43
Inpatient Cost 15361 506.36 7520.87
(b) Phone Survey
N Mean SD
Consent 4283 0.93
Health - HH
Any Inpatient (D) 3973 0.14
Any Outpatient (D) 3973 0.65
Health - Dependents
Inpatient Experience (D) 14246 0.02
Outpatient Experience (D) 14246 0.14
Inpatient Cost 14246 371.59 5537.91
Outpatient Cost 14246 702.79 5415.12
Notes: The table provides means and standard deviations (SD) of the respective variables. Binary variables are
indicated with (D). Monetary amounts are in Pakistani rupees (PKR), where 101 PKR ≈ USD 1.
Balancing tests for these (and other) characteristics are shown in Appendix C.3. They indicate
that the randomization achieved a very good balance of covariates across treatment arms. Also the
share of the four discount types distributed during insurance roll-out is not significantly different
from 25%, consistent with our uniform distribution scheme. Levels of discounts furthermore do
not seem to systematically differ by recipient characteristics.
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3.5 Insurance Demand
Figure 3.2 depicts demand for the three insurance policies of interest. For each policy, demand
is plotted at the four different premium levels. The dark bar illustrates the share of households
insuring at least one dependent, while the lighter bar illustrates the share of eligible dependents
becoming enrolled in the insurance scheme.13 For all offered policies uptake decreases in the
premium. The fraction of households covering some of their members is relatively high in the
individual policy (P1: 42-77%) compared to the household (P3: 26-74%) and the group level
policy (P4: 28-72%). In terms of the fraction of dependents covered, however, the bundled policies
achieve higher uptake (P3: 18-71%, P4: 19-68%) compared to the individual policy (P1: 17-39%).
Table C.2 in Appendix C.1 provides elasticity estimates assuming a linear demand curve. The
resulting estimates vary between -0.6 for the individual policies to -1.6 for the household policies.
In the individual product P1, we observe a large gap between the share of households and the
share of individual becoming insured at any premium level. This gap illustrates that households
to large extent insure only partially and we will analyze in the next section whether the insured
individuals differ from the non-insured with respect to their expected health costs. The gap be-
tween household and individual level uptake is much lower in the household and group policies P3
and P4. This is not surprising and shows that our eligibility criteria of ensuring all dependents in
the household have actually been enforced in the field. The remaining gap exists because smaller
households are more likely to purchase, which again suggests that clients face difficulties to pay
the amount necessary to insure many dependents.
Comparing the individual policy P1 and policies with the household eligibility criterion (P3
and P4), we further observe that fewer households buy insurance if enrollment of all dependents
is required. On the other hand, the share of insured dependents is larger with the requirement.
This suggests a trade-off between a larger pool of insured dependents and a larger pool of in-
sured households. In other words, some households that buy (partial) insurance when offered the
individual policies would not do so when they were required to insure the whole household.
Appendix Table C.3 sheds further light on the determinants for households to enroll in the
different insurance products. In the individual product (P1) household size does not play a role in
whether to engage in some form of insurance, but larger households insure a smaller fraction of
their members. Individuals selecting into the scheme tend to have lower health status and worse
health history. Furthermore, children – especially the oldest son – are more likely to be enrolled. In
the household and group policies (P3 and P4) individual characteristics have less predictive power.
Instead, factors which might aggravate liquidity constraints of households (household size, female
gender of the client and household experience of a hospitalization) correlate with lower take-up.
13 Note that the figure is based on households attending the group meeting. Overall, the attendance in the meeting
is around 80%. We do not find any statistical differences in terms of observable characteristics between households
attending the meeting and households not attending the meeting (refer to Table C.11 in Appendix C.3). The shares
depicted in Figure 3.2 as well as the number of households attending the meetings (and their eligible dependents) are
provided in Table C.1 of Appendix C.1.
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Figure 3.2 – Insurance Demand, by product type
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Notes: The bars indicate average uptake ratios on the household and dependent level respectively. The depicted 95%
confidence intervals account for clustered standard errors at the village level. Small differences between dependent
and household level uptake in policies P3 and P4 occur because of the smaller size of insured households.
3.6 Adverse Selection
In the previous section, we estimated how many households or individuals purchase insurance
as a function of the price, which exogenously varies as part of the RCT. In this section, we ex-
amine who purchases insurance and if these individuals systematically differ from those who do
not. Thereby we analyze the relationship between insurance demand and health risk in terms of
expected reimbursement costs to learn more about adverse selection
3.6.1 Measuring Health Risk: The Expected Cost Index
Expected reimbursement costs at different demand points are of central importance for the
identification of adverse selection in our setup. To measure these costs, we construct an expected
cost index capturing the insurer’s expected reimbursement costs for each individual given baseline
covariates. To translate baseline covariates into expected costs we link characteristics to observed
health events, costs and claim behavior after insurance was introduced. Even though this mapping
is based on the costs observed in reality after the introduction of the insurance innovation, the cost
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index remains purely a function of ex ante characteristics.14 We follow this approach for several
reasons:
First, moral hazard can create a correlation between insurance demand and health costs after
the insurance decision even in the absence of adverse selection. For example, people may change
their behavior after having purchased insurance and take such behavioral changes into account
before buying insurance.15 Specifying the cost index as a function of baseline values avoids any
such confounding.16 Imagine a case where moral hazard exists and increases hospitalization costs
incurred. In this case, the mapping would predict higher costs, but it would do so for all individuals
with the same baseline variables – irrespective of their insurance status. The comparison between
insured and non-insured hence remains unbiased. Note that even though the index does not suffer
from a discrimination problem, our experimental setup allows investigating moral hazard further.
Specifically, we can compute predictive models for health care costs using the 162 control villages
included in the RCT. Since insurance was not made available in these villages, moral hazard
cannot enter into this alternative index. In contrast, estimating predictive cost models using data
from the treatment villages incorporates the overall cost shift due to potential moral hazard as
well. Appendix C.4 reveals that both approaches lead to similar empirical results. For this reason,
we regard adverse selection as the main channel, while selection on moral hazard seems to be
of less relevance in our setting.17 The main analysis presented below hence uses the predictive
model that includes data from all villages in the experiment in order to maximize precision of the
estimation.
Another reason to compute an expected cost index for each individual rather than using insurer
reimbursement costs is that the latter relies on few claim observations. An assessment of selec-
tion across different policies and further subgroups requires a sufficient number of observations,
though. Comparing individuals with respect to a large set of baseline characteristics ensures that
we can effectively use all individuals for analysis and furthermore differentiate them sufficiently.
A drawback of using baseline characteristics is that their interpretation is usually not trivial. Many
studies employing baseline risk measures face uncertainty about how well their measures relate
to the occurrence of health events in the future. Such limitations of the relevance do not apply
here, as our risk measure is based on a mapping of baseline risk factors into inpatient costs aris-
14 See Appendix C.4 for further details on the parametric prediction models. Note that results are robust to other
prediction models.
15 In our case, preventive behavior may change or patients might visit more expensive facilities, both leading to an
increase in the expected cost distribution of insured individuals as compared to uninsured individuals.
16 All baseline covariates are fully exogenous in the sense that they could not be causally affected by the insurance
policies offered because at the time of data collection, households were not aware of the upcoming insurance in-
novations. Furthermore, the household roster used to determine eligibility for insurance was collected before the
innovations were introduced. Otherwise, households might have answered strategically when being asked about who
belongs to their household (particularly for the household and group insurance policies P3 and P4). Table C.8 reveals
that there is no statistically significant difference in the household size reported at baseline.
17 This is in line with our expectations because the insurance only covers in-patient expenses which are mostly related
to emergencies and acute illnesses, where we expect moral hazard to be less relevant.
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ing during the product cycle. The model used for this mapping is strongly prognostic with many
coefficients and the overall model being highly significant (compare Appendix C.4). 18
For the main analysis below, the health risk index is computed in the same way for all individ-
uals under the policies P1, P3 and P4, which share the same coverage limit of PKR 15,000. The
average predicted cost per individual in these policies is PKR 71.42. Appendix C.4 documents
that the index is balanced between policies P1, P3 and P4.
3.6.2 Presence of Adverse Selection: Positive Correlation Test
As described in Section 3.2, adverse selection leads to a situation in which high risk types
choose higher insurance coverage than lower risk types. In a first step, we therefore assess the ex-
istence of such a relationship by implementing a conventional positive correlation test (Chiappori
and Salanie, 2000). The individual’s insurance status is given by a binary indicator for insurance
uptake. Further, we proxy individuals’ health risk by the expected cost index described before.
Figure 3.3 plots coefficient estimates (and corresponding 95% confidence bounds) from a bivari-
ate regression of the expected cost index on the binary insurance status for each of the offered
policies. The horizontal line indicates the overall mean of the cost index. For the individual policy
P1, we observe a large and statistically significant difference in the average cost index of insured
versus uninsured individuals. The average cost index is almost 50% larger for insured individuals
and the difference is highly significant (p-value 0.0001). For household policies P3 and P4, on
the other hand, we find that the difference in health risk between insured and uninsured individu-
als is much smaller. Average predicted costs are between 10-15% higher for insured compared to
uninsured. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level for policy P3 and insignificant
for P4.
The pattern observed in Figure 3.3 is in line with the presence of adverse selection. Higher risk
individuals are more likely to become insured, in particular if given the choice in the individual
insurance policies. The requirement to enroll all household members appears to mitigate such
cherry picking and therefore could be considered a promising tool in alleviating adverse selection.
Note that the observed pattern can also explain the partial insurance uptake within the household
established in Section 3.5. The corresponding demand analysis in Appendix Table C.3 confirms
that idiosyncratic health risk factors are a much better predictor for insurance uptake in the indi-
vidual than in the household or group products. In the absence of positive assortative matching
within the household this result is mechanical in the sense that there is simply no more scope for
adverse selection in the household products. On the other hand, it is possible that clients are less
likely to exploit the scope for selection, for example because they have difficulties to obtain a good
estimate of the household’s riskiness as a whole.
18 Not surprisingly, the predictive power is not perfect since health shocks are generally hard to predict. The non-
explained part reflects pure randomness as well as unobserved health risks.
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Figure 3.3 – Positive Correlation Test: Expected Cost Index and Take-up, by policy
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Notes: Bars indicate mean values of the health cost index by insurance status and policy. Confidence intervals are
derived from OLS regression of the health risk index on a binary insurance status indicator. Standard errors clustered
at the village level.
While the presented evidence of the positive correlation test seems conclusive, the behavior
explaining these results remains less clear. Insurance demand is a conscious decision, but the
choice might well be related to other characteristics besides expected inpatient costs. If these
characteristics – such as risk aversion or income – are related to the measure of riskiness, the
interpretation as deliberate selection on the basis of costs might be misleading. More risk-averse
clients for example are expected to be more likely to insure their dependents. If these clients are
at the same time more likely to be located in households with higher health risk, a similar result
as in Figure 3.3 could arise without intentional selection based on expected costs. In Appendix
Table C.4, we investigate this issue by explaining the demand-risk correlation with non-health
related characteristics on the one hand and health history on the other hand. Even though the
non-health variables are able to explain some of the insurance effect, there remains a large and
significant effect that can only be explained by variables related to past health events. The classical
explanation for adverse selection thus appears to be at least part of the story.
From an insurer’s perspective, the behavior explaining the selection process is not the key issue,
though. For the provider it is more interesting to know the costs caused by adverse selection and
how these change at different price and demand levels. Furthermore, changes in the cost distribu-
tion across prices shed additional light on the origins of adverse selection; classical explanations
for adverse selection imply a decreasing average cost curve which is caused by a transition of
relatively less risky individuals out of the insurance pool with increasing prices. The setup of our
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RCT allows investigating such dynamics caused by price changes specifically, and we discuss the
corresponding analyses in the following section.
3.6.3 Presence of Adverse Selection: Slope of (expected) Marginal Cost
Curve
In this section we move beyond the purely correlational approach and analyze the distribution
of risk types’ at different points of the demand curve. As illustrated in Figure 3.1 and discussed
in Section 3.2, the slope of the insurance providers’ marginal cost curve directly indicates the
presence of adverse selection (Einav and Finkelstein, 2011). In the absence of adverse selection,
the marginal cost curve would be flat. Thus, the risk type distribution of the insurance pool would
be independent of the insurance premium. In contrast, if adverse selection were present, the
marginal cost curve would be upward sloping in price.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the distribution of the cost index in the pool of insured individuals at
different demand levels using box plots. The box indicates the interquartile rage (IQR), with the
median indicated by the line separating the box. The lower (upper) adjacent line indicates the
90th (10th) percentile, respectively. The diamond represents the mean of the distribution. For
the individual level policy P1 the mean costs associated with the insurance pool decrease with
demand, i.e. with lower premiums. While all depicted moments of the distribution tend to shift
downward, the shift is most pronounced at the upper tail. For the household (P3) and group (P4)
policy there also seems to be an upwards shift in the cost distribution with increasing premiums,
but this shift is smaller than under the individual policy (P1). Table C.5(a) shows the result of
testing for a trend in the mean cost index of insured individuals by policy. Findings lack precision,
in particular when there are fewer observations in the insurance pool, but the downward slope of
the average cost curve tends to be stronger in the individual policy (P1) than in the household and
group policies (P3, P4).
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Figure 3.4 – Distribution of Expected Cost Index of Insured over Demand, by policy
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Notes: The box plot illustrates the interquartile rage (IQR), with the median indicated by the line separating the box.
The lower (upper) adjacent line shows the 90th (10th) percentile, respectively. The diamond indicates the value of the
mean.
Appendix C.1 provides further robustness checks and comparisons within the different policy
regimes. Figure C.1 shows the distribution of costs across demand levels amongst the non-insured.
For the individual policy, there appears to be a downward shift in the cost distribution when the
share of insured becomes larger. Marginal individuals switching the insurance status in response
to a change in price hence seem to be high risk relative to the non-insured but low risk relative
to the insured. This is fully in line with the economic theory on adverse selection discussed in
Section 3.2. In contrast, such a pattern for non-insured is not observed under household (P3)
and group (P4) policies. Table C.5(b) provides a formal test for the relationship between the cost
index of non-insured and the share insured. The estimated slope is significantly negative for the
individual policy P1 and insignificantly positive for household and group policies (P3, P4).
We conduct several robustness checks. For instance, we employ an alternative health risk mea-
sure which is constructed by a principal component analysis of baseline health measures. Further,
we repeat the analyses for the main baseline health measures separately. Our primary finding
that adverse selection is much more pronounced in individual versus household and group insur-
ance policies is robust across all these analyses.19 Finally, we validate our analysis by comparing
real hospitalization costs, claim incidences and claimed amounts amongst the insured during the
19 The results for these robustness checks are available upon request.
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product cycle between policy types. All three measures are significantly higher in the individual
policies’ insurance pool (see Table C.13).
3.7 Welfare Analysis of Adverse Selection
In the previous sections we established the existence of adverse selection in particular in prod-
ucts for which clients can select individual members to become insured. The selection is less
pronounced when complete households or groups of households have to enroll. This section in-
vestigates the welfare consequences of adverse selection under the different policies. As discussed
in Section 3.2, the exogenous price variation induced by the RCT setting identifies both the de-
mand and the average cost curves. To analyze welfare consequences, we need to connect the
demand estimates from Section 3.5 with the analyses on the slope of the average cost curve in the
previous Section 3.6.3. Different to the above demand and cost analyses, however, we use priors
to constrain our estimates to exhibit reasonable features. First, we restrict the slope of the demand
curve to yield full coverage at price zero or above.20 Second, we know that with 100% take-up,
average costs of the scheme must equal the mean of the cost index in the sample. We therefore
restrict the average cost curve to pass through this point. This approach is in line with the anal-
yses in Einav et al. (2010). Given these restrictions, we estimate the demand curve via a linear
regression of a dependent level take-up indicator on the exogenously varied premium price. The
cost curve estimates result from linear regressions of the individual-specic cost index on aggregate
demand for the corresponding policy at the respective price. The marginal cost curve can easily
be derived afterwards in the linear case (MC ′ = 2 × AC ′). The result of the exercise is shown
in Figure 3.5 . It plots the average demand at different premium prices, the average cost index at
these respective demand points as well as the estimated demand, average cost and marginal cost
curves for the three policies. As discussed in Section 3.2, the intersection of the demand and aver-
age cost curve determines the market equilibrium, while the intersection of demand and marginal
cost curve determines the efficient allocation.
Even though the linear approximation with restrictions does not fit the data points perfectly,
Figure 3.5 clearly shows that sustaining insurance supply is much harder under the individual
policy (P1). Both linear approximations as well as the visual inspection of data points suggest
that the market for individual insurance is close to a breakdown. In the case of the bundled
policies (P3, P4), however, the average cost curves are less steep and more often situated below
the demand curve. This leads to higher equilibrium demand, higher aggregate welfare and lower
prices compared to the individual policy. This result is to some extent driven by the higher demand
for insurance coverage in bundled policies (estimates shown in Table C.6), but shifts in the average
cost curves (parameter estimates in Table C.7) also play a role. The slope of the cost curve is
20 In other words, we assume full take-up if the product was offered for free. This restriction is binding in only one
case (P1), but the fit still appears to be very good.
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relatively large and highly significant for the individual policy P1 (-32.228). Figures are smaller
and less significant for household policy P3 (-14.884, significant at 5% level) and group policy P4
(-9.302, insignificant). When comparing the slopes, we find significant differences between P1 vs.
P4 (p-value: 0.0751).
Another important aspect to consider is how close the respective policies are to the efficient
allocation. Table 3.4 shows the equilibrium as well as the efficient allocations under the differ-
ent policies and calculates the resulting welfare losses from adverse selection. Despite the lower
gradient of the average cost curves for the bundled policies, losses in quantity caused by adverse
selection (0.11-0.15) are higher than for the individual policy (0.09). Also the calculated welfare
loss is higher for the household and group insurance (P3: 1.00, P4: 0.33) than in the individual
insurance policy (P1: 0.21). There are two reasons for the higher losses despite lower adverse
selection in bundled policies. First, the gradient of the demand curve is lower and second, equilib-
rium allocations are at a higher quantity. Both factors ceteris paribus extend the ‘loss triangle’. We
therefore also calculate the relative welfare loss, indicated in the last row of Table 3.4. Relative to
overall welfare, losses are indeed lower in the household and group policies (10.16% and 3.50%)
compared to individual policy (14.40%).
86
Figure 3.5 – Market Equilibrium and Efficient Allocation, by policy
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Notes: The figure plots the demand, average and marginal cost curves for the respective policies. Average demand
for the corresponding premium is given by the dots in light grey. The slope of the demand curve is estimated from a
linear regression of an individual take-up indicator on the premium for which a restriction of a constant larger or
equal than 1 is imposed. Average costs of the insured for the corresponding demand are given by the dots in black.
The slope of the average cost curve is estimated from a linear regression of the individual level expected cost index
on average take-up at the corresponding premium level. The estimation is restricted to pass through the average cost
index for the respective policy at a demand level of 1. The regressions predicting the both curves are shown in Tables
C.6 and C.7 and account for clustering of standard errors at the village level.
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Table 3.4 – Welfare Analysis
Individual
(P1)
Household
(P3)
Group
(P4)
Equilibrium
Price 103.41 79.48 75.02
Quantity 0.15 0.54 0.54
Welfare 1.32 8.84 8.95
Efficient
Price 93.67 64.20 67.11
Quantity 0.23 0.79 0.67
Welfare 1.49 9.83 9.29
Loss
Quantity 0.08 0.25 0.13
Welfare 0.18 0.99 0.34
%Welfare 11.75 10.06 3.67
The welfare results presented above should be interpreted with caution, as they are sensitive
to the parametric fit of the demand and cost curves. In particular, the cost estimates are based on
insured individuals only and lack precision when demand is low. The restricted linear regressions
smooth such fluctuations, but they also smooth away local slopes. For this reason, the quality
of this parametric fit seems somewhat limited, in particular for the individual policy P1. As a
robustness check, we allow for a quadratic average cost curve that accounts for the analogous
restriction of passing through the mean of the expected cost index at full demand. Appendix Figure
C.2 suggests an even more pronounced contrast between individual (P1) and bundled policies (P3,
P4): the market for individual policies breaks down completely.21 We therefore interpret the linear
specification as a conservative estimate of the difference between the different policies.
Another central element of the welfare analysis is the interpretation of the demand curve. The
neoclassical welfare analysis above assumes that the willingness to pay measures utility derived
by coverage. There might be many reasons why this interpretation is flawed, such as wrong
beliefs about insurance benefits, liquidity constraints, or simply irrational behavior. We indeed
find uptake patterns consistent with liquidity constraints for household and group policies (refer to
the discussion on demand in Section 3.5 for more details). At the same time, these findings cannot
explain why demand for bundled policies is higher than for the corresponding individual policy.
This finding of higher average willingness to pay for household than for individual insurance
is not easy to reconcile with simple neoclassical theory under perfect information. In such an
environment, average willingness to pay should be similar for individual and bundled policies,
even though the shape of the curves might differ.22 Finally, the interpretation of the demand curve
21 The market for individual insurance (P1) breaks down in equilibrium, even though insurance take-up would be
positive in the efficient allocation. In case of the bundled policies (P3, P4), equilibrium prices and quantities remain
very similar and the equilibria are even closer to the efficient situation than in the linear specification. 22 Assuming
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) for example, it is straightforward to show that the sum of the
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might be distorted by the implementation of price variation through discount vouchers. Receiving
a positive discount might for example induce more uptake than other forms of price variation.
While we do not observe deviations from the linear demand predictions at particular discount
levels, we cannot exclude that there are effects on demand. To severely bias our results, though,
such effects would have to be different across policies.
3.8 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper provides robust evidence on adverse selection in low-income health insurance mar-
kets. We analyze a randomized control trial which was conducted in more than 500 villages of
rural Pakistan and where hospitalization insurance for household members of microfinance clients
was offered by a large local NGO. The setup of the RCT allows us to separate adverse selection
from moral hazard, to estimate how selection changes at different points of the price curve and to
test different mechanisms against adverse selection. Our analysis of adverse selection is based on
individual health characteristics at baseline which we translate into an idiosyncratic expected cost
index using realized costs during the product cycle.
The results suggest that there is substantial adverse selection if specific individuals within
the household can be enrolled in the health insurance. In particular, adverse selection becomes
worse with higher premium prices, suggesting a trade-off between cost recovery and the quality
of the insurance pool. Bundling policies on the household level is effective in mitigating adverse
selection to a large extent. Additional bundling of policies on the level of microfinance groups
further improves the risk pool and no significant adverse selection remains in this policy.
Our main analysis assumes that the expected cost index is a good proxy to construct cost curves.
An alternative and more direct approach would be to estimate average and marginal cost curves
using claim data from the insurance provider only. Given that hospitalization is a rare event with
a high unexplained error component, following this strategy would yield very imprecise results
in our sample. Using the best predictor for expected claim costs given baseline covariates as a
measure of health risk has several desirable properties in this context: It is highly relevant for
expected costs, easy to interpret and at the same time its value is less affected by random health
shocks at the respective price/policy points. The drawback of this measure is that we lose the
selection based on health risk that is not explained by observable baseline characteristics. In that
sense, results based on the cost index might represent a lower bound for true selection.
Nevertheless, the results show that (a function of) baseline health information does play a role
for rural microfinance clients in Pakistan when they decide about insurance uptake. Moreover,
a household’s ability to sort high risks into the insurance to a large extent is limited to selection
within households. There does not seem to be much selection on higher levels, such as the house-
willingness to pay for each individual household member as indicated by the demand curve is equal to the willingness
to pay for the whole household.
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hold or the micro-finance group. These findings add to the controversial debate about classical
assumptions in the developing country context. While community level demand factors might
be important (Dror and Firth, 2014), they apparently do not preclude microfinance clients in our
sample from specifically enrolling more risky individuals within their households.
The exogenous price variation induced in the RCT enables us to conduct a comparative welfare
analysis for the different insurance schemes by merging the analyses of demand and costs curves.
This exercise – which naturally rests on some assumptions – suggests that equilibrium allocations
under bundled products are characterized by higher quantities, lower prices and higher welfare
than under individual policies. An increased demand and decreased average cost curves under
bundled policies jointly explain the result. The conclusions related to welfare are subject to some
reservations, though. In addition to the difficulty to precisely identify cost and demand curves, the
neoclassical assumptions needed to interpret the willingness to pay as welfare might not be ful-
filled. In particular, liquidity constraints, peer effects, a lack of financial literacy or biased beliefs
about future benefits could lead to uptake decisions which do not reflect the true utility derived
by insurance. Furthermore, equilibrium allocations might not be relevant for a market where little
supply exists so far. Irrespective of the welfare interpretation and equilibrium allocations, how-
ever, there are important observations to be drawn from the analysis. It suggests that it is easier
for insurers to operate sustainably when offering bundled policies, given that the spread between
willingness to pay and average costs is larger. Further, lower adverse selection under household
and group policies makes entering the market less risky for insurance providers when they do not
know costs and demand at specific premiums.
This paper focuses on simple pooling products. This means that only one policy is offered and
no additional measures against adverse selection, such as co-payments or ex-ante screening are
included. Our results show that even under these circumstances household policies might be able
to achieve a sustainable pool of insurance clients. This is good news for organizations interested
in patching imperfect social security systems via insurance products for the low-income market.
Such organizations might prefer a simple pooling contract to alternative solutions – such as con-
tract portfolios with separating equilibria, screening, or risk classification based on observables –
since the former are simple to market to low-income clients under difficult supply conditions and
might exhibit lower administrative costs.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
Table A.1 – Robustness Checks of Outcome Definition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ITT ITT ITT TOT TOT TOT
Seeds Offered 0.057* 0.069** 0.060**
(0.030) (0.028) (0.025)
Accepted Offer 0.353* 0.422** 0.371**
(0.182) (0.166) (0.152)
Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 974 974 974 974 974 974
R2 0.098 0.093 0.073 0.125 0.135 0.097
Control Mean 0.39 0.26 0.18
Note: This table reports robustness checks for the outcome definition. Column (1) and (4) report impact estimates
on the self-reported measure to have planted hybrid maize seeds. Columns (2) and (5) report impact estimates for
an outcome that - in addition to (1) & (4) - considers the source of hybrid seeds (governemnt, NGO, store), but
does not impose a price threshold. Columns (3) and (6) consider an outcome variabel that - in addition to (2) and
(4) considers a price cutoff of 2000 UGX/kg and requires the reported hybrid seed variety to be of type Longe.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at
1%
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Table A.2 – ITT and TOT Estimates of Hybrid Seed Adoption - Cluster Wild Bootstrap
ITT ITT TOT TOT
Seeds Offered 0.082*** 0.084***
Accepted Offer 0.505*** 0.517***
Store Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables Yes Yes
Bootstrap P-value [.031] [.02] [.011] [.005]
Note: This table reports Intention-to-treat and treatment-on-the-treated estimates based on linear linear prob-
ability / TSLS models. The outcome is an indicator for whether the farmer reliably planted hybrid maize at
endline. The p-values come from the STATA cluster-wild bootstrap procedure boottest with 1000 bootstrap sam-
ples. Control variables are identical to those reported in Table 1.4. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%
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Table A.3 – ITT and TOT Estimates of Hybrid Seed Adoption - Split by Survey Week
ITT
Week1
ITT
Week 2
ITT
Week 3
TOT
Week 1
TOT
Week 2
TOT
Week 3
Seeds Offered 0.135** 0.139*** -0.040
(0.053) (0.046) (0.043)
Accepted Offer 0.551*** 0.857*** -0.434
(0.201) (0.273) (0.468)
Growing Maize -0.124 -0.034 0.096 -0.130 -0.041 0.086
(0.087) (0.071) (0.060) (0.082) (0.068) (0.061)
Grew Hybrid Maize 0.123* 0.014 -0.027 0.078 0.032 -0.034
(0.068) (0.055) (0.062) (0.061) (0.055) (0.061)
Age 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Gender: Male 0.043 0.098* 0.102** 0.046 0.084 0.111**
(0.068) (0.056) (0.052) (0.062) (0.056) (0.053)
Completed Primary Education (or above) -0.053 -0.010 0.014 -0.077 0.023 0.021
(0.066) (0.053) (0.053) (0.061) (0.054) (0.052)
Reachable by Phone 0.211** -0.070 -0.027 0.244*** -0.031 -0.005
(0.096) (0.082) (0.110) (0.087) (0.079) (0.119)
Owns Phone -0.110 0.095 -0.056 -0.157* 0.023 -0.057
(0.091) (0.084) (0.113) (0.083) (0.082) (0.129)
Crop Sold: Cotton -0.269 0.006 -0.462* -0.276 -0.049 -0.525*
(0.193) (0.186) (0.259) (0.176) (0.162) (0.293)
Crop Sold: Sesame -0.291 0.024 -0.514** -0.287* 0.002 -0.592**
(0.194) (0.170) (0.232) (0.172) (0.142) (0.274)
Crop Sold: Maize -0.260 -0.009 -0.499** -0.221 -0.033 -0.556**
(0.221) (0.166) (0.227) (0.193) (0.142) (0.262)
Log(Revenue, UGX) 0.002 0.016 -0.010 -0.012 -0.007 -0.010
(0.025) (0.021) (0.019) (0.026) (0.023) (0.019)
Plot Size planted with Maize (Acres) -0.008 0.011 -0.006 -0.004 0.010 -0.006
(0.021) (0.010) (0.009) (0.021) (0.009) (0.009)
Grow: Beans 0.003 0.047 -0.015 -0.006 0.039 -0.031
(0.084) (0.058) (0.073) (0.077) (0.054) (0.077)
Grow: Cassava 0.107 0.012 -0.008 0.123** -0.002 0.005
(0.066) (0.057) (0.060) (0.061) (0.054) (0.063)
Grow: Cotton -0.038 0.019 -0.162* -0.011 0.043 -0.180**
(0.079) (0.087) (0.091) (0.073) (0.085) (0.088)
Grow: Groundnuts -0.032 0.015 -0.010 -0.026 0.031 -0.003
(0.057) (0.052) (0.055) (0.050) (0.053) (0.056)
Grow: Pigeon Peas 0.076 0.074 0.012 0.074 0.094 0.022
(0.089) (0.070) (0.059) (0.080) (0.067) (0.057)
Grow: Sesame -0.043 -0.009 0.058 -0.010 -0.048 0.078
(0.077) (0.065) (0.080) (0.069) (0.063) (0.084)
Grow: Sorghum 0.030 0.043 -0.043 0.018 0.046 -0.049
(0.073) (0.054) (0.053) (0.065) (0.055) (0.052)
Grow: Soya -0.031 0.002 0.098 -0.049 0.013 0.114
(0.074) (0.086) (0.074) (0.069) (0.081) (0.080)
Grow: Sweet Potato -0.008 0.065 -0.021 -0.035 0.046 -0.013
(0.065) (0.048) (0.050) (0.062) (0.050) (0.048)
Grow: Vegetables (Salad,Greens) -0.080 -0.038 -0.004 -0.042 -0.032 0.006
(0.106) (0.067) (0.059) (0.102) (0.064) (0.057)
Constant 0.375 -0.103 0.708** 0.202 0.182 1.016**
(0.365) (0.313) (0.329) (0.400) (0.296) (0.400)
Store Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 307 332 335 307 332 335
R2 0.202 0.192 0.157 0.231 0.105 0.054
Note: This table reports Intention-to-treat and treatment-on-the-treated outcome estimates based on linear linear probability / TSLS models,
using robust standard errors. The outcome is an indicator for whether the farmer reliably planted hybrid maize at endline. The coefficient
from missing revenue indicator is omitted. Missing standard error estimates for Revenue Missing for the Week 2 estimates are explained with
no variation in the variable for that subsample. Coefficient estimates of an indicator for missing revenue are not reported, but not statistically
significant.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Solution of Equilibrium Expectations
If private characteristics are self-known, an agent’s information set contains only her own pri-
vate characteristics, XpJi = X
p
i . Any individual k connected to i is assumed to know the (condi-
tional) distribution of private characteristics given her own realization, Xpk = x. Thus, agent k
forms her expectation about i’s choice by integrating over all possible realizations of this distribu-
tion (and the type distribution gi). Formally, k’s expectation of i’s decision is
Ψei,k =
∫ ∫
I
(
β0 +X
c′
giβ1 +X
p′
giβ2 +X
g′
g β3 + λ
ng∑
j 6=i
wgijΨ
e
j,i(x
p
i )− gi > 0
)
f
fp,ik (x
p
i |Xpk = x, Z = z) ddxpi
(B.1)
=
∫
F
(
β0 +X
c′
giβ1 +X
p′
giβ2 +X
g′
g β3 + λ
ng∑
j 6=i
wgijΨ
e
j,i(x
p
i )
)
fp,ik (x
p
i |Xpk = x, Z = z) dxpi
(B.2)
where fp,ik (.|Xpk = x, Z = z) denotes the conditional distribution of i’s private characteristics
given k’s realization of private characteristics x and observable information z.1 In principle, each
of the ng group members forms (ng − 1) expectations this way. Yang and Lee (2017) propose
two ways to reduce the dimension of this problem. First, agents can be classified into subgroups
based on publicly observed characteristics. Agents in the same subgroup could be assumed to
face identical distributions of private characteristics. Alternatively, the (conditional) distribution
of private characteristics can be assumed to be exchangeable. Intuitively, this assumption ensures
1 Define xgi = β0+Xc
′
giβ1+X
p′
giβ2+X
g′
g β3+λ
∑ng
j 6=i wgijΨ
e
j,i(x
p
i ). Then, the inner part of equation B.1 simplifies
to ∫
I(xgi − gi ≥ 0)f()d =
∫
I(gi ≤ xgi)f()d =
∫ xig
−∞
f()d = P ( ≤ xgi) = F(xgi)
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that given a public information structure only the realization of k’s private characteristics, not
her identity though, influences her expectation about any i’s decision (Yang and Lee, 2017). As
a consequence, only ng equilibrium expectation functions need to be determined. This study is
particularly interested in the case of independently distributed private characteristics.2 In that case,
the consistency condition for equilibrium expectations in equation B.1 simplifies to the constant
function
Ψei =
∫
F
(
β0 +X
c′
giβ1 +X
p′
giβ2 +X
g′
g β3 + λ
ng∑
j 6=i
wgijΨ
e
j,i(x
p
i )
)
fp,ik (x
p
i |Z = z) dxpi (B.3)
Socially known, private characteristics are defined as every agent i knowing her own private
characteristics and those of her connected peers j. Therefore, the information structure depends on
the social interaction matrix Wg. Moreover, agent i takes into account all information available to
her when forming expectations about her connected peers, while information about non-connected
peers is integrated out as in (ii).3 Consistent equilibrium expectations of agent k about peer i’s
decision are thus given by
Ψei (X
p
Jk
) = ΨeiJk(X
p
k , X
p
i , (X
p
l : l 6= i, n 6= k,Wk,l 6= 0))
=
∫
F
(
β0 +X
c′
giβ1 +X
p′
giβ2 +X
g′
g β3 + λ
ng∑
j 6=i
wgijΨ
e
j,Ji
(Xpi , (X
p
l′ : Wk,l′ 6= 0))
)
fp
(
Xp
l′ : l
′ 6= k, wgil′ 6= 0, wgkl′ = 0|Z = z
)
d(Xp
l′ : l
′ 6= k, wgil′ 6= 0, wgkl′ = 0)
(B.4)
2 The case of independently distributed private characteristics can be solved using the approach proposed by Lee
et al. (2014a). Solving the equilibrium consistency condition in the case of correlated private characteristics requires
approximating integrals of the joint distribution. Refer to Yang and Lee (2017) for a discussion of both discrete and
continuous joint distributions.
3 See Appendix C in Yang and Lee (2017) for an example of both independent and correlated private characteristics.
This study will focus on independent private characteristics.
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B.2 Balancing Tests
Socio-Demographics Table B.1 provides summary statistics and balance tests for the set of
socio-demographic characteristics across the different policies offered. We observe that there are
imbalances in some of the variables considered (such as the share of female clients offfered the
respective policy). As briefly discussed above, such imbalances can arise due to the differing
number of COs sampled from the respective villages per policy. It is reassuring that there are no
imbalances in the variables related the household members’ health status, expenditures or insur-
ance knowledge.4
Discount Checks Discounts are assigned on the household level through a private lottery with
replacement played during the community meeting. Since every household faces the same prob-
ability of drawing a particular discount, we expect a uniform distribution across discount levels.
Table B.2 provides evidence such uniform distributions. It illustrates the relative frequencies of
the discount level for each of the offered policies. Moreover, the table reports the p-value from
Pearson’s Chi-squared test of uniform distributions. The results indicate that we are not able to
reject the null of uniform distributions.
4 The imbalance in the expected cost index measure is per design because policy P2 exhibits a higher coverage, thus
leading higher expected costs for the insurance provider.
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Table B.1 – Summary Statistics by Policy and Balancing Tests
Overall P1 P2 P3 P4 P-val
Socio-Demographics
Dependents (Survey) 3.96 3.69 4.04 4.13 3.92 0.05
(1.756) (1.631) (1.848) (1.800) (1.705)
Dependents (Matched) 3.18 2.95 3.23 3.35 3.17 0.09
(1.696) (1.590) (1.750) (1.763) (1.649)
Group Leader (D) 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.13
(0.381) (0.392) (0.391) (0.376) (0.370)
Client Female (D) 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.19 0.03
(0.328) (0.316) (0.210) (0.336) (0.392)
Client No Education (D) 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.45 0.15
(0.490) (0.486) (0.476) (0.493) (0.498)
Client Age 38.73 38.89 39.24 38.18 38.69 0.74
(11.066) (10.976) (11.301) (10.831) (11.172)
Economic
Wealth Index 0.29 0.38 0.46 0.29 0.06 0.38
(2.514) (2.650) (2.565) (2.418) (2.443)
Income (month) 21846.39 20354.54 25441.86 21623.50 20173.73 0.10
(23435.351) (14528.240) (38570.359) (18021.314) (14860.815)
Savings 15396.26 18837.42 23738.46 12426.29 8496.34 0.04
(84632.817) (93812.261) (141161.883) (35835.945) (25340.921)
Credit 43404.42 42712.61 49230.89 43613.67 38801.73 0.77
(89539.377) (77562.727) (105801.773) (97944.202) (73304.521)
Health & Insurance
Knows Health Insurance (D) 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.29
(0.417) (0.416) (0.443) (0.405) (0.406)
Any Inpatient (D) 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.64
(0.319) (0.309) (0.328) (0.317) (0.322)
Total Inpatient Cost 4461.46 3652.66 6960.60 3400.48 3991.71 0.17
(23875.019) (15655.299) (38920.854) (14081.248) (19392.472)
Total Outpatient Cost 6954.99 8327.31 6756.85 6089.70 6885.63 0.86
(34842.523) (53667.298) (27419.991) (22194.569) (31752.083)
Expected Cost Index (HH) 304.29 281.35 426.56 258.01 262.93 0.00
(306.531) (278.997) (470.120) (185.058) (199.877)
N 1557 338 368 417 434 .
Note: This table provides summary statistics and balance tests of the main baseline characteristics by
treatments arm. The columns contain means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the
respective characteristic. Column 1 provides overall information, while columns (2) to (5) indicate
the respective policy. The last column contains the p-value of a balancing test with the null of equal
mean across the four insurance policies. The test is based on a linear regression of the respective
characteristics on the set of policy indicators and strata fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the village level. Binary variables are indicated with (D). Monetary amounts are in Pakistani
rupees (PKR), where 101 PKR = USD 1.
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Table B.2 – Discount Checks
P1 P2 P3 P4 Overall
0 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.22
10 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.28
20 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.24
30 0.28 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.26
Pearson Chi2 P 0.1518 0.4236 0.7272 0.4238 0.2612
HHs 338 368 417 434 1557
Note: Relative frequencies of discounts given the respective
policy. Pearson Chi2 p provides the p-value from a chi-square
test with H0 of a uniform distribution.
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B.3 Additional Results
Figure B.1 – Insurance Demand - Fraction of Households Insured
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
In
su
ra
n
ce
 U
p
ta
ke
70 80 90 100
Premium (PKR)
Individual (P1)
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
In
su
ra
n
ce
 U
p
ta
ke
120 130 140 150
Premium (PKR)
Individual High (P2)
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
In
su
ra
n
ce
 U
p
ta
ke
70 80 90 100
Premium (PKR)
Household (P3)
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
In
su
ra
n
ce
 U
p
ta
ke
70 80 90 100
Premium (PKR)
Group (P4)
HH Insured (%)
Figure B.2 – Insurance Demand - Number of Dependents Insured
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Table B.3 – Demand and Own Price Elasticity
All IND HH
Premium -0.0043*** -0.0054*** -0.0131***
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0019)
Constant 0.9551*** 1.1550*** 1.6241***
(0.0788) (0.0900) (0.1607)
N 1557 706 851
Note: This table provides parameter estimates from
OLS regression of the dichotomous insurance in-
dicator on the policy premium. For policies P1,
P3 and P4 the coefficient estimate provides an es-
timate of the own price elasticity for the respec-
tive policy since the base premium is PKR100 per
person. For policy P2
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard er-
rors in parentheses.
Figure B.3 – Own Price Elasticities of the Insurance Policies
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This figure provides (mean) own price elasticity estimation of pooled across all policies and by eligibility. The
elasticity estimates are derived as (average) partial effect estimates from OLS regression of a binary indicator of
whether the household is insured on the premium price per person paid.
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Table B.4 provides parameter estimates of equation 2.11 for the benchmark model that does
not account for any social interaction effects (Model 1), and the model that only accounts for
contextual effects. For each model, results from two different optimization algorithms used in the
maximum likelihood estimation are presented. It is apparent that the results are (almost) identical
for both models in terms of point estimates, precision and value of the log-likelihood function
at the optimum. Moreover, as the model does not require the computation endogenously formed
expectations, the gradient based methods - as expected - converge in 2 iterations.
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Table B.4 – Estimation Results - Models 1 and 3
row M1.a M1.b M3.a M3.b
Discount 0.026187 *** 0.026187 *** 0.025520 *** 0.025520 ***
( 0.002551) ( 0.002529) ( 0.002604) ( 0.002576)
Client Age 0.002057 0.002057 0.002172 0.002172
( 0.002589) ( 0.002589) ( 0.002648) ( 0.002648)
client No Education (D) -0.147861 ** -0.147861 ** -0.111982 ** -0.111978 **
( 0.059647) ( 0.059759) ( 0.062776) ( 0.063125)
HH Size -0.045407 *** -0.045407 *** -0.045526 *** -0.045525 ***
( 0.016637) ( 0.016919) ( 0.016753) ( 0.017280)
Wealth Indicator -0.001827 -0.001827 -0.003093 -0.003092
( 0.013246) ( 0.013347) ( 0.014027) ( 0.014197)
HH Income (Log Rs ’000) 0.017875 0.017875 0.007150 0.007150
( 0.048603) ( 0.051261) ( 0.051658) ( 0.054493)
HH Savings (Log Rs ’000) 0.035382 ** 0.035382 ** 0.030537 0.030536
( 0.020876) ( 0.021134) ( 0.023207) ( 0.023530)
Group Leader (D) 0.329395 *** 0.329396 *** 0.416089 *** 0.416080 ***
( 0.072917) ( 0.073769) ( 0.078708) ( 0.080460)
Knows Insurance (D) -0.089529 -0.089529 -0.052575 -0.052575
( 0.069703) ( 0.066923) ( 0.073847) ( 0.070141)
Total Inpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) 0.083083 0.083083 0.073147 0.073145
( 0.079743) ( 0.076619) ( 0.081600) ( 0.078056)
Total Outpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) 0.007216 0.007217 0.014092 0.014092
( 0.023353) ( 0.024541) ( 0.024299) ( 0.025673)
HH Any Inpatient (D) -0.204233 -0.204232 -0.167145 -0.167138
( 0.263742) ( 0.252126) ( 0.271227) ( 0.257651)
HH Exp Cost Index (Log Rs ’000) 0.033487 0.033490 0.110216 0.110214
( 0.176052) ( 0.182172) ( 0.182367) ( 0.189835)
(del) Discount 0.016209 *** 0.016209 ***
( 0.005850) ( 0.005866)
(del) Client Age 0.003017 0.003016
( 0.006237) ( 0.006225)
(del) client No Education (D) -0.161634 -0.161629
( 0.126960) ( 0.126334)
(del) HH Size 0.010225 0.010226
( 0.039427) ( 0.039628)
(del) Wealth Indicator 0.020901 0.020901
( 0.029432) ( 0.029098)
(del) HH Income (Log Rs ’000) -0.030367 -0.030368
( 0.117589) ( 0.116982)
(del) HH Savings (Log Rs ’000) 0.023525 0.023524
( 0.042026) ( 0.041537)
(del) Group Leader (D) 0.886158 *** 0.886150 ***
( 0.300274) ( 0.299603)
(del) Knows Insurance (D) -0.260976 ** -0.260970 **
( 0.140444) ( 0.138398)
(del) Total Inpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) 0.392181 ** 0.392181 **
( 0.202786) ( 0.197423)
(del) Total Outpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) -0.062247 -0.062246
( 0.053203) ( 0.054072)
(del) HH Any Inpatient (D) -1.183825 ** -1.183824 **
( 0.666233) ( 0.643778)
(del) HH Exp Cost Index (Log Rs ’000) -0.467151 -0.467158
( 0.386308) ( 0.389762)
Endogenous
Constant -0.320531 ** -0.320531 ** -0.567072 -0.567057
( 0.170925) ( 0.175823) ( 0.420666) ( 0.428431)
Unobserved
value LogLik -991.8327 -991.8327 -974.0990 -974.0990
Share Mult. Eq. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Iterations 2 2 2 2
Stop Reason 0 0 0 0
Convergence Code 2 0 2 0
Method BHHH BFGS BHHH BFGS
Gradient Analytical Analytical Analytical Analytical
APE
Note: This table provides parameter estimates of the iterative MLE approach. value LogLik is the value of the
log-likelihood. Share Mult. Eq. gives the fraction of groups with multiple equilibria (if any).
Iterations: number of iterations until convergence. Stop Reason = 0: successful convergence of the
iterative approach. Convergence Code of latest MLE iteration. Method: optimization approach (BHHH,BFGS).
Gradients for BHHH and BFGS approaches are provided analytically.
APE: Average partial effect of the endogenous social interaction effects calculated using equation 2.12.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
103
B.3.1 Additional Results by Policy Eligibility
Table B.5 provides parameter estimates of equation 2.11 for the benchmark model that does
not account for any social interaction effects (Model 1), and the model that only accounts for
contextual effects separately for individual and household policies. For each model, results from
two different optimization algorithms used in the maximum likelihood estimation are presented.
It is apparent that the results are (almost) identical for both models in terms of point estimates,
precision and value of the log-likelihood function at the optimum. Moreover, as the model does
not require the computation endogenously formed expectations, the gradient based methods - as
expected - converge in 2 iterations.
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Table B.5 – Heterogeneity by Eligibility - Model 1
row M1.Ind.a M1.Ind.b M3.Ind.a M3.Ind.b M1.HH.a M1.HH.b M3.HH.a M3.HH.b
Discount 0.023890 *** 0.023890 *** 0.024463 *** 0.024463 *** 0.030607 *** 0.030607 *** 0.030812 *** 0.030812 ***
( 0.003856) ( 0.003845) ( 0.004108) ( 0.004027) ( 0.003556) ( 0.003522) ( 0.003751) ( 0.003667)
Client Age 0.003452 0.003452 0.004240 0.004240 -0.000316 -0.000316 -0.001706 -0.001706
( 0.003863) ( 0.003937) ( 0.004098) ( 0.004114) ( 0.003669) ( 0.003588) ( 0.003763) ( 0.003759)
client No Education (D) 0.103577 0.103575 0.107462 0.107462 -0.343181 *** -0.343180 *** -0.262278 *** -0.262276 ***
( 0.089748) ( 0.090404) ( 0.097608) ( 0.096116) ( 0.083281) ( 0.082627) ( 0.089368) ( 0.089171)
HH Size 0.007990 0.007990 0.020330 0.020330 -0.085730 *** -0.085730 *** -0.095426 *** -0.095426 ***
( 0.024618) ( 0.025181) ( 0.025415) ( 0.026088) ( 0.023920) ( 0.024652) ( 0.025041) ( 0.025579)
Wealth Indicator -0.021481 -0.021482 -0.015114 -0.015113 0.015577 0.015577 0.005080 0.005083
( 0.019103) ( 0.019419) ( 0.020749) ( 0.020685) ( 0.019406) ( 0.019170) ( 0.021524) ( 0.021141)
HH Income (Log Rs ’000) 0.075556 0.075559 0.026411 0.026409 -0.029701 -0.029701 0.021879 0.021879
( 0.064983) ( 0.069016) ( 0.071277) ( 0.074177) ( 0.077524) ( 0.078980) ( 0.084550) ( 0.085395)
HH Savings (Log Rs ’000) 0.015329 0.015329 0.007288 0.007288 0.054566 ** 0.054566 ** 0.040153 0.040150
( 0.029426) ( 0.029661) ( 0.033457) ( 0.033558) ( 0.032184) ( 0.031243) ( 0.037695) ( 0.036052)
Group Leader (D) 0.353674 *** 0.353672 *** 0.449989 *** 0.449991 *** 0.272256 *** 0.272256 *** 0.435503 *** 0.435515 ***
( 0.107391) ( 0.107269) ( 0.116681) ( 0.119928) ( 0.103241) ( 0.103998) ( 0.117379) ( 0.117859)
Knows Insurance (D) 0.090572 0.090570 0.102888 0.102889 -0.227284 ** -0.227283 ** -0.154089 -0.154101
( 0.101525) ( 0.099258) ( 0.108907) ( 0.106520) ( 0.100236) ( 0.095473) ( 0.110294) ( 0.102201)
Total Inpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) 0.148585 0.148583 0.131624 0.131628 0.010283 0.010284 -0.023661 -0.023661
( 0.110099) ( 0.114242) ( 0.116830) ( 0.122280) ( 0.118329) ( 0.108996) ( 0.125434) ( 0.113724)
Total Outpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) 0.005659 0.005660 0.018221 0.018221 0.001063 0.001063 0.019244 0.019244
( 0.034885) ( 0.036611) ( 0.037626) ( 0.038673) ( 0.033515) ( 0.034638) ( 0.035358) ( 0.037253)
HH Any Inpatient (D) -0.207525 -0.207519 -0.125634 -0.125653 -0.122501 -0.122504 -0.000659 -0.000659
( 0.368674) ( 0.384426) ( 0.391931) ( 0.413010) ( 0.385768) ( 0.350830) ( 0.409663) ( 0.370310)
HH Exp Cost Index (Log Rs ’000) -0.113995 -0.113991 0.068851 0.068857 0.019651 0.019653 -0.035510 -0.035511
( 0.239360) ( 0.238305) ( 0.243835) ( 0.251305) ( 0.318700) ( 0.331538) ( 0.344926) ( 0.345240)
(del) Discount 0.021367 ** 0.021367 ** 0.017200 ** 0.017201 **
( 0.009421) ( 0.009649) ( 0.008201) ( 0.008097)
(del) Client Age -0.014853 -0.014853 0.010250 0.010251
( 0.010174) ( 0.009861) ( 0.008824) ( 0.009076)
(del) client No Education (D) 0.258893 0.258899 -0.280200 -0.280210
( 0.217378) ( 0.214385) ( 0.177455) ( 0.177230)
(del) HH Size -0.007142 -0.007148 0.080892 0.080890
( 0.062325) ( 0.064921) ( 0.059847) ( 0.058762)
(del) Wealth Indicator -0.006003 -0.006001 0.012828 0.012826
( 0.048192) ( 0.048078) ( 0.042795) ( 0.041312)
(del) HH Income (Log Rs ’000) 0.151689 0.151684 -0.117052 -0.117056
( 0.157114) ( 0.158290) ( 0.206375) ( 0.196972)
(del) HH Savings (Log Rs ’000) -0.091625 -0.091624 0.062651 0.062650
( 0.065490) ( 0.063655) ( 0.063057) ( 0.062098)
(del) Group Leader (D) 0.942475 ** 0.942462 ** 1.320558 *** 1.320575 ***
( 0.452524) ( 0.453759) ( 0.423805) ( 0.442477)
(del) Knows Insurance (D) 0.160176 0.160170 -0.393325 ** -0.393338 **
( 0.214896) ( 0.215864) ( 0.211885) ( 0.204621)
(del) Total Inpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) -0.103446 -0.103428 0.477583 0.477554
( 0.300938) ( 0.304497) ( 0.328903) ( 0.314424)
(del) Total Outpatient Cost (Log Rs ’000) 0.007340 0.007338 -0.123425 -0.123434
( 0.079926) ( 0.085106) ( 0.080674) ( 0.079292)
(del) HH Any Inpatient (D) 1.754527 1.754470 -2.165561 ** -2.165467 **
( 1.134353) ( 1.111124) ( 1.050096) ( 0.981964)
(del) HH Exp Cost Index (Log Rs ’000) -2.181207 *** -2.181216 *** 2.034430 ** 2.034595 **
( 0.573064) ( 0.574972) ( 0.805009) ( 0.795633)
Endogenous
Constant -0.769866 *** -0.769872 *** -0.682518 -0.682463 0.100761 0.100760 -1.042307 -1.042363
( 0.241730) ( 0.253647) ( 0.625728) ( 0.658175) (0.255666) (0.256443) ( 0.675437) ( 0.660516)
Unobserved
value LogLik -450.9305 -450.9305 -430.3994 -430.3994 -519.7075 -519.7075 -496.0593 -496.0593
Share Mult. Eq. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Iterations 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Stop Reason 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Convergence Code 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0
Method BHHH BFGS BHHH BFGS BHHH BFGS BHHH BFGS
Gradient Analytical Analytical Analytical Analytical Analytical Analytical Analytical Analytical
APE
This table provides parameter estimates of the iterative MLE approach. value LogLik is the value of the log-likelihood.
Share Mult. Eq. gives the fraction of groups with multiple equilibria (if any).
Iterations: number of iterations until convergence. Stop Reason = 0: successful convergence of the iterative approach.
Convergence Code of latest MLE iteration. Method: optimization approach (BHHH,BFGS).
Gradients for BHHH and BFGS approaches are provided analytically.
APE: Average partial effect of the endogenous social interaction effects calculated using equation 2.12.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Supplementary Tables and Figures
Table C.1 shows the fractions of individuals and households who bought insurance under the
different insurance policies and different discount levels (D0: no discount, D10: discount of 10
PKR, D20: discount of 20 PKR and D30: discount of 30 PKR). Table C.2 analyzes trends and
non-linearity in insurance demand.
Table C.1 – Insurance Uptake and Enforcement of Eligibility
Individual (P1) Household (P3) Group (P4)
Dependents HH Dependents HH Dependents HH
D0 0.166 0.410 0.182 0.258 0.167 0.265
(0.025) (0.048) (0.031) (0.040) (0.034) (0.043)
D10 0.303 0.651 0.420 0.472 0.269 0.332
(0.026) (0.037) (0.042) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041)
D20 0.341 0.740 0.484 0.510 0.427 0.477
(0.026) (0.032) (0.053) (0.048) (0.046) (0.044)
D30 0.385 0.776 0.708 0.739 0.656 0.683
(0.033) (0.031) (0.048) (0.040) (0.055) (0.050)
N 2981 856 2937 830 3156 877
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of the village.
Table C.4 shows the result of regressing the expected costs index on individual insurance uptake
under the different insurance policies. The first specification implements a simple positive correla-
tion test. It reveals that the difference between insured and non-insured individuals is substantially
larger in the individual (P1) than in the household (P3) and group (P4) insurance schemes. Specifi-
cation (2) tests whether the positive correlation can be explained by selection based on non-health
factors. The idea is that the purchase decision might be influenced by non-health factors which
also correlate with health risk, thus creating a positive correlation without the intention of adverse
selection. Controlling for such confounding factors would therefore lead to a change in the esti-
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Table C.2 – Insurance Uptake and Demand Elasticities
P1 P1 P3 P3 P4 P4
Premium -0.0066*** 0.0320* -0.0164*** -0.0110 -0.0164*** -0.0701**
(0.0013) (0.0173) (0.0017) (0.0337) (0.0020) (0.0276)
Premium2 -0.0002** -0.0000 0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Constant 0.8636*** -0.7413 1.8408*** 1.6162 1.7726*** 4.0090***
(0.1133) (0.7422) (0.1613) (1.4046) (0.1825) (1.1887)
N 2981 2981 2937 2937 3156 3156
Notes: Results are from OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of the village.
mated coefficient compared to the first specification. The results from specification (2) show that
some of the differences between insured and non-insured individuals can indeed be explained by
non-health factors. Nonetheless, most of the correlation remains in policy P1, for which the coeffi-
cient is still highly significant. As a next step, we control for characteristics that are relatively easy
to observe and verify. The idea of this exercise is to test whether an insurance company could in
principle separate risk types when using information that is available and reliable in a low-income
setting under realistic conditions. Specification (3) controls for such (mainly demographic) vari-
ables. Similar to the specification before, the coefficient remains positive and significant for the
individual level policy P1, suggesting that classifying individuals based on observable baseline
characteristics might not solve the adverse selection problem. For illustrative purposes, specifica-
tion (4) uses all control variables – essentially the ones used to create the index. The correlation
disappears as to be expected.
Figure C.1 shows the distribution of costs across demand levels amongst the non-insured. For
the individual policy, there appears to be a downward shift in the cost distribution when the share
of insured becomes larger. Marginal individuals switching the insurance status in response to a
change in price hence seem to be high risk relative to the non-insured but low risk relative to the
insured. This is fully in line with the economic theory on adverse selection discussed in Section
3.2. In contrast, such a pattern for non-insured is not observed under household (P3) and group
(P4) policies.
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Table C.3 – Insurance Demand: Individual vs. Household Policies
Household Level Uptake Individual Level Uptake
Individual
(P1)
Household
(P3)
Group
(P3)
Individual
(P1)
Household
(P3)
Group
(P3)
Household Level
Discount 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.007*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
HH size 0.003 -0.048*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.034*** -0.038***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
Income (in 1000 PKR) -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Saving (in 1000 PKR) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Asset Index -0.005 0.018* 0.003 0.004 0.014 0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008)
Head Female 0.012 -0.133*** -0.098 -0.020 -0.123** -0.096*
(0.042) (0.047) (0.060) (0.033) (0.049) (0.055)
No Education -0.060 -0.047 -0.061 -0.043* 0.004 -0.049
(0.051) (0.044) (0.043) (0.024) (0.034) (0.033)
High Education -0.042 -0.095* -0.029 -0.052* -0.022 0.004
(0.050) (0.052) (0.057) (0.029) (0.028) (0.039)
Any Inpatient 0.085* -0.022 -0.093* -0.012 -0.042 -0.082
(0.045) (0.054) (0.051) (0.030) (0.058) (0.054)
Dependent Level
Female -0.109*** -0.025 -0.004
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
Age (0-4) 0.125*** 0.071 0.084
(0.036) (0.049) (0.052)
Age (5-9) 0.067* 0.049 0.056
(0.038) (0.045) (0.045)
Age (10-14) 0.057 -0.006 0.070
(0.036) (0.040) (0.043)
Age (15-19) 0.061** -0.005 -0.003
(0.030) (0.033) (0.031)
Age (20-29)
Age (30-49) 0.038 -0.045 0.037
(0.042) (0.047) (0.039)
Age (50-59) 0.061 0.115* 0.100*
(0.070) (0.068) (0.054)
Age (60-69) 0.044 -0.019 0.066
(0.057) (0.060) (0.064)
Age (70+) 0.112 0.035 0.168*
(0.082) (0.074) (0.092)
Low Health 0.183** 0.009 0.013
(0.083) (0.099) (0.089)
Medium Health 0.084** -0.003 -0.006
(0.040) (0.038) (0.043)
Inpatient Treatment 0.153*** -0.038 -0.078
(0.056) (0.090) (0.052)
Outpatient Treatment 0.066** 0.051 0.003
(0.032) (0.034) (0.034)
First Son 0.058** 0.017 0.015
(0.027) (0.020) (0.020)
First Daughter 0.027 -0.023 0.034
(0.029) (0.021) (0.023)
Working -0.066** -0.029 0.002
(0.032) (0.028) (0.027)
Constant 0.473*** 0.530*** 0.476*** 0.421*** 0.404*** 0.313***
(0.058) (0.060) (0.062) (0.050) (0.070) (0.072)
N 856 830 877 2981 2937 3156
R2 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.19
Notes: Point estimates result from OLS regression with standard errors clustered at the village level.
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Table C.4 – Correlation between Insurance Demand and Expected Costs Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls none
non-health
covariates^
observable
by insurer∼ all
P1 (N=2981) 29.927*** 19.841*** 19.431*** 2.318
(6.722) (5.582) (5.782) (3.121)
P3 (N=2937) 9.307** 0.291 1.057 -0.323
(3.854) (3.102) (3.181) (1.470)
P4 (N=3156) 7.264 -2.805 -3.197 0.107
(4.793) (3.364) (3.347) (1.624)
Notes: Result from OLS regression of the expected costs index on individual insurance uptake with standard
errors clustered at the village level. Covariates are: HH size, client gender, client education level dummy, age
category dummies, HH income, HH savings, HH asset index, individual work status, individual health status,
inpatient and outpatient treatment experience and related costs.
^ All variables except: individual health status, inpatient and outpatient treatment experience and related costs.
∼ HH size, client gender, client education level dummy, age category dummies.
Figure C.1 – Change in Risk Distribution across Discounts, Non-Insured
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Notes: This figure illustrates shifts in the expected cost distribution by discount level and policy regime. The box
depicts the interquartile range (IQR). The middle line indicates the median. The upper (lower) adjacent line depicts
the 90% (10%) quantile, respectively. The diamond indicates the mean.
Table C.5(a) shows the result of testing for a trend in the mean cost index of insured individuals
by policy. Findings lack precision, in particular when there are fewer observations in the insurance
pool, but the downward slope of the average cost curve tends to be stronger in the individual
policy (P1) than in the household and group policies (P3, P4). Table C.5(b) tests the relationship
between the cost index and the share insured for the noninsured. The estimated slope is negative
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for individual policies (significant for P1), which is in line with adverse selection theory, and
insignificantly positive for household and group policies (P3, P4).
Table C.5 – Trend in Expected Costs
(a) Insured
P1 P3 P4
Uptake (%) −186.817* −47.110*** −20.854
(100.028) (16.653) (13.326)
Constant 158.372*** 102.984*** 84.670***
(34.875) (10.534) (7.376)
N 922 1350 1211
(b) Non-Insured
P1 P3 P4
Uptake (%) −56.068 15.623 10.941
(34.851) (13.745) (17.763)
Constant 84.027*** 62.314*** 64.043***
(10.762) (5.567) (5.761)
N 2059 1587 1945
Notes: Point estimates result from OLS regression of expected
cost index on average demand for relevant policy at respective
discount, standard errors clustered at the village level.
Table C.6 – Slope of the Demand Curve, restricted
Individual (P1) Household (P3) Household (P4)
Premium −0.008*** −0.016*** −0.016***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 1.000 1.841*** 1.773***
(.) (0.161) (0.182)
N 2981 2937 3156
Notes: The slope of the demand curve is estimated from a linear re-
gression of an individual take-up indicator on the premium, and a
restriction of a constant larger or equal than 1 is imposed. Standard
errors are not reported if the restriction is binding (only the case for
P1). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Table C.7 – Slope of the Average Cost Curve, restricted
Individual (P1) Household (P3) Household (P4)
Demand −32.146*** −14.841** −9.617
(9.924) (7.088) (6.955)
Constant 108.560*** 87.621*** 80.081***
(9.924) (7.088) (6.955)
N 922 1350 1211
Notes: The slope of the average cost curve is estimated from a linear
regression of the individual level expected cost index on average take-
up at the corresponding premium level. The estimation is restricted
to pass through the average cost index for the respective policy at a
demand level of 1. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Figure C.2 – Market Equilibrium and Efficient Allocation (Quadratic Cost Curve), by policy
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Notes: The figure plots the demand, average and marginal cost curves for the respective policies. Average demand
for the corresponding premium is given by the dots in light gray. The slope of the demand curve is estimated from a
linear regression of an individual take-up indicator on the premium for which a restriction of a constant larger or
equal to 1 is imposed. Average costs of the insured for the corresponding demand are given by the dots in black. The
slope of the average cost curve is estimated from a quadratic regression of the individual level expected cost index on
average take-up at the corresponding premium level. The estimation is restricted to pass through the average cost
index for the respective policy at a demand level of 1.
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C.2 Randomization Procedure
Sampling from incoming credit applications implies that we do not know the set of villages
with incoming credit applications ex-ante. Instead, we start with a census of all villages in which
our implementation partner operates. To achieve a balanced treatment allocation we employ a
permuted block randomization procedure for dynamic treatment assignment. This procedure is
used frequently in medical studies facing similar problems of patients stochastically entering the
trial (McEntegart, 2003). In addition, we stratify the treatment assignment across a set of ex-ante
village characteristics to improve balance between treatments along a set of important character-
istics.
Specifically, we condition the randomization on the rural/urban status (4 categories), the his-
torical origin of the village (2 categories) as well as the distance to the next hospital under NRSP’s
panel (3 categories). This leaves us with a categorization of villages into 24 strata. The treatment
assignment proceeds as follows: In a first step, we generate a set of randomly permuted blocks of
the six main treatment indicators for each of the 24 strata. In a second step, we produce a unique
order in which the villages have entered the experiment. For this purpose, we rely on the timing
of loan applications entered in the management information system (MIS). Using the list from
step two, we create strata specific lists of villages that are ordered according to the date and time
they entered the MIS. In a final step, each village on this strata-specific list is matched with the
corresponding treatment from the strata-specific permuted block of treatments.
This procedure guarantees a balanced distribution of treatments in each cluster, in particular
when there are sufficient villages per strata entering the experiment to cover full blocks. The
reason is that within a full block, there is one village assigned to each treatment and no imbalance
can occur. Hence, the more full blocks are covered, the fewer imbalances can remain. Figure C.3
shows the total number of villages in the district where the RCT takes place by strata as well as
the number of villages finally entering the experiment. In only three out of 24 strata there are less
than six villages to create at least one full block.
Figure C.4 also shows the geographical distribution of treatments. The different treatment arms
appear to be well balanced across the whole district suggesting that the randomization procedure
worked as expected.
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Figure C.3 – Distribution of Clusters across Strata
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Notes: The figures illustrates the distribution of treatment clusters across strata. The 24 strata are generated from
ex-ante village level information on location (distance to closest panel hospital, 3 categories), historical origin (chak
vs. no chak, 2 categories) and rural/urban status (percentage of agricultural loans, 4 categories).
Figure C.4 – Treatment Allocation in Sargodha District
Notes: The figure illustrates the distribution of treatments across Sargodha district. The dots capture the center of the
respective village. The legend gives the corresponding treatment. The average minimum distance between the
villages is about 4 km and the average distance about 50 km.
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C.3 Balancing Tests
In the following we present balancing tests that assess whether our randomization indeed re-
sults in a similar distribution of covariates across treatment arms. The balancing tables have the
following structure: The first column shows the overall means (standard deviations are in brack-
ets). Subsequent columns provide means and standard deviations for each treatment arm sepa-
rately. The final column contains the p-value from a joint test for model significance from the
following estimation equation:
Xiv = α + β2I{Tiv=P2} + β3I{Tiv=P3} + β4I{Tiv=P4} + dsSv + εiv, (C1)
where Xiv is the respective covariate, I{Tiv=Pk} , k=2,3,4 are indicators for the respective treat-
ments P2, P3 and P4 (P1 is the omitted category) and Sv with v ∈ {1, ..., 24} represents strata
dummies.1 The error term εiv is clustered at the village level. The test for joint significance of
β2, β3 and β4 , is thus equivalent to a test for equal means in the treatment arms P1 to P4.
Table C.8 (a) provides summary statistics and balance tests for sociodemographic, economic
and health indicators on the household and individual level from the baseline survey. Comparing
the means of sociodemographic indicators across treatment groups (first panel), we observe no
significant differences. This is confirmed by the relatively high p-values of the joint test for model
significance. Also the economic indicators (second panel), household level health indicators (third
panel) and individual level health indicators (fourth panel) show no statistically significant differ-
ences across treatment groups. Table C.8(b) provides summary statistics and balance tests for the
bi-monthly phone survey data. Overall consent to the phone survey is above 90% and balanced
across the different treatments.2 About 2% of dependents report an inpatient event, leading to 15%
of households having some dependent admitted. These numbers are similar to the health seeking
behavior at baseline. Again, all variables appear to be balanced across treatment arms. Balancing
also holds when including the two control groups of villages where no additional insurance was
available in the comparison.
In a next step, we provide evidence for a balanced distribution of discount vouchers. Ran-
dom assignment through household level lotteries with replacement implies an expected uniform
probability distribution of discounts. Table C.9 illustrates the frequencies of the four discount
levels across insurance policy as well as overall. In addition, we test the null-hypothesis of the
expected uniform distribution by Pearson’s Chi-square test, the p-value of which is reported in
the second to last row. Overall, our test does not reject the null hypothesis of a uniform dis-
tribution, even though the share of zero discounts is lower than 25%. This holds true also for
policy P1 for which we observe a stronger deviation from the expected uniform distribution.
1 Note that strata fixed effects are included only in the balance tests for the main treatments P1 to P4. Discounts are
randomized on the level of the household and thus not stratified. 2 We conduct a separate attrition analysis, but do
not find any systematic differences in drop-out across the treatments.
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Table C.8 – Balance Tests across Insurance Policy Treatments
(a)Baseline Survey
Overall P1 P2 P3 P4 P-val
Socio-Demographics - HH
HH Size (Survey) 5.99 5.95 5.95 6.03 6.03 0.57
(2.117) (2.093) (2.072) (2.054) (2.237)
HH Size (Matched) 5.37 5.26 5.43 5.37 5.42 0.37
(1.912) (1.872) (1.956) (1.822) (1.986)
Dependents (Matched) 3.59 3.48 3.62 3.59 3.65 0.44
(1.869) (1.834) (1.876) (1.791) (1.961)
Age of Client 38.62 38.85 38.57 38.24 38.82 0.69
(10.887) (10.918) (10.934) (10.741) (10.955)
Client Female (D) 0.53 0.57 0.51 0.50 0.54 0.33
(0.499) (0.495) (0.500) (0.500) (0.499)
Client No Education (D) 0.55 0.56 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.37
(0.498) (0.496) (0.500) (0.498) (0.497)
Economic - HH
Income (month) 22691.3 21634.4 24515.1 22627.0 21953.0 0.28
(24695) (20018) (34658) (20225) (20379)
Asset Index 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.07 -0.09 0.37
(2.422) (2.433) (2.539) (2.319) (2.387)
Savings 12085.1 13548.5 13092.2 10147.2 11606.5 0.64
(67986) (71670) (85948) (31357) (70158)
Credit 30438.7 27602.8 33056.8 30112.4 30803.1 0.35
(71910) (54074) (79531) (78197) (72204)
Health & Insurance - HH
Any Inpatient (D) 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.51
(0.327) (0.316) (0.338) (0.325) (0.328)
Knows Health Insurance (D) 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.62
(0.385) (0.397) (0.390) (0.383) (0.369)
Health - Dependents
Health Step (1-5) 4.76 4.75 4.76 4.75 4.77 0.97
(0.631) (0.631) (0.644) (0.648) (0.602)
Outpatient Experience (D) 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.96
(0.351) (0.349) (0.355) (0.353) (0.346)
Inpatient Experience (D) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.60
(0.126) (0.124) (0.135) (0.121) (0.124)
Outpatient Cost 609.99 302.63 706.62 491.23 895.49 0.00
(7920.4) (2198.5) (9268.9) (5763.7) (10873.5)
Inpatient Cost 506.36 404.38 747.68 429.66 434.93 0.39
(7520.9) (5261.3) (11433.7) (6260.5) (5164.3)
N (Dependents) 15361 3560 3920 3796 4085
N (HHs) 4283 1022 1083 1058 1120
(Continued on next page)
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(Table C.8, continued)
(b)Phone Survey
Overall P1 P2 P3 P4 P-val
Consent 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.82
(0.259) (0.269) (0.254) (0.261) (0.253)
Health - HH
Any Inpatient (D) 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.46
(0.351) (0.353) (0.334) (0.360) (0.355)
Any Outpatient (D) 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.85
(0.476) (0.475) (0.473) (0.480) (0.478)
Health - Dependents
Inpatient Experience (D) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.96
(0.124) (0.130) (0.121) (0.120) (0.124)
Outpatient Experience (D) 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.88
(0.348) (0.348) (0.349) (0.350) (0.344)
Inpatient Cost 371.59 438.46 452.54 371.85 237.36 0.12
(5537.914) (5116.372) (8022.091) (4937.016) (2872.399)
Outpatient Cost 702.79 569.42 769.31 638.28 812.38 0.07
(5415.117) (3154.431) (5475.952) (5350.682) (6772.168)
N (Dependents) 14246 3275 3641 3496 3834
N (HHs) 2256 504 583 600 569
Notes: The table provides means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the respective variables. Column
1 provides overall measures, while other columns indicate the respective policy. The last column contains
the p-value from a joint test for model significance of equation (C1). Standard errors are clustered at the
village level. Binary variables are indicated with (D).
Table C.9 – Balance Check: Discount Allocation
P1 P2 P3 P4 Overall
0 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22
10 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.27
20 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.27
30 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.25
Pearson Chi2 P 0.2268 0.4632 0.5998 0.2290 0.2144
HHs 856 870 830 876 3432
Notes: Relative frequencies of discounts given the respective policy. Pearson Chi2 p provides the p-value from a
chi-square test with H0 of a uniform distribution. The difference in number of observations to the main balance
checks is explained by the fact that only households attending the community meeting received a discount.
To investigate potential systematic imbalances, we provide additional tests in Table C.10. The
idea is to investigate whether specific household characteristics, potentially related to health indi-
cators and thus insurance demand, cause a jump in the probability of receiving a specific discount
voucher. We replace the main treatment indicators in equation (C1) with discount level indicators,
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where the zero discount group serves as the reference group. We test for discontinuous jumps in
the probability of receiving a specific discount by conducting a joint test for model significance.
The corresponding p-value is provided in the final column. We observe that there is no statistically
significant difference across discount levels for any of the health indicators. Similarly, there are no
systematic differences in economic indicators. In terms of sociodemographic variables, it seems
that there are statistically significant differences in the age and sex composition across discount
levels. A clear, systematic pattern such as older individuals or females receiving higher discounts,
however, is not visible. For this reason, we are confident that the randomization of discounts
through household lotteries in the field is not subject to systematic imbalances.
Table C.10 – Balance Checks (Discounts)
Overall D=0 D=10 D=20 D=30 P-val
Socio-Demographics
HH Size 5.99 5.98 5.96 6.01 6.01 0.94
(2.103) (2.028) (2.048) (2.238) (2.080)
Age of Client 38.72 38.33 39.52 39.02 37.86 0.01
(10.959) (10.916) (11.215) (11.186) (10.397)
Client Female (D) 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.57 0.54 0.03
(0.499) (0.500) (0.500) (0.496) (0.499)
Client No Education 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.52 0.16
(0.498) (0.499) (0.498) (0.495) (0.500)
Economic
Avg. Inc. (month) 22727.4 22963.6 21588.0 24125.4 22264.7 0.12
(25553) (30840) (16445) (28186) (25640)
Land (acres) 1.41 1.29 1.48 1.42 1.45 0.66
(3.264) (2.921) (3.288) (3.123) (3.649)
Savings 12343.9 9757.7 14193.1 12840.7 12043.2 0.40
(73131) (33068) (85167) (90299) (62996)
Credit 30861.7 30574.9 32890.4 30272.8 29535.9 0.72
(70148) (80249) (65293) (73655) (61565)
Health & Insurance (HH)
Any Inpatient (D) 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.55
(0.327) (0.338) (0.335) (0.314) (0.325)
Total Inpatient Cost 4379.7 4895.1 4972.6 3658.7 4060.6 0.55
(22282) (24975) (26317) (19502) (17260)
Knows Health Ins. (D) 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.07
(0.386) (0.382) (0.408) (0.379) (0.371)
N (Dependents) 12283 2643 3283 3236 3121
N (HHs) 3432 739 927 913 853
Notes: The table provides means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the respective variables. Column
1 provides overall measures, while other columns indicate the respective policy. The last column contains the
p-value from a joint test for model significance of equation (C1). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Binary variables are indicated with (D).
Table C.11 provides analogous balance tests for the group meeting attendance. We observe
that there are no statistically significant differences in observables between meeting attendants and
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non-attendants. The observed similarity supports external validity of our results for the population
of credit clients in Sargodha district.
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Table C.11 – Balance Checks (Meeting Attendance)
Overall Not Attending Attending P-val
Health-Dependent
Expected Reimbursement Cost (PKR)^ 82.73 82.59 82.77 0.95
(134.352) (138.970) (133.176)
Subjective Health Status (1-5) 4.76 4.77 4.76 0.41
(0.631) (0.625) (0.633)
Oupatient Treatment (D) 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.69
(0.351) (0.348) (0.351)
Inpatient Treatment (D) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.88
(0.126) (0.125) (0.127)
Outpatient Cost (PKR) 610.0 417.1 658.3 0.06
(7920) (5190) (8467)
Inpatient Cost (PKR) 506.4 525.3 501.6 0.85
(7521) (6632) (7728)
Socio-Demographics - HH
HH Size (Survey) 5.99 5.99 5.99 0.97
(2.117) (2.170) (2.104)
Age of Client 38.62 38.23 38.72 0.23
(10.887) (10.596) (10.958)
Client Female (D) 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.74
(0.499) (0.500) (0.499)
Client No Education (D) 0.55 0.56 0.54 0.34
(0.498) (0.497) (0.498)
Economic - HH
Avg. Monthly Earning (PKR) 22691.3 22560.7 22723.7 0.86
(24695) (20900) (25550)
Asset Index 0.06 -0.05 0.09 0.13
(2.422) (2.419) (2.423)
Savings (PKR) 12085.1 11054.3 12340.3 0.48
(67986) (41200) (73121)
Total Credit 30438.7 28731.2 30861.5 0.41
(71910) (78684) (70138)
Health & Insurance - HH
Any Inpatient (D) 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.87
(0.327) (0.325) (0.327)
Inpatient Cost (HH) 4445.9 4718.2 4378.5 0.76
(24475) (31854) (22279)
Knows Insurance (D) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.73
(0.385) (0.381) (0.386)
N (Dependents) 15361 3078 12283
N (HHs) 4283 850 3433
Notes: The table provides means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the respective variables. Column 1
provides overall measures, while other columns indicate the attendance of the respective household in the group
meeting. The last column contains the p-value from a joint test for model significance similar to equation (C1),
excluding strata fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Binary variables are indicated
with (D). Monetary variables are in Pakistani Rupees (PKR).
^ In line with the other balancing tables, we include all treatment arms in the test – including the individual high
insurance (P2), which features higher expected costs. The mean of the costs index is therefore somewhat higher
than in the standard coverage treatments only (P1, P3, P4).
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C.4 Construction of the Health Risk Index
The insurer’s average cost curve constitutes the central element for testing adverse selection
in this study. A straightforward estimate of the average cost curve would aggregate the insurer’s
reimbursed claims for a given insurance product and price level.3 Since hospitalization is a rare
event, we are – despite the relatively large sample size – not able to estimate the average cost
curve based on these reimbursed claims directly. Instead, we use detailed baseline health and
demographic information (Xi0) to predict the insurance provider’s reimbursement costs for each
individual i (Ci1). Time is indicated with 0 at baseline and with 1 at the end of the insurance period.
We are interested in obtaining a good estimate of the conditional expectation of the provider’s
reimbursement cost at the end of the insurance period, i.e. Eˆ[Ci1|Xi0].
Again, a direct approach would employ observed reimbursement cost to estimate their relation
to baseline characteristics. However, claims are too rare in our data to obtain a good estimate
(only 39 claim cases are reported). Part of this is because claims can only be made by insured in-
dividuals, which excludes the non-insured part of our sample from such an analysis. Furthermore,
not all hospitalization cases lead to a claim.4 We therefore make use of detailed information on
inpatient health events and costs incurred, gathered in our bi-monthly phone survey during the one
year product cycle. Hospitalization events in the phone survey are reported for 334 of the 21,470
dependents in the phone survey sample. Based on the aggregated inpatient expenditures during
the insurance period, we calculate the maximum amount for each individual that could potentially
be reimbursed under the insurance policy (C¯i1). Subsequently, Eˆ[C¯i1|Xi0] can be predicted using
an adequate regression. We furthermore account for the fact that not all of these costs are claimed
by adjusting the final expected cost index (ECIi1) as follows:
ECIi1 = Eˆ[C¯i1|Xi0]×
∑
P
∑
i∈InsuredCiP1∑
P
∑
i∈Insured Eˆ[C¯i1|Xi0]
(D1)
This means the prediction is made based on all potentially claimable costs, which maximizes
statistical power. At the same time, the index is scaled by the ratio between actual claim amounts
relative to the maximal claimable amount according to the policy (PKR 15,000 for P1, P3, and
P4).
We estimate Eˆ[C¯i1|Xi0] using a Tobit model, controlling for a broad range of baseline house-
hold and individual level characteristics.5 The household level variables account for the economic
3 As described in section 3.3.2 of the main text, there are four different insurance products and four different price
levels.
4 To gain insights into this phenomenon we conducted in-depth interviews with some households that were insured,
reported a hospitalization event and yet did not claim reimbursement of their expenses. These interviews have been
conducted after the end of the insurance period to not interfere with the research study. The reported reasons for
this behavior are manifold. While some incidences can be explained with unawareness about the claim procedure
or frustration about the process, other cases are related to missing trust, preference for alternative (more expensive)
coping strategies and recall problems about having bought the insurance product.
5 A Tobit model is a natural choice, as maximum claimable amounts cannot be lower than zero and are restricted to
PKR 15,000 in policies P1, P3 and P4.
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situation, the household size and client characteristics. The individual level characteristics in-
clude demographic information such as age, gender and whether the individual is contributing
to the household income as well as detailed health information. The latter includes individual’s
subjective health status, inpatient and outpatient health history, associated costs, type of health
events experienced and subjective magnitude of the shocks experienced. Table C.12 reports the
estimated coefficients in the Tobit regression for eligible dependents. The estimated coefficients
suggest that dependents in lower age groups cause lower reimbursable claims as compared to the
reference group of 30 to 49 year olds. Further, better subjective health and better self-reported
health history result in lower reimbursable costs.
Column 2 of Table C.12 reports the results of an identical estimation that only considers the
eligible dependents in the control groups. The idea of this additional regression is to assess the ro-
bustness of our results to the existence of moral hazard. As described in Section 3.3.2 the control
groups are not offered any additional insurance and hospitalization expenditure for dependents in
this group hence should not be affected. Thus, comparing the coefficient estimates in column 1
and 2, shows whether moral hazard changes the mapping from baseline characteristics to hospital-
ization expenditures. The resulting coefficient estimates are mostly similar to the ones in reported
in column 1 in terms of sign and magnitude. Based on a Hausman specification test we cannot re-
ject that both models are equivalent (p-value: 0.57). This is consistent with the fact that there is no
significant treatment effect of the insurance treatments on inpatient expenditures (see Table C.14).
The choice between including all observations and using the control groups only hence does not
make a large difference. To maximize precision of our estimates, we include all observations (i.e.
specification 1).
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Table C.12 – Predicting Inpatient Expenditure using Baseline Characteristics
All T Controls Only
Household Level Info
HH Size -2117.81*** -2157.93*
(616.24) (1157.82)
Income (in 1000 PKR) 56.33 -0.41
(43.62) (50.86)
Saving (in 1000 PKR) 15.27 20.89
(10.48) (22.90)
Asset Index 178.60 -565.30
(519.33) (748.02)
Client Female -2693.87 -3971.38
(2501.32) (3516.04)
Client has no education -225.60 -1862.40
(2464.48) (3787.29)
Individual Level Info
Age (0-4) -11284.12** -2515.22
(5128.38) (7817.78)
Age (5-9) -23400.18*** -16939.28**
(5535.32) (8145.62)
Age (10-14) -25454.44*** -17694.00**
(5849.77) (8555.38)
Age (15-19) -12717.43*** -8448.89
(4826.51) (7032.81)
Age (20-29) -8764.89* -9052.73
(5133.15) (7650.28)
Age (50-59) 1512.15 -539.27
(6570.36) (10119.70)
Age (60-69) -5043.40 -5590.26
(6590.69) (9704.61)
Age (70+) -4342.60 -478.83
(7169.47) (10114.03)
Working -14635.29*** -16080.74**
(4194.80) (6587.80)
Female 266.71 -1961.23
(2447.19) (3387.72)
Subjective Health Status (1-5) -6667.32*** -7474.08***
(1659.26) (2535.78)
Outpatient Treatment 8348.97* 90.09
(4355.64) (6834.38)
Inpatient Cost (PKR) 0.06 0.02
(0.07) (0.07)
Outpatient Cost (PKR) 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.01)
Chronic Inpatient Disease 31643.95*** 12698.73
(9441.58) (12701.57)
# Inpatient Cases 2157.61*** 7044.08*
(826.55) (4194.29)
# Neglected Inpatient Care -1061.03 -967.46
(2798.62) (3883.62)
Drop in Subj. Health (Inpatient) -5246.08** -3710.95
(2505.71) (4309.28)
Drop in Subj. Health (Outpatient) 339.89 -1550.96
(1624.50) (2371.66)
Constant -48526.07*** -30326.65*
(10454.33) (15573.63)
sigma 49197.76*** 42658.61***
(3485.41) (4775.13)
N 21473 7227
F-Value 6.30 4.60
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: The table provides results from a Tobit model that explains the maximal claimable costs as a function of
household and individual level variables. Standard error in parentheses are clustered at the village level. Monetary
amounts are in Pakistani rupees (PKR), where 101 PKR ≈ USD 1.
We predict expected claimable inpatient expenditures Eˆ[C¯i1|Xi0] for each individual using
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specification 1 of Table C.12 above. Consistent with Equation (D1), we then apply a scaling
factor of 0.4588 to predict the expected cost index ECIi1 for each individual under the respective
policy.6
Figure C.5 illustrates the distribution of the expected insurer costs across policies P1, P3, and
P4. The mean and median of the respective distribution are shown as a grey solid and a black
dashed line respectively. The figure reveals that the cost distribution is right-skewed in a similar
way for all policies. A test for equality of their means cannot be rejected (p-value: 0.1369).
Figure C.5 – Histogram of the Expected Cost Index, by Policy
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Notes: The figures shows histograms of the provider’s expected reimbursement costs across the four policies. The
mean and median are illustrated through the solid and dashed line respectively. The predicted reimbursement costs
are measured in Pakistani rupees (PKR), where 101 PKR ≈ USD 1.
Figure C.6 shows the balancing of the cost index across policies and prices. The box plots
illustrate the interquartile rage (IQR), as well as the 10th and the 90th percentile of the distribution.
The distributions appear to be relatively balanced across prices in all policies.
Table C.13 summarizes and compares hospitalization costs up to the theoretical coverage limit
(“Claimable Inpatient Costs”), number of claims reimbursed and average payouts under the dif-
ferent insurance policies. Reimbursed claims are based on all observations in the insurance data
set. Claimable costs are based on the self-reported information from the bi-monthly phone survey
and restricted to the observations that can be matched with insurance data (the dataset used in the
paper). Matched and non-matched observations from the survey data are not significantly differ-
ent, though. Besides illustrating the ratio between insurance payouts and potentially claimable
amounts (0.3885), the table reveals that there are indeed strong differences in paid claims between
6 The scaling factor is based on hospitalization expenditure and claim data during the insurance period which are
summarized in Table C.13.
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products. The payout frequency tends to be higher in individual policies (P1, P2) than in house-
holds or group policies (P3, P4) and despite the limited number of cases, several comparisons
via two-sample proportion tests are significant: P1 vs. P4 (p-value: 0.0782), P2 vs. P3 (p-value:
0.0216) , P2 vs. P4 (p-value: 0.0133) and P1+P2 vs. P3+P4 (p-value: 0.0054). Comparisons
between P1 vs. P2 and P3 vs. P4 are all insignificant.
Figure C.6 – Distribution of Risk across Discounts and Policy Regimes
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Notes: This figure illustrates the distribution of the expected cost index by discount level and policy regime. The box
plot illustrates the interquartile range (IQR), with the median indicated by the line separating the box. The lower
(upper) adjacent line shows the 90th (10th) percentile, respectively. The diamond indicates the value of the mean.
Table C.13 – Summary Statistics of Inpatient Expenditure and Claim Behavior
N
Insured
N
Insured
(Matched)
Mean
Claimable
Inpatient Costs^
Mean Predicted
Claimable
Inpatient Costs^
N
Claims
(Total)∼
Mean
Amount
Claimed ∼
P1 1054 921 349.59 212.11 12 114.18
P2 663 615 450.90 316.72 11 202.36
P3 1505 1350 166.80 169.62 9 59.21
P4 1344 1212 122.69 163.10 7 55.04
Total 4566 4098 235.55 199.36 39 91.46
Notes: Monetary amounts are in Pakistani rupees (PKR), where 101 PKR ≈ USD 1. ‘Insured’ are all individuals
appearing the insurance management information system, ‘Insured (Matched)’ are those Insured that can be
matched with our survey data. ^ Based on ‘Insured (Matched)’, ∼ based on ‘Insured’.
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Table C.14 – Treatment Effect of Insurance Policies on Reported Inpatient Cost
Inpatient Cost (PKR)
P1 158.3321*
(92.7487)
P3 109.9905
(106.1380)
P4 −44.5723
(62.1140)
Strata FE yes
N 17832
R2 0.0014
Wald 1.6900
p(Wald) 0.1685
Notes: Reported inpatient costs are in Pakistani rupees (PKR), where
101 PKR ≈ USD 1. The control group serves as the reference group.
The OLS regression includes strata fixed effects and standard errors
are clustered at the village level. The Wald test statistic is from a joint
test of significance of the main treatment indicators. The estimation
sample contains eligible dependents of all policies, excluding policy
P2, for which there exists information from the follow-up phone sur-
vey.
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